

A REVIEW

OF THE REV. DR. JUNKIN'S SYNODICAL SPEECH,

IN DEFENCE OF AMERICAN SLAVERY:

Delivered September 19th and 20th, and Published December 1843:

WITH AN OUTLINE OF

THE BIBLE ARGUMENT AGAINST SLAVERY.

By Rev Thomas E. Thomas

Pastor 1st Presbyterian Ch Hamilton O

"Out upon such folly! The man who cannot see that involuntary domestic slavery, as it exists among us, is founded upon the principle of taking by force that which is another's, has simply no moral sense."

ROBERT J. BRECKINRIDGE.

"It is a debt we owe to the purity of our religion, to show that it is at variance with the law that warrants slavery."

PATRICK HENRY.

* O execrable son! so to aspire
Above his brethren, to himself assuming
Authority usurped, from God not given:
He gave us, only over beast, fish, fowl,
Dominion absolute; that right we hold
By his donation; but man over men
He made not lord; such title to himself
Reserving, human left from human tree. MILTON.

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A REVIEW.

"The Integrity of our National Union vs. Abolitionism: An Argument from the Bible in proof of the position that believing masters ought to be honored and obeyed by their own servants, and tolerated in, not excommunicated from the Church of God: being part of a speech delivered before the Synod of Cincinnati on the subject of Slavery, September 19th and 20th, 1843, by Rev. Geo. Junkin, D. D., President of Miami University."

We have just received, through the politeness of the printer, a pamphlet of some 80 pages, bearing the above title. Abolitionists have frequently been compelled to exclaim, in the language of Job, "O that one would hear me! * * * and that mine adversary had written a book!" Accustomed to meet in deliberative, legislative, and we are sorry to add, in ecclesiastical bodies, no other opponent than a silent but overwhelming vote; and to find all opportunity of advocating the truth cut off by the paltry trick of raising the question of reception, or the man-trap of the Previous Question, they cannot but hail it as an omen of good, and rejoice as in a sure presage of final success, when the defenders of slavery are compelled to meet them in debate; and especially, when they are willing to stamp their thoughts on the enduring page. Certainly we rejoiced, (though our joy was mingled with regret for the mischief it would occasion,) when first we heard that the notorious synodical speech of the President of Miami University, was in the hands of the printer. We regard its publication as an important step toward the thorough and universal investigation of the slavery question, in the Presbyterian Church. Truth loses nothing by free inquiry. The ultimate result of discussion on this subject, the friends of freedom cannot fear. We shall endeavor to pre-

sent to the christian public a complete dissection of the pamphlet before us. Of the soundness or unsoundness of our *subject*, that public must decide.

And first, a single remark in reference to the individuals to whom Dr. Junkin's pamphlet is dedicated;—the Rev. Dr. J. L. Wilson, Rev. J. C. Barnes, Gen. Robert B. Milkin, and C. K. Smith, Esq. That the venerable and esteemed fathers in the ministry, first named, should feel deeply interested in a Bible argument in defence of slaveholders, and that they should request the publication of a synodical speech containing such an argument, is not so singular as lamentable. They believe the Bible; they love the Church of the Redeemer; and however erroneous we may consider their opinions in regard to slavery, we must admit their sincerity, and purity of motive. Of the two last named gentlemen, we cannot refrain from saying that *their* anxiety for the publication of a *Bible* argument as to the propriety or impropriety of excommunicating slaveholders from *the Church*, must strike their numerous acquaintances in this region as somewhat marvellous. Had Dr. J. endeavored to prove that certain characters should not be excommunicated from *the great Church*, as the phrase goes, their concern might have been more easily accounted for. We do not intend, however, to impugn *their* motives, nor to question their sincerity. We are pleased to learn that even the assaults of abolitionists upon “believing masters,” and the fear that these assaults may distract and divide christians, have led these gentlemen to “grieve for the affliction of Joseph.” We earnestly hope that their new-born zeal for a biblical argument upon any subject, and their recently discovered interest in the welfare of the Redeemer's kingdom, may lead them a step further in the path of duty, namely, to connect themselves with some branch of the *visible Church*, and to avow, publicly, their *faith* in that Divine Word whose doctrines concerning slavery they seem so anxious to disseminate.

Will Dr. J. permit us, in this connexion, to ask him two questions? First,—Is it conceivable that the situation of one of these gentlemen in a certain Board of Trustees should have had any influence in inducing the worthy President to select him as god-

father to his first western bantling? And second,—Would it not have been singular, if St. Paul, having published his speech before the Synod at Jerusalem, had dedicated it to Peter, John, Burrhus and Seneca? We mean no offence to Burrhus and Seneca by the inquiry.

A second remark upon the matter contained in the preface. We are sorry that the author has had the unfairness to present, in a dozen lines, a tissue of groundless and ridiculous charges against English and American abolitionists;—what he is pleased to style, his “aggressive movement upon the abolition camp.” (p. 4.) Unsustained by the slightest attempt at proof, and therefore unlikely to meet, as they are unworthy to receive, an answer, they go forth with all the weight of his authority, to produce their effect upon the credulous and unreflecting. If not intended, these gross slanders, (for they deserve no better name,) are admirably adapted, to excite the basest passions of the mob. Had they formed a part of his speech, and had he pretended to support them by the shallow arguments and idle assertions which he brought forward in Synod, the antidote would have accompanied the poison. He would then have convinced his readers, not, indeed, of the truth of his charges, but of the bitterness of his prejudices, the weakness of his judgment, and the strength of his *imagination*. Should these remarks appear unnecessarily harsh, to any one, let him remember that Dr. J. has not scrupled to accuse hundreds and thousands of American citizens and christians, of deliberate treason, and of leaguings with foreigners for the destruction of our republic!

We pass now to the Discourse itself. Dr. J. complains of having been *bantered* into this discussion. “Sir, we have been *bantered* into this subject. We have been told that we are afraid of the light—afraid to meet the argument—that it would soon be seen, upon the vote to take up, who were afraid of the truth. * * * * What was the effect of this banter upon the house? * * * * The reverend father upon my left could no longer look down with indifference upon the gauntlet at his feet. He would no longer be bantered by the boys.” (p. 6.) “You have seen them in this Synod, daring, and braving, and bantering us.” (p. 67.) It was, indeed, asserted upon the floor

of Synod, that those who refused to take from the table, at any time, the resolutions of Dr. Bishop, should be regarded as afraid of the light. Alas! that such a remark, such a banter, if you please, should have been rendered necessary! Alas! that members of Synod, deeply convinced of the unspeakable importance of discussion and ecclesiastical action in regard to slavery, should be driven to such a resort in order to secure the investigation of a great and momentous subject! When was that remark made? Not until repeated efforts to bring the subject of slavery before the house, had been met, first by a refusal on the part of the Committee of bills and overtures, of which Dr. J. was a member, to report a paper; secondly, by frequent motions to lay on the table, or postpone indefinitely, the paper of Dr. Bishop; then, by a large vote refusing to take it from the table, at a suitable period; and lastly, by labored attempts to prove that when Synod had refused to consider a paper at one time, a majority of two-thirds was necessary to call it up at another. No wonder that after so many shifts and turns to avoid a calm and honest examination of so weighty a matter, a member should assert that he and his friends would regard such conduct, if persisted in, as an acknowledgment of inability to meet the facts and arguments by which anti-slavery principles are sustained.

The author of this speech assures us that it was not till "left in a lean minority of four," that he buckled on his armor for the contest. "He had been threshing his wheat by the wine presses, to hide it from the Midianites; and being often urged to go forth to battle in this war, he had still declined; nevertheless he had put a fleece of wool upon the floor, to obtain *a sign from the Lord*. And now, that there seems to be no longer any evasion," (very true,—all manner of *evasions* had been tried in vain,) "*he takes it to be the Master's will that he should discuss this subject,*" &c., (p. 6.)—The worthy Doctor's high pretensions to special divine assistance, and almost to absolute inspiration, more modestly asserted in his printed, than in his oral speech, shocked the feelings of his hearers, and provoked audible expressions of disgust. It is somewhat remarkable, that after such professions of divine guidance, and

after ascertaining, *by his woolly fleece*, that it was *the Master's will he should discuss this subject*," he should occupy much precious time of the synod, and some eight pages of his printed speech, in endeavoring to prove *that neither he nor the Synod had any business to engage in the discussion!* He reminds us, not of Gideon, but of a certain other divine messenger, who, when commanded to go to Nineveh, and cry against it, rose up to flee unto Tarshish!

Let us examine these weighty reasons by which the learned President would convince the Synod that it has nothing to do with the subject of slavery.

"1. Ecclesiastical courts, in a free State, have no jurisdiction over slavery. This Synod has no original jurisdiction at all, when viewed in a judicial capacity." * * * * In a restricted sense, Synod has legislative powers—such as * * * the devising and recommending of measures of benevolence, &c. which are more legislative than judicial. But here, as before, Synod cannot easily come into collision with slavery, provided it keeps within its own constitutional limits. * * * Why then should we spend our time in discussing, in the abstract, a subject over which we have no jurisdiction in the concrete?" (pp. 7. 8.)

What are the duties of a Presbytery, and Synod? for a Synod is but a larger Presbytery. (Form of Gov. B. 1. c. 11.) It is the duty of Presbytery, "in general, to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their care." (Form of Gov. B. 1. c. 10.) "The Synod has power, * * * generally to take such order with respect to the Presbyteries, Sessions, and people under their care, as may be in conformity with the word of God, and the established rules, and which tend to promote the edification of the church; and finally, to propose to the General Assembly, for their adoption, such measures as may be of common advantage to the whole church." (F. Gov. B. 1. c. 11.)

Suppose, now, that the Doctor is right; that abolitionism is of the devil; that the Bible does tolerate slavery, and allow slaveholders to remain in the church untouched by discipline. Suppose that abolitionists actually are, as the Doctor confidently

asserts, (pp. 67, 68) the *tetuphotai* spoken of by the Apostle Paul, (1 Tim. vi. 4:) that they are "proud, knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words, whereof cometh envy, strife, railings, evil surmisings, perverse disputings," &c.: that they are the very characters of whom the Apostle emphatically says to the true Christian, "from such withdraw thyself." Let it be remembered that these *tetuphotai* are not merely a few strangers, prowling about among our churches, seeking whom they may devour, but that some, aye many of our people, our elders, and even of the ministers of this Synod are themselves become zealous *tetuphotai*; they maintain the fundamental principles of "the Abolition movement:" yea more, that they have been laboring for years, and are now laboring to convert the whole Synod into a body of *tetuphotai*; and with such success that an entire Presbytery, one of the largest among us, is, (if we may coin a suitable word,) completely *tetuphotized*: and what is most lamentable of all, some two or three Presbyteries in our connection have actually had the audacity to memorialize the General Assembly in favor of *tetuphotism*! In this unhappy, dangerous, and critical state of affairs, the Synod of Cincinnati assembles, "to order whatever pertains to the spiritual welfare of the churches under their care;"—to "take such order with respect to the Presbyteries, Sessions, and people under their care as may * * * * promote the edification of the church; and to propose to the General Assembly, for their adoption, such measures as may be of common advantage to the whole church."

What course, now, is proposed by the President of Miami University? (to use his own favorite circumlocution for *ego*.) This self-constituted champion of orthodoxy, who once volunteered to prosecute a brother in the ministry, charged with a heresy perhaps less dangerous than Abolitionism,—what remedial measures does he propose to this Synod for their adoption?—What new excision act does he concoct? What well devised and deep laid scheme to prevent the multiplication of these terrible *tetuphotai*? Does he advocate immediate obedience to the apostolic injunction to withdraw from, or eject, these "men of corrupt minds, and destitute of the truth"? Does he implore

this court of Jesus Christ to rush, like Aaron, between the living and the dead, that the plague may be stayed?—Alas! how are the mighty fallen!—He folds his arms, and declares, that, according to the Constitution, the subject does not fall within the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts!

But has he not spoken out boldly in defence of “the scriptural relation of master and slave”? Yes—when “left in a lean minority of four”; but, were the wish of that minority “the governing purpose” of the majority, the Synod would indefinitely postpone, without discussion, any paper alluding in any way to the subject of slavery. We dislike to judge our brethren; but verily it requires all the charity we are master of, to believe them sincere in their desperate charges against anti-slavery men, measures, and principles, while they constantly assert that Presbyteries, Synods, and General Assemblies have no business with this whole matter.

On the contrary hypothesis, that slave-holding is sinful; that it has polluted the Church for centuries; and that it has so far perverted the morals, even of the ministry, that Doctors of Divinity, and Presidents of Colleges, instead of rebuking, actually defend it from the Bible;—it were idle for us to prove that ecclesiastical courts have a *right* to give it their attention. Besides, what a reflection upon the good sense of the Synod of Cincinnati, and many other Synods, does the Doctor’s argument involve! For years past we have discussed the slavery question; and have by repeated resolutions and memorials to the General Assembly, decided that it *does* fall within our province to debate and act in regard to slavery, whether in the abstract or concrete. We trust the future action of our ecclesiastical bodies will demonstrate that American Oxfordism in regard to slavery, is as disreputable among us, as is English Oxfordism upon theology generally.

“2. But again, I (Dr. J.) object to this course: because the discussion will most likely degenerate into a mere debate, dispute, or hot controversy. * * * * Is it reasonable to expect that slavery, abolitionism, and colonization will be discussed here with that coolness and soul-subdued temper which their importance demands, and christian courtesy requires? Does

any man in fact expect it"? (p. 9.)—To whom was this extraordinary language addressed? To a Synod of the Presbyterian Church; a high court of the Lord Jesus Christ; an assembly of intelligent, and, we trust, pious ministers of the sanctuary, and ruling officers in the house of our God! And if this question, or any other connected with morals and religion, cannot be debated with something like a proper spirit by such men, and in such a body, where, we ask, shall we find an assembly in which "these exciting topics" may be fully, freely and calmly investigated?—"As for myself," says the objector, "I have passed through some stormy scenes," (that, for instance, which occurred at a certain University Exhibition,) "and I have learned by experience, that the more boisterous the elements become, the more perfectly all *my* faculties are at command. Brethren must not infer from my repugnance to this discussion, that *individually* I fear the heavings of the billows and the violence of the blast. I hope I shall be enabled to look the wind in the eye, and always to pull the right oar." (p. 9.) Extraordinary man! Well, we hope the Synod will patiently pocket the sorry compliment implied, and console themselves with the reflection that they have at least *one* member who can keep his temper!

In this connection we are reminded that the worthy President has cited the experience of Miami University relative to anti-slavery discussions. "It was early impressed upon my mind," says he, "that this brand had already kindled up a fire which had well nigh consumed Miami University. To such a ruinous degree did the fire burn within her bosom, that the Trustees took up the subject and passed strong resolutions condemnatory of this wild-fire, and commendatory of a more prudent course. Hence, I felt myself called upon, the more earnestly to labor for the suppression of a class of disputations that result in evil, and only evil. The consequence is, peace and kindly feelings between young men from all the States indiscriminately."—(p. 5.) Allusion is here made, indirectly, to the liberal, and truly republican policy of a venerable member of Cincinnati Synod, the worthy ex-President of Miami University. Doctor J. has been pleased to contrast that policy and its results, with his own; of course, much to his own glorification. Let us look at the facts in the

case; and remind the author of this rude, unfeeling, and unprovoked assault upon his revered predecessor, that if those who dwell in glass houses will throw stones, they have no reason to complain when "their violent dealings come down upon their own pates."

The first anti-slavery society among the students at Oxford, was organized in the fall of 1834. The aggregate number of students during the next year, 1835, was 207. *Four years afterwards*, during all which time, it is believed, the society existed; and certainly, freedom of speech was among the guaranteed rights of the young men,—the aggregate attendance of the year 1839, was 250. This was the last year but one of Dr. Bishop's presidency. To such an alarming degree had the wild-fire of abolitionism consumed the University, that in four years the number of students had *increased* from 207 to 250. In the fall of 1840, the present incumbent was elected. He took the chair in April 1841; and began to throw the cold water of his pro-slavery principles upon this destructive fire. *One year afterward*, in 1842, the aggregate attendance of the year was reported at 162 students: and in 1843, it was 132. At the present time, if we are correctly informed, somewhere about 100 pupils are connected with the institution. For the facts and figures above stated, we refer to the annual catalogues of the University. We would not be understood to assert that the decreased attendance is owing solely to any single cause: we simply state the facts; and leave the public to judge whether the fire or the water is most likely to destroy the State Institution. Of the "peace and kindly feeling between young men from all the States," which is said to exist now, we shall say nothing. As to the strife and unkind feeling between northern and southern students, whose existence and untoward influence are assumed to have been felt from 1834 to 1839, inclusive,—Doctor J. is not competent to give, and the graduates of those days do not need to receive, any information.

But what, after all, is the strong condemnatory resolution of the Board of Trustees, cited by Doctor J., and published in the catalogue for 1840? "*Resolved*, That the President of this University be respectfully requested, in the course of his instructions

to the students generally, and more particularly to the Senior class, to inculcate the duty of cultivating an enlarged attachment to our entire country, without respect to its geographical divisions, East or West, North or South; and also to present to the young men of the University the sacred obligation to preserve inviolate the supremacy of the constitutional laws of the United States, and of the States in which their lot may be cast." With what propriety such a resolution can be called *strongly condemnatory of abolitionism*, we leave others to determine. Certainly, the great mass of abolitionists could most cordially have voted for it.

Those who are somewhat familiar with the history of Miami University, and with the recent proceedings of its Trustees, are not a little surprised that Doctor J. should have been willing to awaken unpleasant recollections by alluding to any of their resolutions. Had he forgotten that in August, 1843, scarcely a month before the delivery of his Synodical speech, the same Board had "*Resolved*, That as the Miami University is a Literary Institution subservient to the cause of Christianity in general, and not that of any particular denomination of the Church of God; it is the will of this Board, hereby decidedly expressed, that in the performance of religious duties in the chapel," (which, by the way, are conducted solely by the Doctor himself,) "the services thereof should be free from reference to the distinguishing peculiarities of any denomination of the Christian Church?" Had those resolutions escaped his memory which were offered and discussed, but for certain reasons not adopted, and only recorded on the journal for August, 1842? Did they not forbid any professor or officer of the Institution, "so far to forget the dignity of his station as to *revile* any respectable sectarian body, * * * to *perpetrate unseemly buffoonery*, or *ridiculous mimicry*, or to resort to high wrought stage-effect for the purpose of bringing into contempt any respectable religious denomination?" We are not now asserting that there was any just cause for presenting the resolutions of 1842, nor for adopting those of 1843; but certainly "we are entitled to the conclusion" that there was as little occasion for passing that of 1839, to which Dr. J. has referred.

We hope that in our remarks upon this topic, we have neither exhibited nor felt any thing of the spirit of Abishai the son of Zeruiah, (2 Sam. xvi: 9;)—if it be otherwise, however, let Shimci remember who cast stones; and let our filial love for the venerable head at which they were aimed, be plead in extenuation. We have only to add, before passing to Doctor J.'s *third* reason, that when he tells us how "earnestly he has labored for the suppression" of free discussion, upon slavery, we are forcibly reminded of a certain high personage, a near relation of the Whore of Babylon, John, Bishop of Basileopolis, as he styles himself, who sent forth a little bull—a sort of *bull-calf*, we presume,—to bellow against "The N. York Catholic Society for the Promotion of Religious Knowledge;"—a religious debating society formed among lay-catholics in that city. "The Church," says he, "in the most positive manner, prohibits all laymen from entering into dispute on points of religion," &c.

"3. I object to entering upon the abolition controversy here, because its advocates are an organized political party. * * * * The relation of master and slave is a civil relation; it is regulated by the civil law, and always has been; ecclesiastical bodies never had, in all the world's history, any control over it. * * * * Let our church courts throw themselves into the vortex of party politics, then farewell to peace and harmony—farewell to respectability and public confidence. If individual ministers feel themselves called to soil their cloth in this strife—let them bear the responsibility, and sink alone under the ban of public reprobation, but let not the Synod of Cincinnati commit the suicidal deed. It is surely unnecessary for me to dwell in proof of the fact, that Anti-Slavery is a public, organized political party." (pp. 9–11.)

Had we undertaken to criticise the *style* of the President's discourse, the phrase "*that Anti-Slavery is a public, organized political party*," and others of like construction, might demand attention. But we are engaged in a more important duty. What is the substance of this *third* objection? Slaveholding is a sin, and must therefore be opposed, by the church, with the sword of the spirit. It is a political evil; and should therefore be remedied by political action. But because, as citizens, we

employ political means to remove political evils, we must not, as christians, use religious measures to purify the church from her pollutions! The cry that "the relation of master and slave is a civil relation, regulated by civil law," and the inference that ecclesiastical bodies can have no control over it, scarcely deserves notice. The civil law does not *require* any man to be a slaveholder; though it *permits* slaveholding, in some portions of our country. Precisely in the same way is the sale of ardent spirits a business permitted and regulated by the civil law. Must the church be silent, therefore, as to the immorality of the traffic under certain circumstances? Is it not her duty to testify against even "the *throne* of iniquity," when "it frameth mischief by a law?"—(Ps. xciv: 20.) May she not forbid her members to "give the bottle to their neighbor, and make him drunken also?" Gambling hells, and brothels are "regulated by the civil law" in some countries. Must the church in such countries, decline to rebuke the sins of gaming and whoredom? The exercise of proper church discipline upon irreclaimable slaveholders would doubtless hasten the termination of slavery as a *political* evil. Shall we, for that very reason, refuse the due application of discipline? Such is the argument under consideration: but, whatever others may say, a Protestant, and especially a Presbyterian, should hang his head for shame, at the thought of attempting to maintain such a position. Was not the ever-glorious Reformation intimately connected with political action? "It may be affirmed," (says Smyth, in his recent work on Ecclesiastical Republicanism," p. 112,) "that the spirit of the Reformation led to the establishment of the republican form of government, in countries where it had never before existed."—"The Protestant Reformation," (says Bancroft, Hist. U. S. vol. ii: 456, &c.) "considered in its largest influence on politics, was the common people awakening to freedom of mind." "Protestantism," (says Carlyle, Heroes and Hero worship, 334,) was a revolt against spiritual sovereignties, popes, and much else. *Presbyterianism carried out the revolt against earthly sovereignties and despotism.* Protestantism has been called the grand root, from which our whole subsequent European history branches out, for the spiritual will always body itself forth in the temporal history

of man: the spiritual is the beginning of the temporal." According to the argument we are opposing, Luther should have abandoned the Reformation from the period of the Ratisbon, Torgau, and Magdeburgh alliances; for, "from that hour the cause of Luther was no longer of a nature purely religious; and the contest with the Wittenberg monk ranked among the *political events* of Europe."—(D'Aubigne.) What! must the church withhold all avowal of her anti-slavery principles, because they may have a political bearing? How would Zuingle and Calvin have regarded such a doctrine? "Zuingle restored to the people their rights."—(Eccl. Repub. 113.) "Calvin was not only a theologian of the first order; he was also a politician of astonishing sagacity, and Montesquieu had reason to say, that Geneva ought to celebrate, with gratitude, the day when Calvin came within her walls. Morals then became pure; *the laws of the State underwent a thorough change*, and the organization of the church was based upon the soundest principles."—(Ibid.) Who sounded "the first blast of the trumpet against the monstrous regiment of women?" John Knox, the noble founder of Presbyterianism in Scotland. Had the Solemn League and Covenant no bearing upon politics? a paper which "bound all its subscribers to preserve the reformed religion of Scotland, in doctrine, worship, discipline, and government; and also to seek the reformation of religion in England and Ireland, according to the word of God, and the example of the best reformed churches; to abolish popery and prelacy; to defend the King's person, and preserve the rights of Parliament and the liberties of the kingdom."—(Aiton's Life of Henderson, 509–510.) Were the sainted Henderson, the draughtsman of that Covenant, now living, Doctor J. might hear a reply to this paltry objection, that would make his ears tingle. "A tumult in the High Church of Edinburgh, spread into a universal battle and struggle over all these realms; there came out, after fifty year's struggling, what we call *the glorious revolution, a habeas corpus act, free Parliaments, and much else!*"—(Carlyle, Heroes, &c., 235.) Was not the Westminster Assembly called together by a political party represented by the majority in the British Parliament;—a party then engaged even in a civil war? Did the reverend fathers of that

Assembly hesitate to obey the summons, because the result of their deliberations would be associated with politics? When our own revolutionary contest commenced, did the Synod of New York and Philadelphia express no opinions which might favor the whig party of America? "The Synod of New York was the very first to declare themselves in favor of the struggle, a year before the Declaration of Independence, and to encourage and guide their people, then in arms. * * * * They were the first to recognize the Declaration of Independence, when made; and they materially aided in the passage of that noble act."—(Eccl. Repub. 143-144—see also, Hodge's Hist. Pres. Ch. vol. ii. 481, &c.) Away then with the idle pretence that the church must not bear her part in breaking every yoke, and especially in freeing herself from the sin of slaveholding, because a party of American citizens think it their duty to oppose slavery at the ballot-box. If, as is alleged, the Liberty party is "a weak and contemptible one," the less reason have we for regarding it as an obstacle to ecclesiastical action. Whether or not this is its real character, time will determine.

"4. This controversy places the peace-party, as we may call ourselves in the premises, in a false position. It lays us open to the illogical and unjust, yet plausible inference, that we are advocates of slavery. * * * * We oppose the movements of the abolitionists, chiefly by yielding; therefore, we are deemed and held guilty of pro-slavery. Whereas, we are in truth opposed to slavery, and are doing as much in our respective positions to abate its evils, as our brethren are. We differ from them as to the manner of doing away these evils, whilst we suppose we are much more efficient in the matter of meliorating the condition of the colored race."—(pp. 11-12.)

"Being guilty of *pro-slavery*," reminds us of "*Anti-Slavery being a political party*;"—but we cannot dwell upon the elegancies of composition displayed in this production. That our author, and those who are for "*doing nothing with all their might*" against slavery, are "the peace party," in a certain sense, we readily admit. They are nearly allied to an ancient Jewish party, who "healed the hurt of the Lord's people slightly, saying *Peace, Peace*, when there was no peace;" (Jer. vi. 14.) For, alas! "the

way of peace they know not.”—(Isa. lix. 8.) These brethren forget the Scripture they so often quoted in reference to another subject,—“*first pure, then peaceable.*” As to the real doctrines of the pamphlet before us, and the question whether they are adapted to work the release of the poor slave, or the perpetuation of his bondage, any remarks which may be necessary, will be more appropriately presented when we shall have examined the author’s propositions and arguments. To these we now direct the attention of our readers. It is proper to say, however, that intending, before we close, to present and endeavor to sustain certain propositions of our own, we shall occasionally pass, without notice, such passages of Scripture, quoted by Doctor J., as may be more fitly examined in connection with these propositions.

The attentive reader of Doctor J.’s labored and extended argument, cannot fail to observe that he has not only neglected to define what he means by the terms, *slave* and *slavery*; but that he has either lost sight of, or carefully concealed, their true signification; and in so doing, he has failed to perceive the gist of the whole matter in controversy. Charity, which hopeth all things, inclines us to suppose that, in the plenitude of his Hebrew and Greek, he has forgotten his English! Roaming through the patriarchal, Jewish and primitive christian churches, in search of the prototypes of our southern bondmen; bewildering himself and his readers with a multitude of ancient *abadim*, *shephahoth*, *amahoth*, *douloi*, *paides*, *oiketes*, and *paidiskai*, he really imagines, and would fain persuade others, that these uncouth named creatures are the veritable *slave-gangs* of patriarchs, prophets, and apostles. We shall endeavor to supply his deficiency, and thus keep before the minds of all, the real question at issue. That question, now in process of investigation among the American churches, is this, and no other: Are the professed christians in our respective connections who hold their fellow-men as slaves, thereby guilty of a sin which demands the cognizance of the church; and, after due admonition, the application of discipline? What do we mean by the English word “*slaves*,” as used in this question? What is a slave, in the American sense of that term? “The term *slave*,” says

Doctor Johnson, "said to be derived from the Sclavi or Slavonians, who were subdued and sold by the Venetians, signifies, *one mancipated to a master.*" *Mancipation*, on the same authority, is "*slavery, involuntary obligation.*" The Latin, *mancipium*, from which the word *mancipated* is derived, signifies, (1.) *property*, or *right of perpetual possession, as lands, servants, &c.*, (2.) *a slave.*

A *slave*, then, is a human being, who is made an article of property; and therefore, like all other property, subject to be bought, sold, transferred, imported, exported, levied upon, given away, delivered over to executors and administrators, or assigned to heirs, wholly at the will of his master:—one who is reduced to this condition, and held in it, without the least regard to his consent or refusal to serve such master. The master's claim to him, as property, rests not at all upon the slave's choice: is not strengthened by his willingness; nor weakened, much less destroyed, by his unwillingness, to be a slave.

Our statute books establish this definition. "The civil law," says Judge Stroud, "except when modified by statute or by usages which have acquired the force of law, is generally referred to in the slave-holding States, as containing the true principles of the constitution: it will be proper, therefore, to give an abstract of its leading doctrines; for which purpose I use Dr. Taylor's *Elements of the Civil Law*, p. 429. 'Slaves,' says he, 'were held *pro nullis: pro mortuis: pro quadrupedibus.*' * * * * They could be sold, transferred, or pawned as goods or personal estate; for goods they were, and as such they were esteemed.' * * * * According to the laws of Louisiana 'a slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. His master may sell him, dispose of his person, his industry, and his labor; he can do nothing, possess nothing, nor acquire any thing but what must belong to his master.' * * * 'The slave is entirely subject to the will of his master, who may arrest and chastise him, though not with unusual rigor,' &c. * * * * The cardinal principle of slavery, that the slave is not to be ranked among *sentient* beings, but among *things*—is an article of property, a chattel personal, obtains as undoubted law in all these (the slave-holding) states. In South Carolina it is expressed in

in the following language: 'Slaves shall be deemed, sold, taken, reputed and adjudged in law to be chattels personal in the hands of their owners and possessors, and their executors, administrators and assigns, to all intents, constructions and purposes whatsoever.' * * * * 'In case the personal property of a ward shall consist of specific articles, such as slaves, working beasts,' &c.—(Act of Maryland, 1798, CI. 12. 12.) In Kentucky, by the law of descents, they are considered *real estate*, and pass in consequence to heirs, and not to executors. They are, however, liable *as chattels* to be sold by the master at his pleasure, and may be taken in execution for the payment of his debts."—(Sketch of the laws relating to slavery, pp. 21–24.)

Such, we repeat, is a slave in the *American* sense of the word; the only sense any way pertinent to the matter in debate. *Slavery* is the condition of such a person. We are now to inquire whether Jehovah, in his word, tolerates, or has ever tolerated, *as innocent*, the holding of our fellow-men in such a condition. This is the main question, the true question, the only question. Men may say what they please about *abadim* and *douloi*: but unless they prove that the *ebed* and the *doulos* were with the Divine permission, held as property, subject to all the ordinary uses and liabilities of property; bought, sold, and held without the least regard to their own will in the matter;—talk long and learnedly as they may, they do but prove that they have not yet apprehended the real nature of the question under discussion. That a kind of servitude existed in the families of the patriarchs;—that it was not merely permitted, but even sanctioned, by the Divine Lawgiver, among the Jewish people, no one denies. But what was the nature of that servitude? Was it precisely, or even in its chief features, analogous to American slavery? Abolitionists maintain the negative. Let those who choose to defend slavery, and to sooth the troubled conscience of the slave-holder; to protect them from the censures of the church, and the terrible threatenings of Holy Writ, maintain the affirmative: but let them fairly join issue, march up to "the imminent, deadly breach," and plant (if they can,) their victorious standard on the walls of the citadel. Let them cease to glorify themselves in their easy triumphs over men of

straw. With these preliminary remarks, we proceed to our author's propositions.

PROPOSITION I. Slavery existed during the period over which the old Testament history extends."—(p. 16.) To support this proposition, five examples are adduced.

1. The case of Joseph. That Joseph was a slave, in the proper sense of that term, we cheerfully admit. He was made an article of property: was bought and sold just as were the "spices, balm and myrrh;" and this, without the least regard to his own will. But what assistance the case of Joseph can render to one who would prove that God did not disapprove such slavery, we are at a loss to divine; especially when we remember Joseph's solemn declaration,—"*Indeed I was stolen away out of the land of the Hebrews,*" (Gen. xl. 15;) and Jehovah's command,—"*he that stealeth a man and selleth him, * * * shall surely be put to death,*" (Ex. xxi. 16.) But we are assured that "*the Ishmaelites did not steal him. * * * His brothers stole him from their own father, and sold him.*"—(p. 17.) Ah, indeed! but *Joseph* says he was *stolen away out of the land of the Hebrews*. Was Dothan, "a town twelve miles north of Samaria," (Calmet,) *out of the land of the Hebrews*? And did his brothers whip him away to Dothan, from his father's house in Hebron? If Joseph knew, *they* stole him, who carried him from his native land,—the Ishmaelites. The Doctor contradicts the plain story of the Hebrew slave himself, to give plausibility to the inference that the purchase and sale of freemen is not man-stealing. A worthy object, truly!

2. The "souls" that Abram, Sarai, and Lot "had gotten in Haran," (Gen. xii. 5.) Some able critics, ancient and modern, Jewish and Christian, have contended that the Hebrew word *asu*, "gotten," "expresses the instrumentality used in the conversion of the souls whom they had brought with them from Haran." Doctor J. misrepresents, and then ridicules the argument used on the floor of the Synod in defence of this interpretation. We shall not here insist upon it. It is not necessary to our argument; for, admitting the correctness of his criticism, and granting that these "souls" were servants, whom Abram and others had acquired, "or bought with money;" does

it follow that he bought them of any other than themselves, or against their will? or that he held them as property which he might sell to the highest bidder?—that is, that they were slaves? Scriblerus, in his treatise on Logic, informs us “that there cannot be more in the conclusion than there was in the premises.”

3. The slavery of the Israelites in Egypt, Ex. i. 13, 16. (p. 22.) We deny, and it has not been proved, nor can it be, that the Israelites were held as the individual property either of Pharaoh or of his people. That they were wickedly oppressed, and in a condition of cruel bondage, is very true. But grant that they were slaves: will any one undertake to prove, by their history, that God tolerates slavery? If he do, let the bloody Nile, and the croaking frogs in Pharaoh’s bedchamber, and the lice upon man and beast in all Egypt, and the swarming flies, and the dying cattle, and the boil with blains upon every living thing that was Egyptian, and the grievous hail and the fire that ran along the ground, and the mighty thunderings, and the locusts covering all the land, and the thick darkness that might be felt, and the wailings of the whole nation of oppressors over the corpses of their first-born, answer his argument. We shall not. Had this been Dr. J.’s proposition, “that oppression existed in very ancient times; that it was abhorred of God, and punished with the most fearful plagues,” the history of the Israelites in Egypt might have been appealed to as most conclusive proof!

“4. The next instance, wherein slavery is recognized as a relation existing, I shall mention, is in the fourth and tenth commandments. ‘Thou shalt not do any work, thou nor thy son, nor thy daughter, thy man-servant, nor thy maid-servant, nor thy cattle, nor thy stranger that is within thy gates.’ ‘Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbor’s wife, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor any thing that is thy neighbor’s.’ In both these precepts ownership in and control over, the man-servant and the maid-servant, is spoken of in the same language as ownership in the ox and the ass. In the latter, it is clear that covetousness could not exist, but where *real ownership* existed.” (pp. 53, 54.)

If it had been or could be proved that *ebed* and *amah*, man-

servant and maid-servant,) necessarily signify a male or female *slave*; and if it had been shown that the Hebrews held slaves by the permission of Heaven, then, indeed, we must admit that these commandments recognize the existence of slavery, and protect the master's claim of property in human flesh. That neither of these is true, we shall prove in the sequel. As for the argument from the 10th commandment, the only one offered here to show that the servants were really property; it proves too much, and therefore nothing. They must have been property, slaves—or they could not be coveted! Then the *wife*, too, must be property, a slave, or she could not be coveted! In both these precepts, ownership in, and control over, the *wife*, the *son*, and the *daughter*, is spoken of in the same language as ownership in the man-servant and the maid-servant. If the man-servant is property, because he is called *thine*, just as *thy* ox, and *thy* ass; by parity of reasoning, *thy* wife, *thy* son, *thy* daughter are property. If the wife may be coveted, though not the property of her husband, why may not the servant? And what becomes of the assertion that “covetousness could not exist but where real ownership existed?” Cannot a bound-boy, or a bound-girl, who is merely indented to his master for a term of years, be coveted? But in this case the master has a property-right, not in the flesh and blood of his apprentice; but in his talents and services for a given period; and the servant is a bond-man,—an *ebed*,—but not a slave.

“5. The Gibeonites furnish a fifth example. * * * * Here note, [1.] They were reduced to perpetual slavery—they and their children. [2.] This was a punishment for their sin. Their lives had been forfeited. They knew that they were devoted to death, and preferred slavery to death.”—[p. 24.]

The *facts* in regard to the Gibeonites appear to have been these. [1.] They were a very numerous people. They had four cities, Gibeon, Chephirah, Kirjath-jearim, and Beeroth. [Josh. ix. 17.] One of these, Gibeon, is described as a “great city, as one of the royal cities,” and “greater than Ai; and all the men thereof were mighty.”—[x. 2.] Now Ai had 12,000 inhabitants. [viii. 25.]

[2.] They probably remained in their own cities for a long

time: how long we cannot say. Evidently they continued there after they "had made peace with Israel," [x. 1;] for there were they attacked by the five kings of the Amorites, [x. 5;] and successfully defended by Joshua. The fact that "Kirjath-baal, which is Kirjath-jearim" is mentioned as "a city of Judah," [xv. 60, xviii. 14;] and "Gibeon, Beeroth, and Chephirah," as "cities of Benjamin," [xviii. 25, 26,] will not disprove it. For Jebusi or Jerusalem is classed with the cities of Benjamin, [xviii. 25, 36,] though long inhabited by unconquered Canaanites, [Judg. i. 21;]—Bethshean, Ibleam, Dor, Endor, Tannach, and Megiddo, with those of Manassah, [Josh. xvii. 11, 12,] though "when Israel was strong, they did not utterly drive out their inhabitants, but put them to tribute," [Judg. i. 27, 28;]—and Rehob, Zidon, &c., with the cities of Asher, [Josh. xix. 24–31;] though the last named was never possessed by the Asherites; but always inhabited and held by the Zidonian Canaanites. In later times, the Gibeonites seemed to have been removed from, or to have exchanged, their possessions. They probably did not reside in Kirjath-jearim when the ark of God was there; [1 Chron. xiii. 5, 6; 2 Chron. i. 4;] nor in Gibeon, when the tabernacle was pitched in that city; [1 Kings iii. 4, 5. 1 Chron. xxi. 29. 2 Chron. i. 3–6, 13.] After the return from Babylon, the children of Gibeon, Kirjath-jearim, Chephirah, and Beeroth, are numbered with "the men of the people of Israel," in distinction from the Nethenims, who are regarded as descendants of the Gibeonites. [See Ezra. ii. 20, 25, 43–58. and Neh. vii. 25, 29, 46–60.] The prophets of Gibeon, too, [Jer. xxviii. 1,] were, most likely, Jews. Still, the Gibeonites had their own possessions and cities. The whole tenor of the narrative respecting Saul's war of extermination upon them, and of the vengeance subsequently inflicted on his family, implies, that in the time of David they were a distinct people, having their own business, and pursuing their own interests. Indeed, their cities are expressly mentioned, [Ezra. ii. 70.] "So the Priests, and the Levites, and some of the people, and the singers, and the porters, and the *Nethenims*, [*the given, devoted ones*, that is, to the temple service, as the word Nethenims signifies,] *dwelt in their cities*, and all Israel in their cities." This passage might seem to countenance Bishop Patrick's supposition,

that they “were dispersed into the cities of the Priests and Levites.” [Quoted in M. Henry, Josh. 9.] But Nehemiah records the same event in somewhat different language: “So the Priests, and the Levites, and the porters, and the singers, and some of the people, and *the Nethenims*, and all Israel, *dwelt in their cities*,” &c. [vii. 73;] from which we as naturally infer that the Nethenims had cities to themselves, as that the priests and common Israelites had. If, however, Bishop Patrick’s supposition be correct, our argument is unaffected. They dwelt in their own houses, keeping together their own families, and occasionally “serving at the altar, out of the profits of which, it is probable, they were maintained.”—[Henry.]

[3.] *The Gibeonites were not reduced to personal slavery; nor were they rendered the private property of the Israelites. In other words, they were not slaves. When Israel found that the Gibeonites were neighbors, “all the congregation murmured against the princes. * * * And the princes said unto them, Let them live; but let them be hewers of wood and drawers of water unto all the congregation.”* [Josh. ix. 18–21.] But “Joshua called for them, and he spoke unto them, saying, * * * There shall none of you be freed from being bond-men, [*ebed*], and hewers of wood and drawers of water *for the house of my God*.” (vs. 22, 23. M. Henry well observes, “The princes would have them slaves to all the congregation, at least they choose to express themselves so, to pacify the people; but Joshua *mitigates the sentence*, both in honor to God, and in favor to the Gibeonites: *it would be too hard to make them every man’s drudge*; if they must be hewers of wood and drawers of water, than which there cannot be a greater disparagement, especially to citizens of a royal city, yet they shall be so *to the house of my God*, than which there cannot be a greater preferment.” Let it be observed, also, that the Hebrew word, *ebed*, bond-man, only, is employed. There is no mention of the *amah* or *shiphhah*, maid-servant: nor is there the slightest reason to believe that any service was required of the *female* Gibeonites. If verse 27, be appealed to as against this position,—“and Joshua made them that day hewers of wood and drawers of water for the congregation, and for the altar of the Lord,”—let Henry remove

the difficulty: "They were employed in such services as required their personal attendance on the altar of God, &c. * * * * They were herein servants to the congregation too; for whatever promotes the worship of God, is a real service to the commonwealth."

Let any one read 2 Sam. xxi. 1-14, and believe, if he can, that the Gibeonites were the personal property of the Hebrews. "Saul sought to slay them, in his zeal to the children of Israel and Judah." (vs. 2.) A singular zeal, truly, for the welfare of his subjects, which would lead him to catch and destroy all their slaves! What would the reputation of that statesman be worth, who should propose such a measure in his zeal for the interest of our southern slaveholders? If these people were not slaves; but property holders in the cities of the priests; or, as is more probable, possessed of cities and farms of their own, the policy and conduct of Saul would be precisely like that of the Georgian legislators in expelling the poor Cherokees, that they might seize their houses, lands, and gold-mines; popular enough with their constituents, but abhorrent to God. King David "called the Gibeonites, and said unto them, * * * * what shall I do for you? and wherewith shall I make the atonement, that ye may bless the inheritance of the Lord?" A high honor, verily, for the King to ask the slaves' blessing upon the Lord's inheritance! And they said, "Let seven men of Saul's sons be delivered unto us, and we will hang them up unto the Lord in Gibeah of Saul." What! do the slaves wish to insult their masters by hanging seven sons of his majesty, their late king? hanging them with their own hands; and in Gibeah, too, Saul's native place? Yes, nothing less will satisfy them: and what is more astonishing, the reigning monarch says, "I will give them." Seriously, no man in his senses, not previously resolved to find slavery in the Bible, would ever dream that these Gibeonites were the slaves of Israel.

4. The only servitude imposed upon the Gibeonites was the discharge of the menial services in the temple; and these services were performed by a small number of their males, drafted, from time to time, for that purpose. The preceding facts and references prove this: we only add, that but a small

umber could possibly find employment in the temple, at least, on all ordinary occasions. Reasonably enough, therefore, does Bishop Patrick think that they "came up with the Priests and Levites, *in their courses*, to serve at the altar." (Quoted in Henry.)

In view of this plain statement of Scripture facts relative to the condition of the Gibeonites, what apology can be offered for the christian minister, in a free state, who can coolly compare the conduct of Joshua toward these people, with that of "some church in Virginia which owned slaves, hired them out, and appropriated the product towards paying their minister's salary;" about which, he says, "a great noise has been made!" (p. 24.) True; he adds, "I am not to apologize for such cases." But he does apologize, and says, "It might hence be inferred that slave labor" (that is, *unpaid* labor,) "in building a church, in cleaning and keeping it, may not be a soul-damning sin, even under the gospel!" How refreshing to turn from the —— (we will not characterize it by the term it deserves)—the speech—of such a northern man with worse than southern principles, to the "Letters on Slavery," by the Rev. J. D. Paxton! He was a genuine Virginian, pastor of the Cumberland Congregation, once a slaveholder; but he emancipated his bondmen, because he "believed slavery morally wrong." Compelled to abandon his charge, for having told them "too much truth at once," in regard to the sinfulness of slaveholding, he addressed them these "Letters." "The congregation," says he, "in their associated capacity own a number of slaves—about 70. They are hired out from year to year, and the proceeds are the chief item with which they pay the salary of the pastor." Mr. P. saw the wickedness of such conduct, and said to his people. "I was greatly desirous of adopting some plan for improving the condition, and bringing about the liberation of the slave property held by the congregation." (Lct. p. 11.) Verily, there is more to be hoped from southern slaveholders, than from their northern apologists.

"Proposition II. The law of Moses permitted the Hebrews to buy their brother Hebrews and to retain them in bondage or slavery, six years." (p. 30.) Three passages are quoted in proof.

Ex. xxi. 2, If thou buy an Hebrew servant—an *ebed*—six years he shall serve; and in the seventh, he shall go out free for nothing.—Ex. xxii. 3, if he (the thief,) have nothing (wherewith to make restitution) then he shall be sold for his theft. Lev. xxv. 39, If thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, &c. The practical operation of these laws is illustrated by reference to 1 Kin. iv. 1, and Matt. xviii. 25.

Here we have a strange jumble of passages; two of which have no relation to the proposition they are brought to sustain, and none of which has any bearing upon the main question. Ex. xxi. 2, undoubtedly proves that a Hebrew might buy a Hebrew man, his brother. But to *buy* implies to *pay for*. Now when a Hebrew bought a free Hebrew, not sold for crime, to whom did he pay the money? This vital point the Doctor has not condescended to notice. We hope to prove, in due time, that the money was paid to the person purchased: and assuming this, for the present, we would inquire whether that man is a *slave*, who voluntarily disposes of his services, to a neighbor under whose roof he is to dwell, during a definite and brief period, and for a stipulated sum which he receives in hand? If he is, then does Ex. xxi. 2, prove that “the law of Moses permitted the Hebrews to buy their brother Hebrews and to retain them *in bondage or slavery* for six years.”

Ex. xxii. 3, might have some connection with the proposition under which it stands, if the author had shown that the thief must be sold for six years; neither more nor less. But this is not the fact. No definite period of service is assigned by the law, and for a very good reason: common equity requires that the thief should be sold only for that period of time in which his services would equal in value the amount which he should have restored. “If a man steal an ox, or a sheep, and kill it, or sell it; he shall restore five oxen for an ox, and four sheep for a sheep. * * * If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, whether it be ox, or ass, or sheep; he shall restore double. * * * if he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft.” (Ex. xxii. 1–4.) Now suppose a sheep to be worth a month’s labor. A and B each steal a sheep; and both are taken in the act. The theft

being found in their hands alive, the law requires them to pay double. A has a flock of his own; he gives back the stolen animal, and another, and escapes. Unfortunate B is peniless: he restores the stolen sheep, but cannot give double: he must therefore, be sold. For what length of time? The President of Miami University, we suppose, would say, For six years. An infant school prattler would reply, Till he can pay a sheep's worth of work;—that is, for a month. And any jury of twelve honest men under heaven, would decide that the infant scholar was right, and the President wrong. Were Doctor J.'s exposition of the law correct, how unequal would be the divine legislation! The rich thief escapes with a trivial loss of property. The *poor* wretch, more liable to temptation, and with fewer motives to resist covetous desires, must lose his liberty for half a dozen years! The man who stole an ox, and killed it, must restore five oxen. He who seized a sheep, if it was found in his possession, must restore two sheep. The Divine Lawgiver makes as much difference in the punishment of the two, as there is between one sheep, and four oxen. Our Doctor of Divinity, sitting in judgment on the case, would consign both the criminals to slavery for six years!

After all, this law cannot prove slaveholding to be justifiable, except as a punishment for sin. Every one admits that servitude, for a given period, may be a proper penalty for crime: and yet it may be sinful to enslave the innocent.

We shall explain Lev. xxv. 39, in another connection. Suffice it to say here, that Doctor J.'s assumption in regard to the servant spoken of,—“he is sold for debt,”—is wholly gratuitous. The law neither says nor implies any thing of the sort.

Upon 2. Kin. iv. 1, the author says, “The widow of a prophet called upon Elisha with a most pitiful complaint; her husband, a man of God, died in debt, ‘and the creditor is come,’ says she, ‘to take unto him my two sons to be bondmen.’—Most cruel and distressing: as if the creditor should come upon the widow of his pastor, as soon as he was dead, drive her from the parsonage, and take her sons to make bondmen of them. Now Elisha does not object against the legality of this course. For aught that appears, this right and power exists [*exist*] in the

creditor.”—We should be glad to see the law, if there be one, authorizing parents to sell their children for debt, or creditors to seize them. Ex. xxi. 7–11, of which we shall speak hereafter; give no such authority. “The Romans, Athenians, and Asiatics in general,” says Dr. A. Clarke, “had the same authority over their children that the Hebrews had.” (But he does not inform us how or where they obtained it.) “Romulus gave the Romans power to cast them into prisons, beat, employ them as slaves in agriculture, sell them for slaves, or even take away their lives. (Dion. Halicarn.) Numa Pompilius enacted that if a son married with his father’s consent, his father could not sell him for debt. Diocletian and Maximian forbade freemen to be sold for debt. The ancient Athenians had the same right over their children as the Romans: but Solon reformed this barbarous custom. So the people of Asia, and Lucullus tried to check it by moderating the laws respecting usury.”—Now the advocates of slavery may try hard to prove that the statutes which God gave to the Jews were as barbarous as those of the heathen round about; and that Jehovah made laws similar to those which Solon had the humanity to repeal: but their only proof will be an appeal to the practice of the Hebrews, during corrupt periods of their history.

Neh. v: 1–13, is cited by our author. “This law of sale, was much abused at times, and led, by its abuse, to great oppression. * * * But these abuses—this rigid severity, show that the law tolerated the sale,” &c. (p. 31.)—What were the facts here? Some of the poor, having borrowed money in times of scarcity, were compelled to “bring into bondage their sons and their daughters, to be servants, (*abadim*.) And Nehemiah was very angry when he heard their cry, and these words. And he set a great assembly against them. (He held an *abolition* meeting.) And he said unto them, we, after our ability, have redeemed our brethren the Jews, which were sold unto the heathen; and will ye even sell your brethren? or shall they be sold unto us? These rich men are charged, not with usury or covetousness, but with *attempting* to buy *sons*, as servants; and with having actually purchased daughters, whom they did not betroth unto themselves:—thus

taking advantage of their parents' necessities. It is worthy of note that the *sons* of the poor had not yet been sold; but the parents feared they should yet be compelled to sell them. This is evident from the language of vs. 5. "and *some of our daughters* are brought into bondage already."—What followed? "Then they held their peace, and found nothing to answer."—Strange indeed! What, nothing to answer! Why not turn to the law of God authorizing parents to sell their children to pay debts, and creditors to buy them? Doubtless, they would have done so if they could.—The fact is, the Jews frequently adopted the wicked customs of their heathen neighbors. The nobles and nabobs had just returned from Chaldea, where slave-holding was practised without rebuke; and they thought it would be well to make slavery one of their own "domestic institutions." But the *people*, knowing it to be an innovation on their rights, took the alarm; and that good old abolitionist, Nehemiah, soon destroyed the prospects of the pro-slavery party in Judea.

Even if the contrary were true, and the creditor, (2. Kin. iv: 1,) were requiring "the rigid enforcement of his right," were these two sons to be made *slaves*? Were they to become property, articles of traffic, to be sold again by the creditor at pleasure? There is no evidence of this. Justice would require that in this, as in the case above mentioned, the sons should labor for the creditor until, by their service, they had paid their father's debt; and no longer. Whether that time were a month, a year, or ten years, this was all the creditor seems to have claimed: for when the widow sold the oil which Elisha had miraculously supplied, she paid the debt, and the lads were free.—So in the last case cited by Dr. J., Mat. xviii: 25, &c. The servant was "delivered unto the tormentors *till he should pay* all that was due unto his Lord."

"Proposition III. This state of servitude—this relation of master and slave, might, in certain cases, become perpetual for life." (p. xxxii.)—For the present, we shall content ourselves with a simple denial of this assertion, the grounds of which denial shall be exhibited in the proper place.

A few remarks, however, may be necessary, upon the

doctrine incidentally advanced in the Doctor's exposition of the first proof under this head; Ex. xxi: 4. If his master (the master of a Hebrew six years' servant,) have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself. "Now this wife," says Dr. J., given by the master, might be a Hebrew maid servant, or a Gentile; and it matters little which; for a Hebrew girl, sold by her father, did not go out free at the end of six years: (verse 7,) * * * But the presumption is, and the assumption we are entitled to, that the wife given by the master was a Gentile or a heathen slave; concerning whom there can be no doubt (as we shall see) that she was a slave. Now, in this case the law is explicit, the children are slaves when the mother is. We have heard a great deal said about the barbarity of the law maxim, *pars sequitur ventrem*, as containing a doctrine too horrible and vile to be spoken in the English language. Brethren ought first to enquire whether a doctrine is taught in the Bible, before they allow themselves to be horrified by it. Now, Mr. Moderator, you know, and every scholar in this Synod knows, that the Latin law maxim, is read in plain English, in Ex. xxi.: 4,—“the wife and her children shall be her master's,—*pars sequitur ventrem*—a slave mother makes a slave child. There it is in the word of God, and our horrified brethren dare not deny it.” (pp. 32, 33.) The learned Doctor uttered a doleful jeremiad, before Synod, upon the degeneracy of our ministry in respect to literary attainments. Few, now-a-days, could read Turretin! When the Presidents of our Universities mistake *pars* (a part,) for *partus* the (offspring,) what wonder that their pupils cannot read Turretin, or even Liber Primus?

Quid pueri faciant, errat quum etiam Doctor?*

We should consider this blunder a fault of the printer, had not the author committed the same error during the delivery of his speech. “If the master have given a wife,” &c. Was this wife a Hebrewess or a Gentile? No matter which, says Dr. J., “for a Hebrew girl, sold by her father, did not go out free at the end of six years.” He forgets that such a Hebrew girl

*Quid domini faciant, audent quum talia fures!—VIRGIL.

could not be given to the servant by his master, but was betrothed by himself or his son. (Ex. xxi: 8-11.) If this wife was a Hebrewess, she had become a *six years' servant* under the statute, Deut. xv: 12. If a Gentile, she had been bought according to the law, Lev. xxv. 44, and was engaged to serve till the year of jubilee. In the latter case, too, she must have been a *proselyte*; for the spirit of the law, Deut. vii. 1-4, forbade the marriage of an Israelite with a heathen. The Hebrew man had served his six years. During his time of service, his master had given him one of his female servants as a wife. Shall she go out with her husband? Shall the husband's rights take precedence of the master's, or the master's of the husband's? If the woman were a Hebrewess, and if her six years had expired at the same time with her husband's, there could be no question that she went out free, and no legislation would be needed in that case. But if her six years had not expired, which would be almost universally the case, then the law decides that the husband's authority must yield to the master's: the wife shall be her master's, not her husband's: in other words, the *subsequent contract* between the servant and the woman, shall not annul the *prior contract* between the master and the woman.

The same principle applies, if the wife were a proselyted Gentile, whose contract with the master would not terminate until the jubilee. In either case, the woman was her master's *servant*, but not his property; any more than she would have been her husband's property, if she had gone out with him. In both cases, the children are to remain with the mother rather than with the father. For she has an equal right to them with her husband: she has a home for them in her master's house; which he has not;—(he had sold himself through poverty;) and the master, at whose expense they have been maintained during their tender years, has a right to be recompensed by their labor in riper years. Besides, if the mother were a Hebrew woman, the eldest child could not be more than *five* years old; they would need the mother's more than the father's care; and both she and her children would go free before the eldest was six. In no case, however, was the marriage annulled; nor were the

wife and little ones separated from the husband and father. The Jewish master could not sell the woman, nor her offspring; and the servant would naturally remain in the neighborhood of his family; perhaps laboring as a hired servant in the house of his master. What necessity is there for supposing, with some commentators, that God allowed Hebrew servants that *legal fornication* which the Romans called *contubernium*? The whole law, while scrupulously mindful of the master's rights acquired by previous contract with a female servant, is marked by the benevolence of Him "who taketh the lambs in His bosom."

"Proposition IV. The Hebrews were permitted by their law, to buy servants from the heathen, to hold them in perpetual servitude; and to transmit them as hereditary property to their children." (p. 37.) "This is a compound proposition," says our author, "and may be broken down into three distinct parts." We add, that while no one denies the first part of this proposition, the second and third parts may be "broken down" so as never to rise again: which charitable work we shall endeavor to perform in the sequel.

"Proposition V. A very considerable degree of severity, in the treatment of servants, was indulged in during the Old Testament times." (p. 39.)

What the author can have in view, in attempting to sustain this proposition, we cannot conceive; unless, indeed, he has resolved to show how far a christian minister dares venture to represent the word of God in the most odious light. If he means that a *just* degree of severity, a severity not inconsistent with the law of love, was, with the approbation of Heaven, employed in the management of servants, the proposition is a very harmless one: and were the admission of any use to the Doctor, we would grant that the same thing was true in regard to the treatment of *children*! If he means to say that in the Old Testament times, even good people sometimes fell into a passion, and used unjust severity, and even *cruelty*, toward their dependents; for which God was angry with them; he is engaged in a very easy, but needless business. But if he would intimate that the Father of mercies, the God and Father of all flesh, *allowed* those whom he had chosen to be a special people, and a

holy people unto himself, (Deut. vii. 6,) to employ unjust severity and cruel treatment toward their inferiors,—all the reply that can be necessary, is, an expression of mingled contempt and indignation at the assertion, and of profound pity for its author; who, in his zeal to defend American slavery, has charged God so foolishly. We might pass this proposition without further notice; but the examples which have been adduced as proof, demand some attention.

1. The case of Sarai is cited, who “dealt hardly” with Hagar. (Gen. xvi. 1–9.) The original is, *waatteanncha Sarai*, “and Sarai afflicted her;” *anah* signifying, to afflict, &c. “She was abused and maltreated,” says Doctor J., “to such a degree, as to induce her to flee to the wilderness. * * * * We can form no idea of this affliction but by referring to other passages where the word is used.” (pp. 39, 40.) The following are then cited: Isa. liii. 7. He (Christ) was oppressed and he was *afflicted*. Job xxx. 11, Because he hath loosed my cord and *afflicted* me. Ex. i. 11, Therefore they did set over them taskmasters, to *afflict* them with their burdens. “We cannot but conclude,” he adds, “that this affliction was corporeal, and exceedingly hard to bear.”

But why not quote Gen. xv. 13? And he said unto Abram, Know of a surety that thy seed shall be a stranger in a land that is not theirs, and shall serve them; and they shall *afflict* them (*weinnu*) four hundred years. *And also that nation whom they shall serve will I judge*, (that is, punish.) Ex. i. 11, might have been illustrated by Ex. iii. 7, 8, And the Lord said, I have surely seen the *affliction* (*eth-oni*) of my people which are in Egypt, and have heard their cry by reason of their taskmasters, for I know their sorrows: and am come down to deliver them out of the hand of the Egyptians. As good old Job has been summoned to testify in this case, it may not be amiss to hear “ane word mair” from him: [xxxiv. 28,] So that they [the wicked, mighty men] cause the cry of the poor to come unto him, [God,] *and he heareth the cry of the afflicted*, [*aniyyim*.] How truly was this declaration, so consolatory to the oppressed, verified in the case of Hagar! “When Sarai dealt hardly with her, she fled from her face. And the angel of the Lord found her by a fountain of water in the wilderness. * * * And he said, Hagar, Sarai’s maid, whence

comest thou? And whither wilt thou go? And she said, I flee from the face of my mistress Sarai. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Return to thy mistress, and submit thyself under her hands. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, I will multiply thy seed exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for multitude. And the angel of the Lord said unto her, Behold thou art with child, and shalt bear a son, and shalt call his name Ishmael, *because the Lord hath heard thy affliction*, [aneyek.] And she called the name of the Lord that spake unto her, Thou God seest me: for she said, Have I also here looked after him that seeth me? Wherefore the well was called Beer-lahai-roi."

How does Doctor J. represent this angelic visit? Leaving wholly out of sight his message of mercy, he describes "the mighty Redeemer," like some Kentucky slave-catcher, as having come down from heaven, simply to defend the rights of the master, to restore the fugitive slave! "The angel of the Lord found her. This is none other but the angel Jehovah, the mighty Redeemer. * * * *And what was God's message to her?* Like a modern abolitionist, did he give her wings to fly, and bid her be off from such cruelty and oppression? Did he hire some Vanzandt, to conceal her in his wagon, and hurry her away towards Egypt, * * * or toward some frozen Canada, to suffer in an inhospitable climate? * * * And the angel Jehovah said unto her, Return to thy mistress, and submit thyself under her hands. Such is Jehovah's command, to a poor, abused and afflicted runaway African slave. How different the counsels of Infinite Wisdom, from those of modern abolitionism!" [p. 40.] And as if he labored to present the story in the most repulsive features possible, he adds, "The phrase, *under his hand*, [Ex. xxi. 20,] may throw some light on the instruction of the angel to Hagar, when he tells her to submit herself under the hands of her mistress. *It undoubtedly implies the use of the hands in severe correction.*" The Lord Jesus, then, came from the throne of glory, to tell the poor, "abused and maltreated" slave to return and receive further severe correction from the hands of her enraged mistress! And *this* was "*God's message to her!*" Not one word of comfort! Not a single intimation to Sarai that she was doing wrong! And this was the God "who heareth the cry

of the afflicted!" A more awful and horrible misrepresentation of the blessed word and character of God, it has seldom been our misfortune to read.

Let us look at the truth of the case. [1.] Hagar was not the *slave*, but the *wife* of Abram. [Gen. xvi. 3.] She was pregnant by him; and in a delicate, if not dangerous situation. At Sarai's own suggestion, she had become a secondary wife. [2.] Sarai, offended at her pride, which, under the circumstances, was very natural, but of course sinful,—*afflicted* her. [3.] God has promised to hear the cry of the *afflicted*; and he fulfilled his promise; not sending an angel, but coming personally. He calls her "Sarai's maid," "as a check to her pride: though *she was Abram's wife, and as such, obliged to return*, yet he calls her Sarai's *maid* to humble her."—(Henry.) He tells her to return, and submit herself under the hands of her mistress; for the secondary wives were subject to the principal wife. So says Josephus; who, being himself a Jewish priest, and conversant with oriental customs, was perhaps as well qualified to judge of this matter as the President of Miami University. Speaking of Zilpah and Leah, who stood in precisely the same situation to Jacob, as Hagar to Abram, he says, "Zilpah was handmaid to Leah, and Bilhah to Rachel, *by no means slaves*, but however *subject to their mistresses*." (Antig. B. I. c. 19, § 8.) The Saviour then adds these words of consolation: that the child in her womb should be a son; that she should be safely and happily delivered; that by this son she should become the parent of an innumerable posterity,—the very blessing given to the father of the faithful; and that her seed should be invincible,—a promise not made respecting the seed of Abram by Isaac. He condescended, also, to name her unborn child; and to remind her of his gracious visit, and his attention to the cry of her affliction, called him *Yishmael*, that is, *God will hear*. No wonder that after an interposition in her behalf, so kind, timely, and honorable, Hagar too set up her Eben-ezer, calling the Lord *El-roi*, the visible God; and the well where he had appeared to her, *Beer-lahai-roi*, the well of him that liveth and seeth me. And let it be remembered, that all this while, Abram, though the father of Ishmael and of believers, received no heavenly visit, no divine promise respecting his

future son; and that so far as we know, Jehovah never appeared to him nor spoke with him during the fourteen years following. How different the air of the Scripture narrative, from that of the Speech before us! How forcibly we are reminded, by every circumstance, of His loving kindness, and regard for the oppressed, who afterwards said, in the law of Moses, “Any widow, (*almanah*, *forsaken one*, and Hagar was very like such an one when her husband said to Sarai, Behold thy maid is in thy hand; do to her as it pleaseth thee.)—“Any widow, or fatherless child *ye shall not afflict*, (*lo thrannun*.) If thou afflict them in any wise, and they cry at all unto me, I will surely hear their cry; and my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless.”—(Ex. xxii. 22–24.) “How different the counsels of Infinite Wisdom,” from the representation of these modern anti-abolitionists! Such is a fair specimen of the manner in which the Scripture is perverted, for the defence of slavery, by a Doctor of Divinity, a master in Israel! Tell it not in Gath; publish it not in the streets of Askelon; lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph. * * * * I am distressed for thee, my brother—*Junkin*.

2. Ex. xxi. 20–21, is the other *proof* cited to sustain this fifth proposition. “If a man smite his servant, (*abdo*), or his maid, (*amatho*), with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall surely be punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished: for he is his money. * * * * Here we see extremely violent whipping; and, if death follow immediately, the master shall be punished, to what extent the law does not define. But, if the slave survive the beating a day or two, the man-slayer goes with impunity—‘he shall not be punished.’ The reason of this impunity is stated—for he is his money.’ It is presumed that the interest of the master will be, in all ordinary cases, a sufficient guarantee to the safety of his own purchased slave.”—(p. 41.)

It must be admitted that this law, as it appears in our English version, would seem to be a hard one for the poor servant, but we think it has been satisfactorily shown by Weld, in his Bible

Argument against Slavery, that when viewed in the language in which it was dictated by Jehovah, like all his other laws, it bears the impress of infinite wisdom and equity. Taking it as an isolated statute, with the expository remarks of Dr. J., we are led to the conclusion that a Hebrew master might beat his servant so inhumanly as to cause his death in twenty-four hours, and yet be wholly unpunished. Can this be a law of Him with whom there is no respect of person? In view of the law as thus interpreted, perhaps, the Legislature of North Carolina, in 1798, passed the following act: "That if any person shall hereafter be guilty of wilfully and maliciously killing a slave * * * * he shall be adjudged guilty of murder, and shall suffer the same punishment as if he had killed a freeman: provided always, this act shall not extend * * * * to any slave *dying under moderate correction*."—(Stroud's Sketch, p. 37.) Yet this act is an improvement upon its supposed model; for if the correction were immoderate, the murderer must suffer the same punishment as if he had killed a freeman: but Dr. J. assures us that the Hebrew law did not define the punishment, tho' the slave died under his master's hand!

An attempt is made to relieve the evident harshness of the law, as thus explained, by telling us the legislator "presumed that the interest of the master would be, in ordinary cases, a sufficient guarantee to the safety of his own purchased slave." But what protection had the servant in those *extraordinary* cases, in which the master's interest would *not* be a sufficient safe-guard of his servant's life;—the very cases in which he would need legislative protection? This suggestion, therefore, will not remove the difficulty. The Divine Law-giver could not but know the fact, attested by the history of all slave-holding communities, that when the passions of the master are aroused, the fear of pecuniary loss will not always induce him to spare his victim. How many slaves have been deliberately murdered by their masters, in our own country! The very existence of laws, such as that which we have just quoted, proves the occurrence of such crimes: for laws are not passed to punish crimes never committed. (See Stroud's Sketch, p. 39, and the note.) Well, knowing, then, the violence of fallen man "dressed

in a little brief authority;" and how little revenge would heed the thirty pieces of silver lost by its gratification; did He leave the poor bondman unprotected, in the hands of an infuriated tyrant, who might, with impunity, *kill him by moderate correction?* Credat, Judæus Apella. Non ego.

Let us consult the original statute. [1.] "If a man smite his servant or his maid," &c. The *ebed* and the *amah* here mentioned, might be Hebrews, (Ex. xxi. 2, *ebed Ibri*;) or of foreign birth, (Lev. xxv. 44.) Nothing in the law confines its application to persons of one class, or of the other. The servant might be a husband and father: the maid, a wife and a mother.

[2.] Notice the instrument employed in correction: "with a rod," [*Shebet*;) not a deadly weapon, but a stick suitable for inflicting chastisement. Compare the following passages in which *shebet* occurs: Isa. x. 15, As if the *rod* should shake itself against them that lift it up, &c. xxviii. 27, The fitches are beaten out with a staff, and the cummin with a *rod*. "Cummin is a plant much like fennel; and which produces blossoms and branches in an umbellated form." [Rob. Calmet.] The rod used for threshing it, was, therefore, a small stick. Mic. v. 1, [Hebr. iv. 14,] They shall smite the judge of Israel with a *rod* upon the cheek.—Not with a *club*, surely.—Lev. xxvii. 32, Whatsoever [of the flock, &c.,] passeth under the *rod*,—namely, which the shepherd carries to govern the sheep. Mic. vii. 14, Feed thy people with thy *rod*.—If, in the use of such an instrument, the master whipped his servant till he died "under his hand," the weapon itself proved the infliction of many stripes, with savage cruelty, and a determination to take life.

[3.] In this case, the master shall "surely be punished," says our translation: but the original is, *nakam yinnakem*, *he*, [*the servant*,] *must assuredly be avenged*.—For proof that *nakam* signifies *to avenge*, and generally, if not uniformly, implies *the taking of life*, consult the following among other passages: Gen. iv. 15, Whosoever shall slay Cain, *vengeance shall be taken* on him [*yukkom*] seven-fold. iv. 24, If Cain *shall be avenged* [*yukkam*] seven-fold, &c.—Joshua x. 13, And the sun

stood still, and the moon stayed, until the people *had avenged* themselves [*adyikkom*] upon their enemies. Judg. xv. 7, 8. And Samson said, * * * * yet *will I be avenged* of you, [*nikkamti*] &c. * * * * And he smote them hip and thigh, with great slaughter; xvi. 28. Samson's last prayer was, That I may at once *be avenged* [*weinnakemah nekam*] of the Philistines, for my two eyes. 1. Sam. xiv. 24, Cursed be he that eateth, &c. * * * * that *I may be avenged* [*nikkamti*] on mine enemies. xviii. 25, The King desireth a hundred fore-skins of the Philistines, *to be avenged* [*lehinnakem*] of the King's enemies. xxiv. 13, The Lord *avenge* me of thee, (*unekamani*.) 2. Sam. iv. 8, Behold the head of Ishbosheth, * * * * the Lord *hath avenged* my lord the King this day of Saul and of his seed, [*wayyjitlu* * * * * *nekamoth*, hath given vengeance.] 2. Kings ix. 7, And thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy master, that *I may avenge* [*wenikkamti*] the blood of my servants, the prophets, &c. Jer. v. 9, Shall not my soul *be avenged* [*thithnaakkem*] on such a nation as this? Verse 29, the same words. Jer. xlv. 10, For this is the day of the Lord God of Hosts, *a day of vengeance*, that *he may avenge himself* of his adversaries, [*yom nekamah lehinnakem*]; and the sword shall devour, &c. * * * * and be made drunk with their blood, &c.

We are told that the law does not define the extent of the master's punishment. [p. 41.] When God declares that the deliberate murder of a servant must assuredly be avenged, one who carefully examines the divine system of laws given by the hand of Moses, will scarcely be at a loss to determine the nature of that vengeance. Compare Lev. xxiv. 17, 21, 22, and he that killeth *any man* shall surely be put to death * * * * he that killeth a man, shall be put to death. Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country: for I am the Lord your God. Num. xxxv. 30, 31-33, Whoso killeth *any person*, the murderer shall be put to death by the hand of witnesses * * * * moreover, ye shall take no satisfaction for the life of a murderer, who is guilty of death, but he shall be surely put to death. * * * * So shall ye not pollute the land wherein ye are: for blood it defileth the land: and the land cannot be cleansed of the blood that is shed therein, but

by the blood of him that shed it.—Would not the blood of a servant defile the land, as certainly as that of a master?

(4.) This law provides for another case; namely, that of a master who beat his servant with a rod, so that he died, not under his hand, but after a day or two. Our version says, “he shall not be punished”; and Doctor J. asserts that he escaped with impunity.—Let us examine this point.—There are various kinds of homicide. First, wilful murder, which is justly reckoned a capital crime. Secondly, manslaughter: then, justifiable, and accidental homicide. We are not aiming at legal exactness, in this general classification. The Mosaic code, like every other equitable system of criminal jurisprudence, recognizes these distinctions. It institutes an inquiry into the intention of the manslayer; and assigns different penalties, according to the nature of the offence committed. In proof of this, consult the whole law relative to the cities of refuge, Num. xxxv. particularly verses 20–24; and Deut. xix.

In the case under consideration, the master could not be regarded as a wilful murderer. He did not *intend* to kill his servant. This appears, first, from the fact that the servant did not die under his hands. Had he designed to kill him, or had he acted under the impulse of ungovernable passion, he would have beat him to death upon the spot. Secondly; the kind of instrument employed, favored the conclusion that he did not intend his death. Compare Num. xxxv. 16, If he smite him with an instrument of iron, so that he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death. And if he smite him with throwing a stone wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death. Or if he smite him with a hand weapon of wood wherewith he may die, and he die, he is a murderer: the murderer shall surely be put to death.—Now this master used no such deadly weapon; but a rod. The presumption was therefore in his favor.—Thirdly, “he (the servant) is his money;” *kaspo hu; his silver is he*. This cannot be taken literally: he was not his master’s *silver*, nor his shekels and gerahs. When Christ says of the sacramental bread, This *is* my body, he means, this represents my body. So the servant *represented* his master’s money. The master

had given money for him, that is, *for his service*; as will be fully proved hereafter. Now, if he killed him, the money was paid, but the service could never be obtained. The interest which he had in his servant's life, therefore, afforded, *in this case*, additional presumptive proof that he was not a wilful murderer. For however little the fear of loss might influence an infuriated master, the circumstances already adverted to, prove that this man was not actuated by hate or revenge. On the contrary, he was in such a state of mind, that he might weigh the consequences, and consider the pecuniary loss to himself, if he killed his servant.—These circumstances, taken together, acquit the master of deliberate wilful murder: the law therefore declares, not that “he shall not be punished,” but, *lo yukkam, he, or it*, (the servant, or his death,) *shall not be avenged*; that is, in the same sense in which *nakam* had been just used in the previous verse; the master's *life* shall not be taken. That he must suffer such punishment as should be awarded by the judges who tried the case, and acquitted him of capital crime, there can be little doubt, when we remember that blood defiled the holy land; and that even he who slew a man unawares, and was not his enemy, neither sought his harm, must flee to the city of refuge, and abide there unto the death of the High Priest, on pain of death by the hand of the avenger of blood. (Num. xxxv. 22, 28.)

It may be supposed that the loss of the servant's labor was a sufficient, and therefore, the only penalty. Let it be considered, however, that the man who smote out his servant's eye or tooth *inadvertently*, was obliged to set him free for his eye or tooth's sake; that is, to suffer the loss of his service. [Ex. xxi. 26, 27.] We say, *inadvertently*; for if that cruelty were *purposely* inflicted, a more severe punishment was enjoined. “If a man cause a blemish in his neighbor; as he hath done, so shall it be done unto him: breach for breach, eye for eye, tooth for tooth: as he hath caused a blemish in a man, so shall it be done to him again. * * * * Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country; &c., (Lev. xxiv. 19, 22.) Now if the man who unintentionally knocked out his servant's tooth, lost his future service; surely equity would

impose a heavier penalty on him who unintentionally, but perhaps from want of due care and consideration in chastisement, took his life. Does the life deserve no higher protection than a tooth? Are they reckoned of equal value by the Divine Lawgiver?

The above interpretation of this whole law will be confirmed by examining it in connection with the laws immediately preceding and following. [1.] "If men strive together, and one smite another with a stone, or with his fist, and he die not, but keepeth his bed: if he rise again, and walk abroad upon his staff, then shall he that smote him be quit: only he shall pay for the loss of his time, and shall cause him to be thoroughly healed." [Ex. xxi. 18, 19.] [2.] "If a man smite his servant, &c., with a rod, and he die under his hand, he shall surely be punished. Notwithstanding, if he continue a day or two, he shall not be punished," &c., (verses 20, 21.) [3.] "If men strive, and hurt a woman with child, so that her fruit depart from her, and yet no mischief follow: he shall be surely punished, according as the woman's husband shall lay upon him: and he shall pay as the judges determine." (verse 22.)—In our version, it is simply said, in regard to the criminals mentioned in the second and fourth cases, "he shall surely be punished:" while in the third, we read that the master "shall not be punished;" apparently, the same sentence of acquittal as in the first case, where the law says, "he shall be quit." The original Hebrew accurately distinguishes these several offences, by the penalty affixed to each. First, "he that smote him *shall be quit*," *wenikkah*,—the verb *nakah* signifying, to be pure, innocent; and in Niphal, as here, to be free from punishment. (Gibbs' Man. Lex.) Secondly, the wilfully murdered servant, shall as we have seen, assuredly be avenged, (*nakom yinnakem*.) Thirdly, in the case of the master guilty, not of murder, but of manslaughter, the law says, *not, nikkah, he shall go unpunished*, as in verse 19.; but, *lo yukkam*, the servant shall not be avenged, by taking the master's life. Fourthly, in regard to him who accidentally kills an unknown child, the law decides, not indefinitely, "he shall be surely punished;" but *anosh yeancsh*, he shall surely be *fin*ed: *anash* meaning to mulct, fine, punish by fine or forfeiture. (Parkhurst.)

So much, then, for the only proofs brought to sustain this fifth proposition, "that a very considerable degree of severity in the treatment of servants, was practiced in Old Testament times." But we cannot pass from this topic without expressing our sincere regret that Doctor J. should have thought it his duty to attempt the proof of such a proposition. Is this "the suffering truth" of the day? Is too great lenity in the treatment of slaves, the crying sin of the South? Are the thousands of poor, unhappy creatures now held in bondage by the members of our own church, so idle and disobedient, through the undue relaxation of discipline, and the disuse of the cowhide, that the President of (what was once) the leading literary institution of the free West, must stoop from his dignity, indirectly to encourage these masters in imitating what he supposes to have been the patriarchal and Jewish custom, and in employing *a very considerable degree of severity*?—But we leave him to the reproaches of his own conscience.

"Proposition VI. That God has nowhere in the Old Testament PROHIBITED slavery. There is no command to this amount, 'Masters, let your servants go free.' The relation of master and slave is nowhere condemned as a sin, and forbidden to exist. * * * * If the relation of master and servant, in perpetuity or for life, be in itself and apart from all cruelties and abuses of power, a horrible sin in the sight of God, let us have a text from the Old Testament to condemn it." (p. 43.)

Our author, in the course of his remarks upon 1 Tim. vi. 1-5, takes occasion to give a learned criticism upon *zugos, ol, motah, mozenayim, &c.*; the Greek and Hebrew terms for yoke, balances, &c.; in which he absolutely demonstrates that *the yoke is an emblem of genuine slavery!* "Under the yoke," says he, "a phrase which undoubtedly signifies bondage, *deep and degraded slavery*, * * * a symbol of bondage, a type of slavery. (p. 63.) * * * Thus it is clear, that to be *under the yoke*, is to be in a state of slavery. *To have the yoke broken off is to be made free.*" (p. 64.) About half an hour, during the delivery of the speech, was consumed, not to say wasted, in yoking the Synod with this doctrine. We are glad to find that certain hints which were thrown out, have led the Doctor to *shorten* his yoke, and thus

make it somewhat easier to bear. If any of the members had previously hesitated to concede what they might deem so disputable a doctrine, surely the long array of passages adduced and expounded, and the Doctor's peculiarly lucid and logical reasoning, must have dissipated every doubt! Certainly, all scholars must hereafter admit, that if there be any reliance on the *ars critica*, our author has shown conclusively, that *the yoke* typifies not *servitude*, merely, but *slavery*. At any rate, *we* are decidedly, converts to this *new opinion*; which, we hope, will be embodied in the next edition of the *Comprehensive Commentary*.

But unfortunately for this sixth proposition, which deserved a better fate than to fall by the hand of its father, one of the passages to which we are referred, is Isa. lviii. 6. Is not this the fast that I have chosen? to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens, *and to let the oppressed go free*, and that ye **BREAK EVERY YOKE**, (*notah.*) The Septuagint renders it thus: *Ouchi toiauten nesteian exelexamen legei kurios, alla luc panta sundesmon adikias, dealuc straggalias baion sunal-lagmaton, apostelle tetrausmenous en aphesci, kai pasan sungraphen adikon diaspa*. I have not chosen such a fast, saith the Lord: but loose every bond of unrighteousness, untie the cords of forced contracts, dismiss the oppressed by an act of emancipation, and tear in pieces every unjust written agreement.—Now, if the yoke is an emblem of slavery, and if language can convey definite ideas, the Lord declares, in this passage, his abhorrence of slavery, and requires immediate emancipation: yea, more; he refuses to hear the prayers of those who neglect to liberate their slaves. If it be asked, How could the Lord require the immediate release of all slaves, when he had himself established laws tolerating slavery?—we answer, he had established no such laws. If it be asked, How could the Jews have slaves to liberate, if their law allowed no slavery?—we reply, they could as easily imitate their heathen neighbors in slave-holding, as in any other sin.

This application of the passage, the Doctor heard at Synod; and in his printed speech replies to it as follows: "The prophet is correcting abuses in the context referred to. As in the days

of Nehemiah, the Hebrews had generally disregarded the laws relative to their treatment of slaves: they did not release at the end of the sixth year, nor even at the jubilee—they treated their Hebrew servants with rigor, contrary to law. These illegal exactions he would correct. The law forbid the Hebrew to make his brother serve with rigor, this Isaiah would restore—‘to loose the bonds of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens.’ The law ordered the servant to be set free, of whom the master had broken a tooth, or destroyed an eye: this the prophet enforces, ‘and to let the oppressed—the broken, as it signifies, go free:’ that is, for his eye’s or tooth’s sake. The law made all Hebrew slaves free at the end of six years; and here the prophet, like Nehemiah, enforces the law: ‘Let every man, who is entitled by law to his freedom, go free—break ye off every yoke.’ To infer from the general term ‘every yoke,’ that those who were not by law entitled to freedom, must obtain it, is not to interpret, but to pervert the prophet’s language.” (p. 65.)

This *exposition* demands a few remarks. (1.) The author *asserts* what he should have *proved*, when he says that the clause “break every yoke,” applies to the Hebrew six years’ servants *only*. Neither the words themselves, the text, nor the context, authorize any such conclusion. He refers us, indeed, to Neh. v. 1–13; and intimates that Nehemiah and Isaiah were engaged in the same work of correcting abuses relative to *Hebrew* servants. There is this important difference, however, between the passages: Nehemiah tells us expressly that he was speaking of Hebrew servants; (vs. 1, 2, &c.,) while Isaiah says no such thing. But grant that the passages are parallel:—Nehemiah’s language is point-blank against Doctor J.’s exposition. The law, as we have seen, allowed the conditional sale of a daughter, who was to become the wife of her purchaser; (Ex. xxi. 7;) but we do not find that Jewish parents were authorized to sell their sons. Yet this was done in the days of Nehemiah. Taking advantage of the necessities of the times, these ancient oppressors bought girls as servants, not as wives; and were about to purchase poor boys also. It is not intimated, that these children were held more than six years. On the contrary, the

probability is that the parents complained to Nehemiah very soon after the transactions took place. And what does he say? "We, after our ability, have redeemed our brethren, the Jews, which were sold unto the heathen; and will ye even sell your brethren? Or shall they be sold unto us?" (v. 8.) He does not reprove the rich Jews for holding their brethren beyond the legal period; but for the simple fact of holding them at all. And if this passage be parallel to Isa. lviii. 6, and expository of it, then are we certain that the prophet is here condemning all kinds of involuntary bondage, whether practised under or without the *forms* of law.

(2.) The learned President is surely joking,—putting us off with a pun instead of a proof,—when he tells us in his usual chaste and flowing style, "the law ordered the servant to be set free, of whom the master had broken a tooth, &c.: this the prophet enforces, 'and to let the oppressed—the *broken*, as it signifies, go free;—that is, for his eye's or his tooth's sake.'" The poor slaves whose teeth had been broken out by their master's cruelty, were the *retzutzim*, the oppressed, the *broken*, were they? Partly broken, they were, undoubtedly;—broken as to their teeth. But will the Doctor assert, in sober earnest, that the Hebrew word here used, specially denotes persons whose teeth or eyes are knocked out? We are aware that the margin reads, "broken," for "oppressed;" and that the word *ratzutz* sometimes has that signification: as, for instance, in Ps. lxxiv. 14, Thou *breakest* the heads of the Leviathans in pieces. But were the broken-headed Leviathans, those, particularly, whose teeth or eyes were knocked out?—So, Isa. xxxvi. 6, Lo, thou trustest in the staff of this *broken* reed, on Egypt, &c., xlii. 3, A *bruised* reed shall he not break, &c. The worthy Doctor reminds us of Crambe, the chum of Martinus Scriblerus, of whom his biographer says, "As for Crambe, he contented himself with *words*, and if he could but *form some conceit* upon them, was *fully satisfied*. Thus Crambe would tell his instructor, that all men were not *singular*. * * * * When he was told that a substance was that which was *subject to accidents*; then soldiers, quoth Crambe, are the most substantial people in the world. Neither would he allow it to be a good definition

of accident, that it could be *present or absent without the destruction of the subject*; since there are a great many accidents that destroy the subject, as burning does a house, and death a man." Even so does our Doctor "form a conceit" upon the word "*broken*:" "let the oppressed—the broken—go free; that is, those whose *teeth are broken out*!"—*Risum teneatis, amici?*—And this is the critic who talks of abolitionists "twisting and wrenching the Scripture!"—(p. 63.)

The verb *ratzatz*, from which comes *retzutzim*, "the oppressed," is evidently used "in a metaphorical sense; to break, crush, oppress greatly." (Parkhurst.) Compare the passages cited in his Lexicon: Deut. xxviii. 33, The fruit of thy land, and all thy labors, shall a nation which thou knowest not eat up: and thou shalt be oppressed and *crushed* [*ashuk weratzutz*] always. Judg. x. 8, And that year, they vexed and *oppressed* [*warotzetzu*] the children of Israel. I Sam. xii. 3, 4, Behold, here I am: witness against me before the Lord, and before his anointed; whose ox have I taken? or whose ass have I taken? or whom have I defrauded? whom have I *oppressed* [*ratztzothi*?]—To these add the following: 2 Chron. xvi. 10, and Asa *oppressed* [*waratzetz*] some of the people the same time. Job xx. 19, Because he hath *oppressed* [*ritztatz*] and forsaken the poor. Am. iv. 1, Hear this word, ye kine of Bashan, that are in the mountain of Samaria, which oppress the poor, which *crush* [*harotztzoth*] the needy; which say to their masters, Bring, and let us drink. The Septuagint renders *ratzatz* by *telhrausmenous*; from *thrauo*; which signifies, to break in pieces, to bruise, to crush to pieces, to grind, [Donnegan:] but never, that we find, *to knock the teeth out*! Will Doctor J., in the second edition of his speech, favor us with a reference to the *other* passages in which *retzutzim* means slaves that have lost their teeth or eyes?

[3.] Our author interprets the clauses, "to loose the bands of wickedness, to undo the heavy burdens," as a restoration of "the law which forbade the Hebrew to make his brother serve with rigor." Did he not observe that his favorite term, *yoke*, is contained in one of these clauses; that "to undo the heavy burdens" is, *hatter aguddoth motah*, *to untie the knots of the yoke*, that is, "the cords inserted into the wooden parts of it;" [Park-

hurst;] and that this expression conveys the same general idea as the last clause, "break every yoke?" Why, then, does he expound it so differently?

(4.) We are told that "*every yoke*" is a general term, which must not be pressed too strongly; but interpreted according to the critical canon relative to all general expressions; such as, "Servants, obey your masters in *all* things;" "Render them *all* honor," &c. But are such terms never to be taken strictly? When David says, "I hate *every* false way," (Ps. cxix. 104,) does he mean that there are some false ways which he did not hate? When he tells us that mankind "are *all* gone aside," (Ps. xiv. 3,) does he not mean that "there is *none* that doeth good, no, *not one*?" Is there not a multitude of similar cases? By what authority, then, does Doctor J. decide that "*every*," in Isa. lviii. 6, belongs to the former, rather than the latter class of general terms?—that "break *every* yoke," signifies, break *a few* yokes, only, namely, those on the Hebrew six years' servants who have been kept beyond the legal time; but let the yoke remain on others till they have served the full period; and on the ear-bored Hebrews, and the heathen, *forever*? In fact, he has, with amusing inconsistency, decided the contrary; and assured us that "*every*," is to be construed strictly. He applies the command, "break every yoke," to the Hebrews whose term of service had been illegally protracted: and was not *every one* of these to be emancipated? This command, therefore, according to his own exposition, implies, that servants held according to law were not under the yoke,—that is, *were not slaves*. We are authorized to assert, then, that Isaiah lviii. 6, is an act of immediate emancipation, passed by the Court of Heaven, in favor of all the slaves in Israel.*

* We beg leave to introduce, here, a brief piece of Ecclesiastical history, and correspondence, which may confirm our exposition of the passage in question. In the year 1833, our General Assembly addressed a letter to the United Secession Church of Scotland, part of which is as follows: "Allow us just to solicit your particular attention to a minute of the proceedings of our present Sessions, in which we recommend to our own churches, and take leave to invite those of other communions, to set apart the first Monday in January next, as a season of special prayer, with fastings, for the conversion of the world to God."—(Min. Gen. Assemb. 1834, pp. 57-59.) The United Secession Church wrote a reply, dated Glasgow, March 1, 1834; in which they

Having now passed in review all Doctor J.'s propositions which have respect to the Old Testament, we proceed to his arguments from the New Testament. His general positions are stated in these words:—

“I. There is not a sentence in the New Testament, which expressly forbids the having, and holding of a slave.”

“II. There is not a sentence in the New Testament, which,

speak thus: “Dear Brethren, * * * * Since we know that God heareth not sinners, it is the more incumbent upon those who have received the truth, in the love of it, to pray for sinners, and to make prayers and intercessions for all men, that they may be saved,—not only for men of every rank, but of every kindred and nation: and since we know that if there is any thing in our hearts inconsistent with equity, or with the object for which we pray, God will not hear us, let us see to it that our hearts condemn us not in our prayers, so as to destroy, or even impair our confidence: *let our fasting be such as the Lord hath chosen, accompanied with the undoing of every burden not imposed by the revealed will of God, and the breaking of every yoke not compatible with the nature and design of the gospel dispensation.* These suggestions we have been induced to present, * * * * simply as an indication of our views on a most important subject, which we consider as intimately connected with exertions for the spread of the gospel. * * * * We have deeply lamented the organization, among professed christians, of a system of slavery worse than that which existed among the heathen, and have long deplored the accumulation of guilt it has brought on our native country. Having, *as a Court, petitioned Parliament against it, and recommended the same measure to all our congregations,*” (Surely they are not aware of the evils to be feared from connecting religious and political action! Will not Doctor J. send their leading men a few copies of his speech; or, at least, of *his four arguments* against the introduction of the slavery question into Ecclesiastical bodies?) * * * * “we cannot but earnestly entreat our dear brethren in Christ to co-operate with us, and with all who are associated to obtain the abolition of the system wherever it exists.”

This reply embodied, unintentionally, the keenest satire upon our supreme Ecclesiastical Court, as well as upon our whole church. To appreciate it, we must remember that sixteen years previous, the Assembly of 1818 had said to the world, “*We consider the voluntary enslaving of one part of the human race by another, as a gross violation of the most precious and sacred rights of human nature; as utterly inconsistent with the law of God, which requires us to love our neighbor as we love ourselves; and as totally irreconcilable with the spirit and principles of the gospel of Christ,*” &c. No wonder that when the Assembly of 1834 received this letter, it hung its head for shame. Thank God! we had virtue enough to blush. The answer was in these words of humble confession: “We receive in kindness your observations on the subject of slavery. They are the reproofs of friends, and are like precious oil. We hope they may make us more sensible of the evils of the system, and rouse us to new and increased exertions to remove the iniquity from among us. WE ARE VERILY GUILTY IN

by a fair and just interpretation according to the rules of grammar, gives ground for the logical inference, that the simple holding of a slave, or slaves, is inconsistent with christian profession, and christian character.”—(p. 45.)

The first of these assertions is in the mouth of all pro-slavery men. They deem it an irresistible argument. “If,” say they in the language of this pamphlet, (p. 44,)—“If our opposing brethren had written the New Testament, or any one book of it, would you not expect to find a strong, plain, and unequivocal testimony against slavery, in it?” And yet we find no such testimony; no single sentence that, in so many words, declares, It is sinful to hold human beings as property.

May we not fairly turn this argument against our opponents? If Dr. J. had written the New Testament, or any one book of it, would you not expect to find a strong, plain, and unequivocal assertion of the right of property in man; and a declaration that holding unpaid, involuntary servants, for life, and bequeathing them to one’s children, is entirely consistent with christian character?—But there is another very short and simple answer to the question asked us. The opponents of slavery will produce just such a passage as is desired, when the advocates of slavery shall have found a similar express declaration of scripture against horse-racing, gambling, dancing, theatre-going, house-burning, the exhibition of the Grecian and Roman games, gladiatorial combats, piracy, &c. &c.—Tertullian thought it necessary to write a tract, *De Spectaculis*, and eloquently to

THIS MATTER. * * * * * Moral means are those on which we are constrained chiefly to rely. These we are bringing into operation; and it is believed that the friends of man and the friends of God are beginning to feel on this great point, more sensibly than they have hitherto felt, and to act more efficiently than they have hitherto acted, in removing this trespass from among us. IT HINDERS OUR PRAYERS, AND TILL THIS STUMBLING BLOCK OF OUR INIQUITY BE TAKEN AWAY, WE CANNOT EXPECT THE GOSPEL OF OUR BLESSED SAVIOUR TO EXHIBIT ALL ITS POWER IN THE CONVERSION AND SANCTIFICATION OF MEN.” Memorable acknowledgment!—But what an awful commentary upon this public and solemn declaration, is the subsequent action of the Assembly, in regard to slavery! During the *nine* years which have passed since 1834, that body has uniformly laid upon the table, anti-slavery petitions from members, Presbyteries, and Synods; and indefinitely postponed the whole subject as often as it has been forced upon them!

inveigh against attending *the public shows*. Why did not Paul as expressly condemn these spectacles? They were exhibited in every principal city of the Roman Empire. The temples and the amphitheatres were perhaps the first buildings which met his eye, as he entered Cæsarea, or Antioch, or Corinth, or Rome. Herod the Great built a theatre in Jerusalem, and a vast amphitheatre in the plain; where he celebrated games every fifth year, in honor of Cæsar, to the great scandal of pious Jews; as Josephus informs us, (*Antiq. B. xv. c. 8, § 1.*) Why did not Christ or his apostles denounce this innovation, which they must have beheld with grief and indignation? Witherspoon wrote a treatise against the stage. Why did not Peter pen a single paragraph? Such questions may be multiplied indefinitely.—Shall we be told that gladiatorial combats are forbidden by the command, “Thou shalt not kill?” Slaveholding is equally forbidden by the law, “Thou shalt not steal.” Does the injunction to “redeem the time,” condemn attendance upon theatrical exhibitions? As certainly does the golden rule, “Do unto others as ye would that they should do unto you,” forbid one man to hold another, against his will, as property, subject to be bought and sold like a beast of burden. The fact is, the Bible was not given to be an *Index Rerum Prohibitaram*, a complete catalogue of all the crimes that ever had been or would be committed. If its Divine Author has given us comprehensive general principles, of easy, natural, and universal application, accompanied with such specifications as show that application; and if these principles condemn every thing that is contrary to the law of love; we presume too much on our own wisdom when we imagine that it would have been far better to have mentioned this, that, or the other sin, in express terms.—Neither Christ nor his apostles asserted, in so many words, the right of mankind to liberty of conscience, and of speech: but, in spite of earth and hell, they *exercised* those rights. They did cry out against the despotic governments of the day: but they established a republican form of government in the church. Living in an empire where there were at least as many, if not twice as many slaves, as free inhabitants; (See Gibbon’s *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, c. 2;) that

wisdom which dwells with prudence forbade them to enrage a government naturally hostile, by declaring war, in plain terms, against the whole system of slavery: but they established *the church* on principles, by whose natural operation, the rich and the poor met together, and the servant was free from his master. The church was Christ's kingdom; destined to break in pieces and destroy all other kingdoms; and, in their destruction, to overthrow every species of tyranny and oppression.

In support of his two general propositions, Dr. J. presents, and defends five *subordinate* propositions.

"1. That the Greek word, *doulos*, usually translated *servant*, properly and commonly means a person held to service for life—a *slave*." (p. 45.)—This we shall pass without remark, for the present.

"2. The second subordinate proposition, with an inference, is, that Paul advises servants to abide quietly in their condition. This he could not do if the relation of master and slave was in itself a sin." (p. 59.)

The learned President is very fond of syllogisms; or, as they are called by a friend of ours, who is often intolerably "*bored*" with his sophistry, under this form,—*sillygisms*. If we are correctly informed, the antiquated dialectics of the schools are his hobby. Indeed, during the delivery of this very speech, he could not refrain from giving the Synod a specimen of the barbarous jargon,—*Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio*, &c.—Suppose we throw the substantial argument of this proposition into the form of a syllogism, employing the *reductio ad absurdum* against ourselves.

Paul advises slaves to abide quietly in their condition.

But the master who holds a slave, sins.

Therefore Paul advises servants to do wrong!

Compare this logic with the following:

Peter advises servants, when buffeted for doing well, to bear it patiently.

But it is sinful to buffet one for doing well,

Therefore Peter advises servants to commit sin!

This reminds us of the famous syllogism of Crambe. "Cornelius told him that he was a lying rascal; that an *universal* was

not the object of imagination, and that there was no such thing in reality, or *a parte rei*. But I can prove (quoth Crambe) that there are *clysters a parte rei*, but *clysters* are *universales*; ergo. Thus I prove my minor. *Quod aptum est inesse multis*, is an *universale* by definition: but every clyster before it is administered has that quality; therefore every clyster is an *universale*." (Pope's Works, vol. iv.)—By the way, we recommend to the students of Miami University who may study logic, the *Codicillus, seu Liber Memorialis, Martini Scribleri*,—particularly, Crambe's *Treatise on Syllogisms*, in chapter vii.—But to return from this digression: who does not see that the fallacy of the Doctor's argument lies in the clause, "if the relation of master and slave be in itself a sin."—Abolitionists affirm that such a relation is sinful; that is to say, the master who holds his fellow-man as a servant, without regard to his will, and as property, commits sin. But does it follow that *the slave sins* in being forcibly held in that relation, or by voluntarily remaining in slavery, when he cannot escape without doing more harm than good? It is sinful to persecute; but not to be persecuted: to smite the innocent on the right cheek; but not for the smitten to turn the other also: to hold a slave; but not to be held in slavery; nor to advise another to remain in that condition, rather than bring reproach on the gospel. And this is precisely what the apostle does, in the only passage referred to,—1 Cor. vii. 20, 24. Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he is called. Art thou called being a servant? Care not for it; (but if thou mayest be made free, use it rather.) For he that is called in the Lord, being a servant, is the Lord's freeman: likewise also, he that is called, being free, is Christ's servant. Ye are bought with a price; be ye not the servants of men.

Here observe, [1.] That the person addressed is the slave of a heathen master. The apostle speaks, (verse 10,) to the married, both parties being christians. He addresses "the rest," (verse 12.) "If any brother have a wife that believeth not," &c. "and the woman which hath a husband that believeth not," (verse 13.) In the same connection, he exhorts the slave having an unbelieving master, (verse 21.) So Scott and

Whitby: "The design of the apostle * * * * is to inform them, that their christianity did not exempt them from their secular relations to heathens, the believer still continuing in his conjugal relation, and in the same relation of a servant to his heathen master." [2.] He commands the slave to abide in the condition in which the grace of God found him. But for what reason? Because he was the real and rightful property of his master? Because the slave-holder invaded none of the servant's inherent rights? Because slave-holding was innocent and lawful? Had any of these things been true, how natural, how proper, not to say how necessary, that the apostle should assert them. They would have been the best possible reasons for the duty enjoined. Had the slave been the property of his master, in the sight of God; he would have had no more right to carry *himself* off, than to steal any other part of his master's goods and chattels. But Paul gives not the remotest hint of such a right of property. He states the ground of his injunction in all the cases referred, (verse 15,) "God hath called us to peace;" and (verse 16) to do good and not injury to the souls of unbelievers with whom we may be providentially connected. "For what knowest thou, O wife, whether thou shalt save thy husband? Or how knowest thou, O man, whether thou shalt save thy wife?" And equally, How knowest thou, O slave, whether thou shalt save thy master? Altho' he had a right to liberty, and was *bound* to accept it when offered, ("if thou mayest be made free, use it rather,") yet, to obtain it, under ordinary circumstances, by flight, or by open resistance, would produce any other result than "*peace*;" would prevent him from laboring for his master's salvation; would prejudice the unenlightened minds of heathen slave holders against Christianity; would induce them to forbid their unconverted slaves from attending christian worship, or conversing with religious people, lest they, too, should become, first christians, and then fugitives; and finally, would afford apparent reason for the popular clamor, that the apostles designed to "turn the world upside down." To avoid these injurious consequences, Paul exhorts such servants to sacrifice their rights, that the gospel might be honored. And this he could

do with perfect propriety: for altho' we dare not, through fear of consequences, neglect our duty; we may, for a sufficient reason, relinquish our privileges.—Far enough, then, is this apostolic injunction from recognising the right of property in man,—the lawfulness of slave-holding.

In the following words, (v. 23,) "Ye are bought with a price; be not ye the servants of men;" the apostle probably adverts to the redemption of the soul by the blood of Christ, as in ch. vi. 20; and therefore forbids the redeemed to "be blindly followers of men, conforming to their opinions."—(Bloomfield.) But when our author, after representing abolitionists as insisting "that 'be ye not servants of men,' is a natural servitude,"—roundly asserts that "such a construction is not only violent, but it is *disingenuous*, &c. * * * *No commentator ever entertained such an idea: until modern abolitionism invented it, the world, I presume, was ignorant of such a construction;*" [p. 53,]—he allows his zeal to outrun his discretion. Those eminent expositors, Whitby, McKnight, and Doddridge, (to omit others,) have adopted the very interpretation which Doctor J. so unceremoniously rejects. "Are ye bought out of servitude by the charity of christians? Return not again to the service of unbelievers." [Whitby, vol. 2, 138.] "Ye were bought with the price of Christ's blood: become not the slaves of men, by selling yourselves to them." [McKnight.] In this sense, only, as forbidding freedmen from again becoming slaves, voluntarily, was this passage quoted by abolitionists on the floor of Synod; and Dr. J. does them the highest injustice when he represents them as "abusing it to the encouragement of slave insurrections." [p. 54.] It is a stale and hackneyed slander upon anti-slavery men, picked up from the filthiest sewers of defamation, that they "encourage slaves to cut their master's throats."

"3. The third subordinate proposition, with an inference. The New Testament recognizes some masters as good men—true and faithful believers: therefore, the relation of master and slave, may exist, consistently with christian character and profession." [p. 53.]

We shall notice, at present, only the first proof under this head; that drawn from Mat. viii. 9, &c., the case of the

centurion. If our author intended merely to say that some slaveholders have been eminent christians, we should not deny the assertion. But he evidently means to teach that slaveholding is not sinful, because some good men have held slaves. Let us allow, for argument's sake, that the centurion was a slaveholder; and resort again to the use of the syllogism. The Doctor's argument will run thus:—

The Centurion was an eminent believer.

But he held slaves.

Therefore slaveholding is consistent with christian character.

If this be logical reasoning, then we may arrive at some singular conclusions, from Scripture premises.

Abraham was the father of the faithful.

But Abraham lied to Abimelech.

Therefore lying is consistent with christian character.

Noah was an eminent preacher of righteousness.

But Noah got drunk.

Therefore drunkenness is consistent with ministerial character.

Lot was one to whom the Lord was merciful.

But Lot became intoxicated, and lay with his two daughters.

Therefore intoxication and incest are consistent with christian character.

Why the old lady's logic was equal to this:—

Solomon was the wisest man.

Samson was the strongest man.

Therefore Jonah was in the whale's belly!

Is the Doctor satisfied with syllogistic reasoning? Cannot he discover that the piety of "the captain" will not sanctify all his practices? Does he not perceive, that, even granting he was a slaveholder, Christ's commendation of his faith will not prove the rightfulness of slaveholding?

"4. The fourth subordinate proposition. The New Testament recognizes the existence of slavery." (p. 54.) This is connected with the next proposition; and depends upon the same proof.

"5. The fifth subordinate proposition.—The New Testament prescribes the duties of servants to their master, and of masters to their servants—enjoining obedience to the one, and kind treatment from the other."—(p. 54.)

We pass this proposition also without remark. All the passages cited to sustain it, will be fully examined in their proper place. We cannot, however, forbear to notice the gross slanders which the author has been pleased, in this connection, to heap upon abolitionists. "Modern anti-slavery doctors," says he, "teach that slaves may and ought to disobey their masters—to run off, to steal their master's, or any other person's horse, saddle, bridle, food, clothing, any thing that may be necessary to facilitate their escape. Such morality may be found in the abolition journals of the day. * * * * Now we put it to *our brethren*, whether this course of conduct, in christian slaves, is not much more likely to win their masters * * * * to embrace the doctrine from which it springs, than the stealing, and running off, *which they recommend*."—(pp. 55, 56.) "The morality of modern abolitionism * * * * recommends the slave to disobey, to steal, to run off," &c. [p. 60.] These charges are made in general terms; against abolitionists as a body. And although met and refuted, on the floor of Synod, and their utter falsity, as far as the great body of abolitionists are concerned, plainly demonstrated, Doctor J. has not scrupled to repeat them, mere assertions as they are, in his printed speech. True, a few individuals, a local society or two, may have advocated such doctrines; but they have, in multiplied forms, been disavowed, opposed, denounced, by the mass of abolitionists throughout the country. We cannot conceive how any honorable motive could prompt the author to reiterate these miserable accusations.

The pamphlet closes with a reply to an argument, offered on the floor of Synod, by an esteemed brother. "One excellent brother," says the author, "seeing no room for denial, proceeded to argue this against *me*, *admitting the position I have elaborated, as true*."—(p. 73.) Now the fact is, brother Steele, who is the individual referred to, *preceded* Doctor J. in the order of debate; and therefore could not have *admitted* a position which had not been elaborated. How sadly, (though, we doubt not, unintentionally,) that brother's real sentiments are misrepresented by Doctor J., may be seen by examining a series of able articles in the Baltimore Literary and Religious Magazine, [vol. 3, and vol. 4:] correctly attributed to his pen. The argument offered

by brother S., is thus mistated by Doctor J. "All things which involve many great and crying moral evils, ought immediately to be abandoned and abolished. But slavery, as it exists and is practised in the United States, involves many great and crying evils. Therefore, &c." [p. 75.] Doctor J. replies, that the marriage and parental relation, and even civil government, involve many great moral evils; and should therefore, by parity of reasoning, be abolished: and he adds, "Before you can infer that slavery ought to be immediately abolished, you must prove that it *necessarily* involves many great and crying moral evils." (p. 77.) Now this was, in fact, the very argument of Mr. S.; (we say this on his own authority;) and a most conclusive argument it is. "Slavery," said he, "*necessarily* involves great moral evils." So said the General Assembly of 1818, whose language he quoted. After depicting those evils, they add, "Such are some of the consequences of slavery; consequences not imaginary—but *which connect themselves with its very existence.*" (Digest. 312.) So says the truth itself. Grant, what Doctor J. has endeavored to maintain, that A may justly hold B as property, as he holds his land, cattle, &c.; and it necessarily follows that A may justly sell B to be separated from his wife; and B's children, to be severed from their parents. B and his family may be rightfully divided among the heirs of A; or sold by executors to pay his debts. Thus the claim to property in human flesh conflicts with the marriage and parental rights; and tramples them under foot. Rightly, therefore, did our brother argue that a system founded on the claim of property in man, should be immediately abolished.

With a heavy draught upon the patience of our readers, we have passed in review the various propositions and arguments of Doctor J. We beg their continued attention, while we endeavor to establish, on our part, the following propositions:

1. THAT THE SERVANTS OF THE PATRIARCHS WERE NOT SLAVES.
2. THAT THE SERVITUDE PERMITTED BY THE MOSAIC SYSTEM, WAS NOT SLAVERY.
3. THAT THE APOSTLES DID NOT TOLERATE SLAVEHOLDING IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.

4. THAT THE BIBLE CONDEMNS, AND POSITIVELY FORBIDS SLAVE-HOLDING.

We wish our readers to remember, in the outset, the true meaning of the word slave. Due attention to it is a matter of vital consequence in this whole discussion. Every kind of servitude is not, under all circumstances, slavery. Subjection, entire subjection, even perpetual subjection, not only in act, but even when every thought is brought into obedience, will not always constitute slavery, if that subjection be *voluntary*. Dr. J. seems surprised with such a statement. "We are told," says he, "that voluntary servitude is not slavery. To my utter, but agreeable surprise, this was distinctly and strongly avowed on the floor of Synod, by the principal debater on the abolition side of the house. * * * Let us look at so large a concession from our opponents. It is more than I expected. For, [1.] it maintains, that the moment the man consents to become an *ebed* forever, he is not an *ebed* at all. Let slavery become voluntary, and it is no longer slavery. * * * Then, [2.] Charles Clay is not a slave. His master said to him, when in Canada, 'Charles, you are now a freeman, I have no power to take you to the United States and keep you as a slave.' But Charles chose to come back. He felt that American slavery is better than British freedom. * * * Then, [3.] all that is necessary, according to the brethren's own showing, to restore the slaves of the South to freedom, is to treat them so kindly, that they will voluntarily abide with their masters."—[p. 33, 34.]

Let us examine this flimsy sophistry. The Jewish servant, in the case referred to, (pp. 32, 33,) must "plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; *I will not go out free*. Then his master shall bring him to the judges: he shall also bring him unto the door, or unto the door-post: and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him forever." (Ex. xxi. 5, 6.) Now upon what rests the master's claim to him after this transaction? Clearly, upon the servant's free choice; a choice which the law requires to be expressed publicly, before the judges. Suppose such a master were called to establish his right to the service of such an *ebed*, before a Jewish court: how would he prove it? By

showing that he had once paid money for him,—as indeed he had? (Ex. xxi. 2.) No: but by reference to the record of his choice to serve him until the year of jubilee; and his avowal of that choice when his ear was bored in the presence of the Magistrates. The servant's deliberate act of will was the *only* legal foundation of the Jewish master's claim to his service. The moment he consented to become an *ebed* forever, he was an *ebed*, but not a *slave*. Far otherwise is it with "Charles Clay," and the other southern bondmen who may choose slavery rather than freedom. Were their masters required to establish their right to A, B, and C, they would appeal, not to their *choice* of slavery; but to the money paid for them, and the laws of the land allowing them to hold purchased slaves, willing or unwilling, as property. Cannot the Doctor's usually acute mind perceive the difference between the cases? We say *that* servitude is not slavery, in which the choice of the servant is the *sole foundation* of the master's claim to control: and on the other hand, that condition is slavery, in which the master's legal right to hold and dispose of his servant, rests in no degree, upon the servant's will. The former is the definition of Jewish servitude: the latter, of American slavery. Let the slaves of our country be held as servants, only when they have given their consent, and on the ground of that consent, and we freely grant that they would be slaves no longer. Bearing this distinction in mind, and especially the true meaning of the term *slave*, let us proceed with our argument.

PROPOSITION I. THE SERVANTS OF THE PATRIARCHS WERE NOT SLAVES.

Preliminary. The Hebrew words *ebed*, a man-servant, and *amah*, or *shiphah*, a maid-servant, employed in reference to the patriarchal and Jewish servants, do not necessarily, nor even generally, denote slaves. This, Doctor J. seems to admit. "The word *ebed* * * * in itself properly signifies a worker, a laborer, a person who does work of any kind at all, for another. It is very similar to our word *servant*." [p. 25.] And yet, throughout his argument, wherever he meets with this word, he speaks of it as meaning a slave, and nothing else. (See his remarks

on the fourth and tenth commandments, &c.) Indeed, if *ebed* does not mean slave, but *servant*, his whole argument from the Old Testament is worthless. A few remarks, therefore, upon these words, are necessary. The term *ebed* is used with great latitude of application in the Hebrew Scriptures: its signification is, *a person who serves another, without respect to the length of time, for which, or the principle on which, he renders service.*

It is employed to denote,

1. Frequently, *a servant of God*; one who does the will of God from the heart. Ex. xiv. 31, believed the Lord, and *his servant* (*abdo*) Moses. Lev. xxv. 42, they (the Israelites) are *my servants* (*ki-abda*). 2 Kings, ix. 7, *my servants*, (*abdu*), the prophets, * * and * * all the *servants* (*abde*) of the Lord. Job i. 8, *my servant* [*abdi*] Job. Ps. lxxxvi. 2, Preserve *thy servant*, [*abdeka*,] O Lord.—lxxxix. 3, [Hebr. 4,] I have made a covenant with my chosen, I have sworn unto David, *my servant*, [*abdi*.] This passage is applicable to Christ; [see Hebr. i. 5.] To argue that *ebed*, in such connections, means a *slave*, because believers are bound to render perpetual service to God, is to trifle. A note of admiration, an elevation of the eye-brows, is a sufficient reply.—A sailor who visited a display of fire-works, was thrown, by some accidental explosion, to a considerable distance, and lodged in a cabbage garden. Supposing this to be a part of the exhibition, he jumped up, rubbed his eyes, and eagerly exclaimed, “I wonder what he will show next?”—When D. D.’s undertake to prove, in defence of slavery, that David was God’s *slave*, because he said, “I am thy servant, thy servant, the son of thy hand-maid,” we rub our astonished eyes, and involuntarily ask ourselves, What will they attempt next?

2. Spoken of *one’s self*, by way of respect toward superiors. Gen. xviii. 3, And Abraham said [to one of his three guests,] my lord, * * * pass not away, I pray thee, from *thy servant* [*abdeka*.] xix. 2, xxxii. 18, [Heb. 19.] They be *thy servant* Jacob’s—xlii. 10, to buy food are *thy servants* come—xliv. 24, *thy servant*, my father, &c.

3. To denote the *subjects* of a king, prince, &c. Ex. ix. 20, he that feared the Lord among the *servants* (*abede*) of Pharaoh. Gen. xlvii. 19, 25, Buy us * * and we * * will be *servants*

unto Pharaoh:—that is, we will bind ourselves in subjection to Pharaoh, as our lawful sovereign. They were *then* his subjects; but they came under new and more solemn obligations. The supposition that God, by an act of special providence, enabled Joseph to render the Egyptians the personal property of Pharaoh, to be sold and disposed of at his pleasure, would have suited admirably the principles of the British Stuarts, respecting the divine right of kings. In this age, it hardly needs a grave refutation. Were it true, Joseph would stand pre-eminently infamous as the only prime minister who ever reduced all his fellow-subjects to the condition of purchased slaves of their sovereign.—Compare 1 Sam. viii. 17, And ye [the people of Israel] shall be his (Saul's) *servants*, and 1 Kings, xii. 7, And they [the old men, official advisers of Rehoboam,] spake unto him, saying, If thou wilt be a *servant* [*ebed*] unto this people this day, * * * * then they will be thy *servants* [*abadim*] forever. The elders of Israel seem to have thought that a good king must be, in a certain sense, the *ebed* of his own subjects.

4. Closely connected with this sense is that of *military retainers*—1 Sam. xxv. 10, And Nabal answered David's *servants*, [*abede*,] see verses 40, 41, and compare verse 12, where they are called David's young men [*naare David*.] From verse 13, it is clear that they were part of his armed warriors. Compare Esau's company, Gen. xxxii. 6, xxxiii. 1, xxxvi. 6.

5. Spoken of *courtiers*, civil and military *officers*, &c., Gen. xl. 20, Pharaoh made a feast unto all his *officers*, [*abadav*.] See xli. 10, and compare xl. 2–7, where they are called *sarisim*, *eunuchs*, which cannot be taken strictly; for one of them, Potiphar, was married, compare xxxix. 1; 2 Kings 5, 6. Naaman my *servant*. Now Naaman was “captain of the host * * * a great man with his master.” [verse 1.]

6. This word is applied to the Gibeonites, [Joshua ix. 23.] who, as we have seen, were not slaves.

We have not noticed the use of *ebed* in reference to the patriarchal and Jewish servants; for its meaning, when thus used, is the matter in controversy. The student of the Hebrew Bible is aware that the word has, almost universally, one of the above significations. In a multitude of cases it would belong to

the second class. Doctor J. quotes Trommius as authority for the fact that this word is translated 612 times, in the Septuagint, by the Greek, *pais*. But *pais*, primarily, means a child; a son or daughter; and sometimes officer, attendant. So in Matthew xiv. 1, Herod the tetrarch said *tois paisin autou*, to his *courtiers*. "This word by a use frequent in the Septuagint, is supposed to denote *friends*. But it rather signifies *ministers, officers*, [namely, of the court.]" [Bloomfield.]—"Wherever mention is made of the 'servants' of a king or prince, the term is, for the most part, to be understood of *counsellors, &c.* The leading idea is not that of *servitude*, as understood among us at the present day." (Bush, on Gen. xxiv. 2.)—"As to the term *obed, servant*," says the same author, it comes from *abad, to serve*, which is applied variously to the *serving* of worshippers, of tributaries, of domestics, of Levites, of sons to a father, of subjects to a ruler, of hirelings, of soldiers, of public officers, &c. With a similar latitude, the derivative noun is applied to all persons doing service for others, irrespective of the ground or principle on which that service was rendered. * * * * *To interpret it 'SLAVE,' or to argue, from the fact of the words being used to designate domestic servants, that they were made servants BY FORCE, worked without pay, and held as articles of property, would be a gross and gratuitous assumption.*" [Notes on Ex. xxi. 2.]

In a few cases, *ebed* undoubtedly, means, a *slave*; where the masters were heathens: as Gen. xxxix. 17, The Hebrew servant (*hachbed ibri*),—Joseph. We may perhaps add Gen. xx. 14, for Abimelech gave away some of his servants: Ex. ix. 20, where the servants of the Egyptians are mentioned: and Deut. xxiii. 15.—But historical facts, and the laws defining his condition, must prove that the patriarchal or Hebrew *ebed* was a slave: or it cannot be proved.

Doctor J. lays great stress upon the fact that the *ebed* (servant,) and the *sakir* (hired servant,) are contrasted. (pp. 26–29.) Ex. xii. 44, 45, Lev. xxii. 10, 11—xxv. 39, 40, are cited in proof. We are assured, also, that *ebed* is never translated *misthotes*, in the Sept.; nor *sakir, doulos*. Now no one contends that the *ebed* and the *sakir* belonged to the same class of servants. There was an important distinction between them. 1. The *sakir*

labored during a period, fixed, not by law, but by special contract. He seems never to have engaged for a longer time than three years. Compare Isa. xvi. 14, Within three years, as the years of a hireling (*sakir*.) xxi. 16. Lev. xxv. 53. Hence the Hebrew six years' servant is said to have been worth double a hired servant to his master. (Deut. xv. 18.) 2. He was paid daily, or at least at short intervals according to contract. "Thou shalt not oppress a hired servant (*sakir*) that is poor and needy, whether he be of thy brethren, or of thy strangers that are in thy land within thy gates; *at this day thou shalt give him his hire, neither shall the sun go down upon it*, for he is poor, and setteth his heart upon it: lest he cry against thee unto the Lord, and it be sin unto thee. (Deut. xxiv. 14, 15.) 3. He maintained, with his earnings, a separate family. This was the chief characteristic of his class. Hence, he was forbidden to eat the passover with his employer's family, for he formed no part of it, and might be uncircumcised. (Ex. xii. 43-45.) For the same reason he was prohibited from eating 'the holy thing,' when in the priest's service: for the holy thing was for the priest and his family, of which he was not a member. (Lev. xxii. 10, 11.) In short, the *sakir* resembled the hired servant with us.

The *ebed* was a servant of another class; *but not therefore a slave*. 1. His term of service, (when that service was not the punishment of theft,) was fixed, by law, at six years. [Ex. xxi. 2; Deut. xv. 12.] And if thy brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, be sold unto thee, and serve thee six years; then in the seventh year thou shalt let him go free. Compare Jer. xxxiv. 12-14. He might extend the period of service, if he pleased, to the year of Jubilee.—[Ex. xxi. 5, 6; Deut. xv. 16, 17.] 2. Instead of daily wages, he received a sum agreed upon between his master and himself, at the beginning of his engagement. This was called "the money of his purchase." [Lev. xxv. 51.] If the *ebed* was a minor, probably the money was paid to the parents, as in the case of a Hebrew girl sold by her father.—(Ex. xxi. 7.) He received, in addition, food, clothing, a home, &c. Finally, if he be left at the end of six years, he was "furnished liberally out of the flock, the floor, the wine-press, &c.—(Deut. xv. 14.) 3. Unlike the *sakir*, the *ebed*,

and his family, if he had one, became a part of the master's family. They lived in his house, eat at his table, and were subject to his control, just as were his children. Hence, the *ebed* might eat the passover with his master's household; for, if a Gentile, he must have been circumcised when he entered upon service.—(Ex. xii. 44; compare verse 48, where it appears that the Jew, like the stranger, must not eat the passover unless *all his males* were circumcised.) Hence, also, the priest's *ebed*, being part of his family, might eat of "the holy thing," altho' "a sojourner of the priest," even if he were a Hebrew of royal rank, was forbidden to partake.—(Lev. xxii. 10, 11.) If the *ebed's* claim to partake, rested on the fact that he was the priest's *property*, then the priest's *dog* had an equal right to eat of the holy thing. For the same reason, and not because he was a piece of property, the *ebed* and not the *sakir*, is mentioned in the fourth commandment, which is addressed to the master and head of a family; who is bound to prevent the violation of the Sabbath by any of its members.—(Ex. xx. 10.) It does not follow from the language of this command, that the servants, any more than the children, were, like the cattle, held as property by the father of the family; but only that they were under his control. In short, the *ebed* and *amah*, among the Hebrews, were very like the bound-boy and the bound-girl, among us.

We shall not dwell upon the other terms, *amah* and *shiphpah*. If *ebed* does not necessarily mean *a slave*, it is needless to contend about these. A remark or two, however, may be proper. Hagar is called *shiphpah*, a hand-maid, (Gen. xvi. 1,) and *haamah*, the bondwoman, xxi. 10. Ishmael is styled *ben-haamah*, the son of the bondwoman, xxi. 10. Zilpah is called *shiphpah*, (Gen. xxix. 24;) and Billah, (verse 29.) The latter is spoken of as *amathi*, 'my maid,' [Gen. xxx. 1.] Now Hagar, Billah, and Zilpah were evidently in the same condition in life,—subordinate wives. If Abram calls Hagar "Sarai's maid," even after he had married her; if the angel gives her the same title, and requires her to return to her "*mistress*;" Moses makes the same distinction between Rachel and Leah on the one part, and Zilpah and Billah on the other part. "And he [Jacob] rose up that night.

and took his two *wives*, and his two *women-servants*," &c. (Gen. xxxii. 22; Heb. 23.) What were these two women-servants? The testimony of Josephus has been already cited: "Now each of these had hand-maids, by their father's donation. Zilpah was hand-maid to Lea, and Bilha to Rachel, *doulai men oudamos, hypotetagmenai de*, &c. by no means slaves, but however subject to their mistresses." [Antiq. B. I. c. 19, § 8.] This statement of Josephus is confirmed by the fact, that even when Abraham was offended with Hagar, and Sarah highly exasperated, they seem never to have thought of selling her; nor does she appear to have feared such a thing. When the crisis arrives, and Hagar's conduct can no longer be endured, God says, "Cast out the bond-woman;" and Abraham dismisses her with provision sufficient for her support.—(Gen. xxi.)

Argument I. *The social condition, the treatment, and the privileges of the patriarchal servants, forbid the supposition that they were regarded as property; on a level, in this respect, with the flocks and herds they attended.*

We have just seen that female servants were sometimes taken by their masters, as subordinate wives. Eliezer of Damascus, the steward of Abraham's house, was his heir, in default of issue. [Gen. xv. 2, 3.] To the eldest servant of his house, probably Eliezer, the patriarch commits that most delicate and important business of selecting a wife for Isaac. He was now forty years of age; old enough, one would think to go a-courting for himself. But this duty usually devolved upon the parent; and because of his inability, "the *servant*, the elder of the house," as he is honorably entitled, sets out in search of her upon whom Isaac's future happiness would so much depend. Isaac does not object to this arrangement; nor does he seem to have had the right of refusing the lady whom the servant might select. Arriving at Nahor, "the *servant*, *haebed*, (Gen. xxiv. 5,) informs Rebecca that Abraham is his master, [verse 27.] The fair damsel hastes to tell her mother's house. Immediately, Laban "runs out to the man;" and knowing that he was a servant, thus addresses him: "Come in, thou blessed of the Lord, wherefore standest thou without? For I have prepared the house," [quite an honor to the poor fellow, if he were a slave,]

“and room for the camels.” Laban himself then ungirds and feeds the servant’s camels; brings water to wash his feet, and food for him and his men. But he must tell his message before he will eat. Accordingly, he thus begins his speech: “*Ebed Abraham anoki*, Abraham’s servant, am I.”—Do they treat him with less ceremony and respect, after so candid a confession of his rank? Do they thrust him into the kitchen to lodge with menials? Even his master could hardly have been more honorably entertained. Surely the air of the whole narrative contradicts the supposition that this man was a *slave*, in the proper sense of the term.

Argument 2. *Abraham, on a certain occasion, armed his servants, and led them to battle. This he would never have done, had they been slaves.*

“When Abram heard that his brother was taken captive, he armed his trained [servants,] born in his own house, three hundred and eighteen, and pursued them unto Dan.”—(Gen. xiv. 14.) Had these young men been the children of parents whom Abram had “gotten,” bought, at Haran or elsewhere, without their consent; whom he had dragged from their friends and native country; whom he ranked with his cattle; whose children, (these very lads,) he had seized, at birth, as his legal property; would Abraham have dreamed of arming them, and leading them so far from home as Dan, the further extremity of Canaan? If he had been so silly, would they have returned with him? Or rather, would they not, in the present unsettled state of the country, while his brother was a captive, and his neighbors were fully employed in defending themselves, have improved the opportunity to turn their arms against their master, and recover their own and their parents’ liberty? In vain are we amused, as we were at Synod, with cock-and-bull stories of Southern slaveholders, who, on an emergency, have armed their slaves with scythes. There may have been a case of this kind; but the situation of such scythe-bearing slaves would be immensely different from that of the patriarchs. The American slaves, into whose hands an inconsiderate master might put deadly weapons, well know that a powerful national government exists, prepared to put down a servile insurrection;

and that although they might succeed in putting a few of their oppressors to death, a certain and more terrible death would speedily overtake *them*. Abraham and his servants dwelt alone; strangers, in a strange land. Abandon the absurd idea that these three hundred young men were slaves; and the whole story is plain, probable, and conformable to present oriental customs. They were *hanikav yelide betho*, his instructed ones, the sons of his house, [xiv. 14.] The verb *hanak* signifies "Initiated, instructed, that is, in the religion and worship of the true God." [Parkhurst.] Compare Prov. xxii. 6. "*Train up [hanok] a child in the way he should go,*" &c. Abraham had taught them and their parents, by example as well as precept, "to do justice and judgment," [Gen. xviii. 19.] Such a household he need not fear to arm for the rescue of a brother. "This mode of preparing for battle," says Burder, "and these manners, still prevail in the East, where the *soldiers of a chief* are often *children of the house*."—[Quoted in Comp. Com.]

Argument. 3. *The servants of the patriarchs became such by their own voluntary act. Therefore they were not slaves.*

(1.) Buying a human being, of a third person, against his will, was, according to patriarchal morals, *man-stealing*.—Through the envy of his brethren, Joseph was sold to a company of Midianite merchants. Like the whore of Babylon in later times, these men "traded," occasionally, "in the bodies and souls of men." (Rev. xviii. 13.) The whole circumstances, (Gen. xxxvii.) show that the transaction was a common one *with them*. The poor boy was unwilling to be sold. Doubtless he wept, and plead with his brethren to spare him, and restore him to the bosom of his aged father. They remembered, afterward, "the anguish of his soul, when he besought them, and they would not hear." (Gen. xlii. 21.) Every generous, every fraternal feeling, was stifled, in their bosoms, by envy and jealousy. The Midianites were prompted by no envious feeling: but such scenes were usual with them. Slave-trading, as is always the case, had steeled their hearts. They hoped the little fellow would soon stop blubbering; and forget his father's house: or if he should not, what cared they, provided they made fifty per cent. on their bargain.—Many years after,

Joseph, in prison, relates his story to the officers of Pharaoh, and says, "*Indeed I was stolen away out of the land of the Hebrews:*" *ki-gunnob gunnabli*,—the intensive form,—most assuredly I was stolen. Compare the same word in the eighth commandment, (Ex. xx. 15;) *Lo tignob, Thou shalt not steal.*—We have already shown that the Midianites were the men-thieves who stole him *away out of the land of the Hebrews.*—They, doubtless, considered the purchase and sale of Joseph a fair transaction, done "in the honest way of business," as old Tom Turnpenny would say. And Dr. J. seems to think that, "according to the notions of the age" (p. 1) it was all well enough! Joseph, however, regarded it as, most assuredly, man-stealing. And certainly, the great-grandson of Abraham was acquainted with the principles and practice of his progenitors.

(2.) The patriarchs had not the physical power to compel involuntary service: their servants were therefore voluntary, both in the commencement and in the continuance of their servitude. Abraham and his descendants were surrounded by heathen tribes. They had no fixed habitations, no continuing city. Their immense flocks and herds, were necessarily scattered over the country, frequently fifty or sixty miles from home. (Gen. xxxvii. 12–17.) The servants were chiefly engaged in attending these flocks. There were no patrols in the land: there was no constitutional compact for the delivery of fugitives: nor were thousands of citizens leagued to suppress an insurrection. *Canada was all around them*; within a day's or an hour's journey. How easy for them to escape under such circumstances! How certain that they would have escaped, had they not been voluntary servants!

(3.) The patriarchal servants were required to receive circumcision.—We have an account, (Gen. xvii. ;) of a solemn covenant transaction between God and Abraham. This covenant was, in its nature, temporal,—"*I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee * * * all the land of Canaan,*" &c.; and spiritual,—"*I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant; to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee.*" Of this covenant, circumcision was "the token." (verse

10.) Every adult, therefore, who was circumcised, entered, or professed to enter, into a solemn engagement to take the Lord as his God forever. Upon whom, now, does Jehovah command this token to be placed? "He that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every man-child in your generations, he that is born in thy house, and he that is bought with thy money, *must needs be circumcised.*" (Gen. xvii. 12, 13.) There were, in Abraham's family, many adults, doubtless, who had been bought with money. Suppose he bought them without their consent, of the heathen round about,—of any one who chanced to have a slave, and to need money. They continue in the belief and practice of idolatry; at least so far as they dare.—The conduct of their master would but poorly recommend his religion to their acceptance. They still prefer the gods of their fathers to the God of their oppressor. Abraham lectures them upon the necessity of doing justice and judgment: but what care they for homilies on justice from one who has stolen them, and is daily pocketing their earnings? As much as southern slaves care for "*massa's family wusship*," and we all know what that means.—The Lord sees the real state of their heart: he knows that altho' they may unite with Abraham in the observance of outward forms, yet they detest him and his religion. And still when entering into a solemn covenant with the patriarch, he commands all these involuntary and unconverted slaves to become parties to this covenant, and to receive the token upon their flesh! Will they, nill they, Abraham must arm himself with the shears, and place upon them, by force, THE SIGN OF A LIE, the seal of a covenant to which, in heart, they refuse their assent! And this was a standing law to all the masters in Israel: a law of that Being who "abhors the sacrifice, where not the heart is found!" To such a conclusion are we forced if we assume that the servants of the patriarchs were involuntary. Our opponents see this: and one of them had the hardihood to assert, before the Synod, as a proof of the extent of Abraham's power as a master, "that he could *compel* his slaves to make a profession of religion!"—Brethren, let the old, haggard Mother of harlots and abominations maintain such a doctrine. The Bible, and the God of the Bible, abhor it.

Shall we be told that slaves might be circumcised without their consent, as well as infants? The latter did indeed receive the seal of the covenant *without* a consent which it was *physically impossible* to obtain; but not *against* their will. Unable to choose for themselves, their parents might properly acknowledge for them those obligations to God under which they were placed by their birth. Not so with adults. Those who are "of age" must "speak for themselves."—If the servants of Abraham were voluntary; if they were bought with their own consent, and of themselves; if none were purchased but those who chose to abandon idolatry, and learn to serve the living and true God; in short, if Abraham's family were, as we have reason to believe, a pious household; then was it an act, not of justice merely, but of condescension, love, and mercy in Jehovah, to allow them a part in his covenant with the father of the faithful. Indeed, *their very admission* as parties to such a covenant, was a distinct recognition of the fact that they were not articles of property; but men; rational, accountable beings; standing before God, on an equality with their master; fellow-heirs with him of the promised land; alike partakers of the divine promises, and pilgrims to the heavenly Canaan.

Argument 4. *The patriarchs never sold their servants, nor gave them away, nor transferred them to their heirs: therefore they were not slaves.*

We are repeatedly told by Moses that the patriarchs had servants bought with money: but not a single passage occurs from which we can possibly infer that they ever sold a servant. Wealthy masters sometimes exchanged presents.—"Abimelech took sheep, and oxen, and *men-servants*, and *women-servants*, and gave them unto Abraham." [Gen. xx. 14.] Courtesy would seem to require the latter, as rich as he was generous, to return the compliment in kind. But he would teach the king of Gerar a lesson respecting the rights of subjects: "and Abram took sheep and oxen" *only*, "and gave them to Abimelech." [xxi. 27.] Abraham gave "gifts" to his sons by Hagar and Keturah; but no servants. [xxv. 5, 6.] Isaac gave no slave to Jacob, when he went to Padan Aram to seek his fortune. Jacob selected she-goats, and he-goats, and ewes,

and rams, and camels with their colts, and cows, and bulls, and she-asses, and foals, all which he sent "by the hand of his servants," as a present to Esau. [xxxii. 13.] Would not the servants themselves have been as acceptable? He sent to the unknown Governor of Egypt, "a little balm, and a little honey, spices, and myrrh, and nuts, and almonds." xliii. 11.] Why did he not send a few servants? He must have known that slaves were very saleable commodities in Egypt. He probably had thousands, as say our writers on Biblical antiquities: they must have been burdensome to him in that time of famine; and the Governor had food in abundance for them. They would have been "better off" there. Strange, indeed, that the happy thought never entered old Jacob's head! Nor were servants transmitted by the patriarchs to their heirs. We have authority, on this point, that will be conclusive with some of our opponents. "The servitude of Abraham's family was not transmitted to posterity. It is said, Abraham gave all that he had unto Isaac. But unto the sons of the concubines that Abraham had, Abraham gave gifts, and sent them away from Isaac his son, while he yet lived? We are not informed what became of Abraham's servants, but there is not the slightest evidence that any body ever had authority over them but himself and Isaac." (If Isaac seems to have inherited his father's servants, it is only because he remained at the old homestead, and needed to engage their services in keeping the flocks and herds which they had kept for his father.) "Would Isaac transfer them to Esau, who sold his birthright? Certainly not. Nor did he give them to Jacob. When Jacob went down into Egypt, 'with all that he had,' *even the servants he brought with him from Padan Aram did not go with him.* All the souls that went down were seventy,—all of whom were his own children and grandchildren.—[Gen. xlv. 27. Ex. i. 5.]"*

Agreeable to this is the testimony of the Jewish rabbins, who say "that slaves were set free at the death of their master, and did not descend to their heirs." (Rob. Calmet.) Dr. J. asserts that "the seed of Abraham carried their slaves with them down

[* Relations and Duties of Servants and Masters.—By J. L. WILSON, D. D. p. 17, 18.]

to Egypt.”—(p. 23.) But if Jacob had such a multitude of slaves as he must have had if he inherited all those of his ancestors, how comes it that *his own sons, and no others*, go to Egypt, with their sacks and asses, to buy corn? Do American masters leave their slaves idle at home, and send their boys to mill?

Before we pass to the second proposition, it may be proper to answer the question, “May we not infer that the servants of the patriarchs were slaves, because we find them classed with cattle, &c.?—For instance, Gen. xii. 16, And Abraham had sheep, and oxen, and he-asses, and men-servants, and maid-servants, and she asses, and camels.” Answer (1.) We may as well conclude that servants were irrational, and quadrupeds; because they are ranked with these animals. (2.) If servants are property, because classed with camels, &c.; then a wife is property, for she is mentioned in connection with the ox and the ass, [Ex. xx. 17.] (3.) The servants are evidently distinguished from the property, in some cases. “And Abram, &c. * * took * * all the *substance* that they had gathered, *and the souls* that they had gotten in Haran.”—[Gen. xii. 5.] “And Lot also, who went with Abram, had *flocks*, and *herds*, and *tents*, and the land was not able to bear them, that they might dwell together: for their *substance* was great.”—[Gen. xiii. 5, 6.] Their herdmen are mentioned separately, [verse 7.] [4.] When the *wealth* of the patriarchs is spoken of, servants are not mentioned: but only when their *greatness* is described. “Abram was very *rich* [*kabed, heavy,*] in cattle, and silver, and gold.”—[Gen. xiii. 2.] Why are not slaves added to the list? If he had “thousands,” they were the most valuable, as well as *burdensome* part of his property. No Southerner would omit his slaves in an account of his wealth. The Shechemites say, “Shall not their cattle, and their substance, and every beast of theirs be ours?”—(Gen. xxxiv. 23.) They make no mention of Jacob’s slaves. Compare (Gen. xxxi. 16–18. Deut. viii. 12–17. Josh. xxii. 8. 1 Sam. xxv. 2. 2 Chron. xxxii. 27–29. Job. i. 3; xlii. 12—with Gen. xxiv. 35; xxvi. 13, 14; xxx. 43; xxxii. 4, 5; xxxvi. 6, 7.

PROPOSITION II. THE SERVITUDE PERMITTED BY THE MOSAIC SYSTEM, WAS NOT SLAVERY.

Argument I. We may prove this proposition from the

admissions of our opponents, and the character of the Divine Law-giver. "I remark," says Doctor J., "that God has nowhere *sanctioned* slavery. To *sanction* is to approve of and command as a thing that is right, and that ought to be. * * * On the contrary, I take the distinction before alluded to, that the Bible *tolerates* slavery. Now toleration is bearing with—enduring a thing; and it implies that the thing is viewed as an evil. Job tolerated his biles, and the foolish behaviour of his wife. *We tolerate evils that cannot be instantly removed.* * * * Be patient, Brethren! God has tolerated this dreadful evil more than thirty centuries of years. And he has tolerated yet worse evils. He has tolerated you and us, with all our sins and corruptions upon us," &c. (pp. 43, 44.) Doctor J. trifles; he plays upon words. God has, indeed, tolerated, borne with us and our sins; but then he has constantly condemned our sins, and declared them to be that abominable thing which his soul hateth. So he tolerates many evils which he does not see fit to remove; and testifies against them. But, if our author be correct, God has tolerated slaveholding, for thirty centuries, and has not spoken a word in the Old or New Testament to condemn it. Slaveholding is not, therefore, in his estimation, to be classed with *moral* evils. But, say our opponents, it is a *natural* evil, to be ranked with war, &c. "Presbyterians * * * could not deny the lawfulness of the relation between servants and masters, no more than they could deny the lawfulness of *war*, when 'the powers that be' said there should be war."—[Relations and Duties, &c., pp. 30, 31.]—Admit this; and let us reason upon the admission that slavery is not a moral but a natural evil. Still it is, in its own nature, evil, only evil, and that continually. God may bring good out of it; as he may cause war to produce beneficial results; but, in itself, it is an evil. Hear the confession, upon this subject, of a distinguished Kentuckian, himself a large slaveholder,—one who has enjoyed abundant opportunities to know the truth of his assertions;—I mean Cassius M. Clay. "Slavery is an evil to the slave, by depriving of * * * liberty. I stop here—this is enough of itself to give us a full anticipation of the long catalogue of human woe, and physical and intellectual and moral debasement, which follows in the wake of slavery. Slavery is

an evil to the master. * * * * It corrupts our offspring by necessary association with an abandoned, degraded race. * * It is a source of indolence and destructive of all industry. * * The poor despise labor, because slavery makes it degrading.—The mass of slaveholders are idlers. * * It is the mother of ignorance. * * * It is opposed to literature even in the higher classes. * * It is destructive to all mechanical excellence. * * It is antagonistic to the fine arts. * * It retards population and wealth. * * * It impoverishes the soil. * * It induces national poverty. * * It is an ill to the free-laborer. * * Where all these evils exist, can liberty, constitutional liberty, live? No indeed, it cannot, and has not existed in conjunction with slavery!” Such is a picture of the tendencies and results of American slavery, drawn by a master hand; and such, all history assures us, have been the consequences of slavery in every age, and in every land.

Now even our opponents will grant that no wise, and especially no righteous legislator, if called on to frame a code of laws for the government of a non-slaveholding community, would deliberately *introduce* into that community, a system replete with such enormous evils. Even were he legislating for a nation of slaveholders, he would make no arrangements for the extension and perpetuation of slavery; but, on the contrary, he would adopt measures, if not for its immediate, at least for its gradual abolition. He would check and restrain the system by every justifiable means. What, then, was the situation of the Israelites, in respect to slavery, when the just, and good, and holy God gave them, by the hand of Moses, a complete civil, political, and religious constitution? Just fifty days before, they had set out from Egypt, where, for a century or more, they had felt the woes of bondage; and in the ruin of Egypt, had seen its fatal consequences to the oppressor. If they themselves were slaveholders, when they stood around Mount Sinai, to receive the law from their Deliverer, surely never were a people in more favorable circumstances for its immediate and total abolition. But they were not slaveholders. Our author has, indeed, asserted the contrary; but he has contented himself with assertion. The sacred historian gives not the least ground for

the inference that a single servant, much less a slave, accompanied Jacob and his sons into Egypt.—(See Gen. xlv. 6–27.) Doctor J. allows that if they had slaves there, the Egyptians seized them.—(p. 23.) As for “the mixed multitude,” (Ex. xii. 38,) he *asserts*, without the least probability, that they were Jewish slaves who chose to follow their masters. The Hebrew, *ereb rab*, a great mixture, denotes persons of mingled extraction, Jewish and foreign; and those who have mingled with a people to whom they do not belong. Compare Num. xi. 4. “The mixed multitude that was among them fell a lusting: and the children of Israel also wept again,” &c. “The sons of the Israelitish woman, whose father was an Egyptian,” [Lev. xxiv. 10,] probably belonged to this class of persons. Neh. xiii. 3, Now it came to pass, when they had heard the law, that they separated from Israel all the *mixed* multitude. Jer. xxv. 21, The kings of the *mingled people* that dwell in the desert. M. Henry describes this mixed multitude as composed of fortune-hunting or curious Egyptians, who wished to see what would happen to the Israelites, and probably soon quitted them, to return home. There is not, therefore, a shadow of proof that the Israelites had a solitary slave among them, when before Mount Sinai. If it be said that servants bought with money are mentioned, Ex. xii. 44, we reply, that the law then given was evidently, in part, prospective. Compare vs. 25–48, &c.

Under these circumstances, the only perfect Law-giver bestows on his chosen people, the only body of civil enactments that ever came from heaven. And, strange to say, the very first statutes promulgated, are those, in which, (*if our opponents rightly interpret them*;) he deliberately introduces the evil of slavery! We say, *introduces*, for it is not true that he barely tolerated, a pre-existing system as “we tolerate evils that we cannot remove.” It did not pre-exist: and if it had existed, he could have removed it. Even granting that for which, as we have seen, there is not a shadow of proof,—that the Israelites were already a slave-holding nation—can it be believed that the Wisest and Best of Law-givers, the Avenger of the oppressed in every age, who had just delivered the Israelites from the yoke of bondage, and who well knows “the physical, moral, and

intellectual evils" uniformly produced by slavery, instead of adopting some restrictive measures, some gradual emancipation laws, would point out the mode of obtaining slaves from abroad, [Lev. xxv. 44-46;] authorize the Hebrews to purchase of the heathen round about; and thus multiply and perpetuate these dreadful evils?—Pro-slavery men are therefore shut up to the necessity either of maintaining that slavery is *in no sense an evil*, or of abandoning their position that the Mosaic system of servitude was a system of slavery. We shall endeavor to prove that it was an institution, most just and kind to the servant; most equitable and beneficial to the master.

Argument 2. *Adults, not guilty of crime, became servants only by SELLING THEMSELVES.*—To this vital point, Dr. J. has devoted only half a dozen words—"*the miserable subterfuge, that he sold himself.*" [p. 16.] We shall see with what propriety he substitutes a sneer for sober argument. If it be not true, let those who deny it, show us of whom they could be legally bought. "And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee," (Lev. xv. 29.) No crime is here mentioned. The man is too poor to maintain a separate family: he must become a servant. Now who is authorized to sell him? In some parts of our country, such persons may be sold by the overseers of the poor; tho' not as slaves. Were there such officers among the Hebrews, who might dispose of this poor man?—The Jewish poor-laws were of another sort. (See Lev. xxv. 35.)—Were the elders of the gate allowed to sell him? Might any rich neighbor catch the pauper, sell him to the highest bidder, and pocket the money! Show us the law for such "a fair business transaction." If there is no such law, then we need no Daniel to tell us that the poor Hebrew *sold himself*, to some wealthy neighbor, who could employ and maintain him and his family.

So says the law itself, (Lev. xxv. 39.) And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and *be sold* unto thee.—The Hebrew is, *wenimkar, and sell himself* unto thee. The verb *nakar* signifies, *to sell*, and, in the Niphal, as here, *to be sold*, or *to sell one's self*. The Niphal species of verbs is used, either, "(1) as the passive of Kal, 'or (2) to express an action

performed by the subject upon himself or reflexive * * * * Gram-
 marians are not agreed as to what should be considered the
 primary signification." (Nordheimer § 11-1.)—Again, verse
 42. They shall not be sold (*yimmakeru*, *sell themselves*;) as
 bondmen. In both these passages the original verbs may be
 translated with the reflexive sense; and so have our translators
 rendered the same word, in the same form, (verse 47.) And
 if a sojourner or a stranger wax rich by thee, and thy brother
 that dwelleth by him wax poor, and sell himself (*wenimkar*) unto
 the stranger, &c. But in verse 48, tho' the same transaction is
 spoken of, they render the word in the passive, "After that he
 is sold (*nimkar*, *hath sold himself*;) he may be redeemed," &c.
 And indeed he was sold—by himself. Compare verse 49, or if
 be able, he may redeem himself, (*wenigal*, Niph. of *gaal*, to
 redeem.) How could this Hebrew whose poverty led him to
 sell himself, ever be "able to redeem himself," unless he had
 received of the stranger "the price of his sale?" (verse 50.)
 It may be said that, in this case, he was *certainly* able to redeem
 himself, at any time, and therefore needed not that "any nigh
 of kin," (verses 48, 49,) should redeem him. So he was; he
 might have redeemed himself the hour after his sale, if he had
 no other use for the money he had received: but what would
 he gain by a transaction that would reduce him to the same
 situation of helpless poverty as before? The law contemplates
 his obtaining from his master the price of his labor in advance,
 and investing it in such a manner, that, in the course of a few
 years, he might be able to refund the money, and have some-
 thing left to support his family.—Again, Deut. xv. 12, And if
 thy brother, a Hebrew man, or a Hebrew woman, be sold
 (*yimmaker*, *sell himself*;) unto thee, &c. Neh. v. 8, We, after
 our ability, have redeemed, (*kaninu* have bought, but not for
 slaves, our brethren the Jews which were sold unto the heathen;
 and will ye even sell your brethren? or shall they be sold
 (*wenimkeru*, *sell themselves*) unto us?—alluding to this custom of
 servants selling themselves, Elijah says to Ahab, Thou hast sold
 thyself to work iniquity. 1 Kings, xxi. 20, compare verse 25.
 There was none like Ahab, which did sell himself to work
 wickedness. 2 Kings, xvii. 17, The Jews sold themselves to do

evil, &c. Isaiah i. 1, Behold, for your iniquities have ye *sold yourselves*, (*nimkartem*.) lii. 3, Ye have *sold yourselves* for nought, &c. Compare a similar expression, Ro. vi. 16, *o paritane te heautous doulous eis hupakoen*, &c. to whom ye *yield yourselves servants* to obey, &c.—Prof. Bush, in his Notes on Ex. xxi. 2, makes these remarks. “The following instances of the use of the term (*kanah*, to *buy*.) will go to show that its sense is modified by the subjects to which it is applied, and that it does not by any means necessarily convey the idea of the Hebrew servants being bought and sold as goods and chattels, as they are under system of modern slavery, especially in our country.” He then cites a number of passages. “Here, as the service among the Hebrews was for the most part voluntary, the ‘buying a Hebrew servant’ may as legitimately imply *the buying him from himself*, that is, *buying his services*, as any other mode of purchase. Indeed, as there is no positive proof that Hebrew servants were ever made such or kept in that condition by force, against their own consent, except as a punishment for crime, *the decided presumption is, that such is the kind of ‘buying’ here spoken of.*” And so Scott, on the same passage: “The Hebrews sometimes *sold themselves* * * through poverty.” Maimonides, a learned Jewish rabbi, (quoted by Bush,) speaks of the Jews as *selling themselves*.

Argument 3. *Hebrew girls could be sold by their parents; but not for a period extending beyond the years of maturity, when they were to be married by their purchaser, or by his son.*—“And if a man sell his daughter to be a maid-servant, she shall not go out as the men-servants do. If she please not her master, who hath betrothed her to himself, then shall he let her be redeemed: to sell her unto a strange nation he shall have no power, seeing he hath dealt deceitfully with her. And if he have betrothed her unto his son, he shall deal with her after the manner of daughters. If he take him another wife; her food, her raiment, and her duty of marriage shall he not diminish. And if he do not these three unto her, then shall she go out free without money. (Ex. xxi. 7.) This law allowed the sale of a daughter, as a female-servant (*leamah*.) She was not a *slave*, however: for, [1.] She was purchased in her maidenhood, to

become her master's wife at womanhood. She was to serve till the age of maturity, and no longer. After that period, the master must marry her; or she might claim redemption. For, surely, her master might not keep her five, ten, or fifteen years after she was marriageable, still deluding her with promises of marriage, and thus prevent her from obtaining freedom. If he betrothed her to his son, it was on the same condition,—that the marriage should be consummated when she should arrive at mature age.—(2.) The fact that she was *purchased of her father* does not prove that she was the property of her purchaser. Wives were commonly bought by their husbands, even though they were never to serve as hand-maids. So Boaz bought Ruth: “moreover, Ruth the Moabitess * * * have I purchased to be my wife.” [Ruth iv. 10.] Hosca says of his wife, “Lo, I *bought* her to me for fifteen pieces of silver, and for a homer of barley, and a half-homer of barley.” [iii. 2.]—Jacob paid fourteen years’ labor for Leah and Rachel. [Gen. xxix. 15–29.] His wives say of their father, “He hath *sold* us,” &c. (xxxi. 15.) Shechem offered to buy Dinah: “What ye shall say unto me, I will give.” (xxxiv. 11, 12.) David paid a hundred foreskins of the Philistines, for Michael the daughter of Saul. “The king desireth not any *dowry* (*mohar*) but,” &c. 1 Samuel, (xviii. 24.) Compare Ex. xxii. 16, and if a man entice a maid that is not betrothed, and lie with her, he shall surely *endow* her [*mahor*, *purchase* her] to be his wife:—with verse 17: and Deut. xxii. 28, 29. If a man find a damsel that is a virgin, which is not betrothed, and lay hold on her, and lie with her, and they be found; then the man that lay with her shall give unto the damsel’s father fifty shekels of silver, and she shall be his wife, &c. A similar custom prevailed among the ancient Greeks: See Homer’s *Iliad*, ix. 146, *philen anaednon*, a mistress obtained without the usual gifts, xi. 243, *polla d’edoke*, xvi. 178–190, *muria edna*, xxii. 472, *cpei pore muria edna*.—See, also, the purchase of a *husband*, Eurip. *Medea*, 230:

Panton d’ hos’ est empsucha, kai gnomen echei,

Gunaikes esmen athliotaton phuton:

Has prota men dei chrematon huperbole

Posin priasthai, despoten te somatos.

Herodotus, (Lib. 1, cap. 196,) tells us that the Babylonians

and others sold girls for wives, at public auction. "*Nomoi de autoisi hode katestatai*, &c. In my description of their laws, I have to mention one, the wisdom of which I must admire; * * * In each of their several districts this custom was every year observed: such of their virgins as were marriageable, were at an appointed time and place assembled together. Here the men also came, and some public officer sold by auction the young women one by one, beginning with the most beautiful * * * taking it for granted that each man married the maid he purchased." [Beloe's translation.] The remains of a similar custom existed among the ancient Germans: *Dotem non uxor marito, sed uxori maritus, offert. Intersunt parentes et propinqui, ac munera probant; &c.* (C. C. Taciti, *Germania*, xviii.)—Indeed, the history of our own country is not without example of wives purchased for forty pounds of tobacco, apiece: but no one ever dreamed that they were therefore the actual property of their husbands.—(3.) She was not a part of the master's chattels; and therefore he may not sell her. "To sell her unto a *strange nation* he shall have no power," (verse 8.) (*leam nakeri*.) "He was not allowed to marry her to another person, or to sell her into *another family*. Thus the words rendered '*a strange people*,' are generally understood, because it is supposed that no Hebrew slave could be sold to a Gentile." (Scott.)—(4.) If he have betrothed her unto his son, he must treat her, in all respects, as one of his own daughters.

Argument 4. *The heathen were bought as servants, only with their own consent.* The law respecting servants of this class, is found, Lev. xxv. 44–46. Both thy bond-men (*abdeka*.) and thy bond-maids (*amatheka*.) which thou shalt have, shall be of the heathen that are round about you; of them shall ye buy bond-men and bond-maids. Moreover, of the children of the strangers that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families that are with you, which they begat in your land: and they shall be your possession (*ahuzzah*.) And ye shall take them for an inheritance (*hithnahaltem*) for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession, and they shall be your bond-men forever, (*leolam bahem taabodu*;) but over your brethren the children of Israel, ye shall not rule over one

another with rigor, (*bepharek*.)—If there were any slaves among the Hebrews, they were persons brought into slavery under the provisions of this act. It therefore demands our most careful examination. Evidently the law permitted the Hebrews to buy heathen servants: but of whom,—and how? Upon the answer to these questions depends the whole controversy, so far as servants of this class are concerned. When a southerner buys a slave, he buys of a third person who claims the slave as his property. If the purchaser asks the consent of the slave,—a thing rarely thought of,—it is not that he may have a legal title to him. The negro is a chattel. He is not considered as entitled to a will of his own. He is not a party to the transaction by which he changes masters. Now if we can show that the heathen *sold himself* to the Hebrew, or at least *consented* to be sold, before the new master could have a title to him, and in order to the very existence of that title, we demonstrate that his condition, be it what it might, was not that of slavery. This we shall attempt to show.

(1.) From whom were these heathen bought? From foreign princes? But is there a shadow of proof that the heathen princes round about Judea were a sort of Guinea chiefs, who made merchandise of their subjects? Did the rich and powerful Gentiles sell their poor and defenceless neighbors? And were God's chosen people permitted to buy them? Jehovah has said, "Rob not the poor because he is poor: neither oppress the afflicted in the gate; for the Lord will plead their cause, and spoil the soul of those that spoiled them." (Prov. xxii. 22.)—Would he allow the Jews to open a market for these spoiled and afflicted ones; and thus indirectly sustain a system of robbery, in which they dared not engage directly? The advocates of slavery can devise but one answer, accordant with their views; namely, that the heathen round about were slave-holders: that they had captives taken in war, &c. whom they might sell to the Jewish purchaser. We admit that some servants of this sort might be bought of the heathen who claimed to be their masters: and shall prove, presently, that even such persons could not be held by the Hebrew, without their consent. But this answer will not meet the difficulty.

The law does not authorise the purchase of those only who were already enslaved by the heathen, but the heathen themselves; and the foreigners resident in Judea. We have a right to conclude, therefore, that the heathen were bought *of themselves*; since they could not be obtained justly, if at all, of any third person.

(2.) It is manifest, upon the face of the law, that *resident strangers* were upon the same footing with the heathen abroad, in respect to its operation. "Moreover, of the children of the strangers, [that is, the *descendants* of the strangers; as, 'your brethren the children of Israel,' [verse 46] means *adult* Israelites,] that do sojourn among you, of them shall ye buy, and of their families," &c. [verse 46.] Of whom would a Hebrew buy a *stranger*? The Jewish magistrates had no power to sell them to any nation who might wish to purchase. Undoubtedly, the *poor* stranger *sold himself*. [The rich stranger might buy even a Hebrew, under certain conditions.] And this will be placed in a clear light by a simple argument. If our national government should, by law, authorize native Americans to buy the German and Irish immigrants now in this country; to buy them of any one but themselves; and that, whether they were willing or unwilling to be sold; and such law were extensively reduced to practice; would any man expect a large immigration of that class of persons, in future? Would not such a law and such practice effectually check their immigration? Would not all the Germans and Irish who remained unbought, flee the country instantaneously? And if, at the same time, we professed great anxiety for their temporal and spiritual welfare; and an earnest solicitude to promote their immigration, that they might escape the despotism of the old world, and share our civil and religious liberties; would not mankind say that our legislation and our professions were strangely inconsistent? Is there, in the history of nations, a single instance, of a statesman, who, in order to promote the ingress of foreigners, proposed to reduce the immigrants to slavery? Apply these remarks to the case in hand. *The Divine Law-giver desired and encouraged the settlement of seriously disposed Gentiles in the Holy Land.* Witness the following statutes. In a multitude of cases, they were expressly

placed under the protection of the same laws with the Hebrews. Lev. xxiv. 22, Ye shall have one manner of law, as well for the stranger, as for one of your own country. Num. xv. 29, Ye shall have one law for him that sinneth through ignorance, both for him that is born among the children of Israel, and for the stranger that sojourneth among them. Deut. xvi. 18, 19, Judges and officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates, * * * and they shall judge the people with just judgment. Thou shalt not wrest judgment; thou shalt not respect persons, &c. xxiv. 17, 18, Thou shalt not pervert the judgment of the stranger, * * * but thou shalt remember that thou wast a bond-man in Egypt. Among the curses uttered from Mount Ebal, was this, [Deut. xxvii. 19,] Cursed be he that perverteth the judgment of the stranger, &c.—Strangers were permitted to offer sacrifices to the Lord.—Lev. xxii. 18–25, Whatsoever he be of the house of Israel, or of the strangers in Israel, that will offer his oblation for all his vows, and for all his free-will offerings, which they will offer unto the Lord for a burnt-offering, &c. Neither from a *stranger's* hand [*ben nakar, the son of an alien,*] shall ye offer the bread of your God at any of these, &c. A ready way was opened for the naturalization of foreigners, and their incorporation into the Jewish church.—Ex. xii. 48, 49, And when a stranger shall sojourn with thee, and will keep the passover to the Lord, let all his males be circumcised, and then let him come near and keep it; and he shall be as one that is born in the land: * * * One law shall be to him that is home-born, and unto the stranger that sojourneth among you. Compare Num. ix. 14. Provision was made for the support of poor strangers. Of the Sabbatical year, it is said, [Lev. xxv. 6,] The Sabbath of the land shall be meat for you; for thee, and for thy servant, and for thy maid, and for thy hired-servant, and for thy stranger that sojourneth with thee, &c.—Deut. xiv. 28, 29, At the end of three years thou shalt bring forth all the tithe of their increase the same year, and shalt lay it up within thy gates: and the Levite, * * * and the stranger, and the fatherless and the widow which are within thy gates, shall come, and shall eat and be satisfied; that the Lord thy God may bless thee in all the work of thy hand which thou doest. (Compare xxvi. 12,

13.) xxiv. 19-22, When thou cuttest down thy harvest in the field, and hast forgot a sheaf in the field, thou shalt not go again to fetch it: it shall be for the stranger, &c. When thou beatest thine olive-tree, thou shalt not go over the boughs again: it shall be for the stranger, &c. When thou gatherest the grapes of thy vineyard, thou shalt not glean it afterwards: it shall be for the stranger, &c. And thou shalt remember that thou wast a bond-man in the land of Egypt: therefore I command thee to do this thing. Compare Lev. xxv. 35,—Strangers were invited to participate in the holy festivities of Israel. Of the feast of weeks, the law says, [Deut. xvi. 11,] thou shalt rejoice before the Lord thy God, thou, and thy son, and thy daughter, * * * and the stranger, &c. Of the feast of tabernacles, the same words, [verse 14.] The oppression of strangers was positively forbidden, Ex. xxii. 21, Thou shalt neither vex a stranger, nor oppress him: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt.—xxiii. 9, Also thou shalt not oppress a stranger: for ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. How touching an appeal to their individual and national recollections! The law enjoined kindness and love toward the stranger.—Deut. x. 17-19, The Lord your God is God of Gods, and Lord of Lords, a great God, a mighty, and a terrible, who regardeth not persons, nor taketh reward: he doth execute the judgment of the fatherless and widow; *and loveth the stranger*, in giving him food and raiment. *Love ye therefore the stranger*: for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. Lev. xix. 33, 34, And if a stranger sojourn with thee in your land, ye shall not vex him. *But the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself*; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. I am the Lord your God. Such was the spirit of the Hebrew law in respect to foreign residents. Idolatrous Gentiles, indeed, and those guilty of other aggravated crimes, were not permitted to enter the holy land. But such foreigners as would submit to the general laws of the country, (Ex. xx. 10. Lev. xviii. 26,] though they might be unwilling to receive the rite of circumcision, were studiously invited by the most favorable statutes ever adopted by any people, in respect to immigrants. And

for this policy there was good reason. The knowledge of the only true God was confined to Judea: the time had not yet come for commanding the church to go out into all the world, and preach the truth to every creature: the principal means of converting the heathen, therefore, was, to invite them, by these special statutes, to take up their abode among the people of God; and thus say to them, as Moses said to Hobab, Come with us, and we will do you good: for the Lord hath spoken good concerning Israel. [Num. x. 29.] Now can any candid student of the Mosaic system believe that the same Legislator who invited foreigners into the country, by such provisions of law as we have quoted, subjected those who accepted his invitation, to be reduced to slavery; to be bought and sold, like beasts of burden, without their consent, and even against their will? to be held forever, and their children after them, in any such condition as that of American slaves? to be ranked in the same category with the lands, houses, cattle, and other hereditary property of the native citizens? The supposition is the extreme of absurdity. Undoubtedly, the law contained in Lev. xxv. 44-46, must be interpreted in consistence with the spirit of the other laws relative to strangers: and since it says nothing to the contrary, we must conclude that, like the Hebrew servants, they *voluntarily sold themselves*.

But the law styles the Gentile bought-servant the *possession* [*ahuzzah*] of his master, and adds, "Ye shall take them as an inheritance [*hithnahaltem*] for your children after you," &c. Doctor J. compares verse 41, "unto the *possession* [*ahuzzath*] of his fathers shall he return," &c., and says, "In short, this word is invariably used to signify ownership in landed estates," &c. (pp. 37, 38.) To show the meaning of *nahal*, to *acquire as an inheritance*, he compares Num. xxxiii. 54, "Ye shall divide the land by lot for an inheritance, (*hithnahatem eth-haaretz*;) and xxxiv. 13, We do not deny that *ahuzzah*, when applied to lands, houses, &c., denotes *property*, in the literal sense of the word: nor that *nahal* means, to acquire or leave for an inheritance, as such property is usually left. But have they the same signification when applied to persons? Must they not be taken in a sense more or less literal, according to the subject to which

they relate? Compare Ezek. xlv. 28, And it shall be unto them for an *inheritance* (*lenahalah*.) I (Jehovah) am their *inheritance* (*nahalthom*;) and ye shall give them no *possession* (*ahuzzah*) in Israel: I am their *possession*, (*ahuzzathom*.) Num. xviii. 20, And the Lord spake to Aaron, Thou shalt have no *inheritance* in their land, neither shalt thou have any part among them: I am thy part and thine *inheritance* among the children of Israel.—Here, the same words which, in Lev. xxv. 45, 46, denote inheritance and possession, are employed in two senses; the one literal, the other figurative. Applied to God, they cannot signify actual property possession; but they are necessarily limited by their subject. In the same figurative sense, believers are called the *inheritance* of the Lord: Ps. xxviii. 9, Save thy people, and bless thine *inheritance* (*nahalahetka*;) xciv. 14, The Lord will not * * * forsake his *inheritance*. See Ex. xxxiv. 9. Deut. iv. 29. ix. 26–29. xxxii. 9, &c. The word *nahalah* is applied by subjects to their kings; 2 Sam. xx. 1, We have no part in David, neither have we *inheritance* in the son of Jesse. Compare 1 Kin. xii. 16. We are fully authorized to conclude, therefore, that “the terms *inheritance* and *possession*, when applied in the Scriptures to *persons*, are not to be taken in their primary sense as applied to *things*; but in a secondary or topical sense, which is to be determined by the connection.” The heathen bondmen were the *possession* of the children of Israel, “in a limited and secondary sense, which must be determined, not by the expressions themselves when used in reference to other objects, but by the established laws and usages of the country, in respect to persons in their condition.”—(See Letters of the Gen. Con. of Maine, (Cong.) to the Presby. of Tombigbee, p. 55.) These laws, as we have seen, regarded the stranger, not as a *thing*, but as a *man*, possessed of “certain inalienable rights” which the Hebrew was bound to respect. Jehovah threatened to “be a swift witness” against those who “turned aside the stranger from his right.”

The position that Gentile servants were bought, only with their own consent, is fully sustained by a consideration of the *religious duties* demanded of such servants. Willing and cheerful services, and those only, are required and accepted by the

Lord. Such services could not be expected, nor reasonably asked, of heathen, purchased against their will, and held in perpetual slavery. To suppose the contrary is to insult the Majesty of Heaven.—But the heathen, or stranger, who became a bond-man, was required, (1.) To be circumcised; (Ex. xii. 48, 49;) that is, to receive the token of a covenant in which the party solemnly avowed the Lord to be his God forever. What a mockery, to put such a token upon an involuntary slave! (2.) This covenant was occasionally renewed; (Deut. xxix. 10–15.) (3.) To eat the passover, and unleavened bread seven days: (Ex. xii. 44.) Every man-servant that is bought for money, when thou hast circumcised him, then shall he eat thereof. Compare verses 15, 19. Seven days shall there be no leaven found in your houses: for whosoever eateth that which is leavened, even that soul shall be cut off from the congregation of Israel, whether he be a stranger, or born in the land. Compare Num. ix. 6–14. [1.] To attend the public feasts with rejoicing; (Deut. xii. 10–12.) And ye shall rejoice before the Lord your God, ye and your sons, * * * * and your men-servants, and your maid-servants, &c. How could involuntary servants rejoice before a God whom they had not chosen? The thought reminds one of the slaves, compelled with the cat-o'-nine-tails, to dance on board ship, during the middle passage. Compare xvi. 10–15. [5.] To receive religious instruction; [Deuteronomy xxxi. 10–13. Joshua viii. 33–35. [6.] To offer sacrifices; [Exodus xxiii. 14–17;] Three times in the year all thy males shall appear before the Lord God. [verse 15.] And none shall appear before me empty. Compare Deut. xvi. 16, 17, where the phrase, “all thy males,” is seen to include servants; (verses 11 and 14, and Num. ix. 13.) Now could such duties be, with justice, forcibly imposed on slaves? As well might christian masters now-a-days compel their slaves to make a profession of religion, receive baptism, conduct family worship, and partake of the communion. But if the heathen servant was purchased of himself, and with his own consent, that consent was a virtual abandonment of idolatry, and choice of the Lord's service. Nor can it be justly objected that such servants

were *bribed* into the Jewish church. It was one thing for a Hebrew to offer a heathen a bribe, as an inducement to become a bond-man and a proselyte; and quite another thing, to refuse to buy any Gentile who did not cordially prefer Judaism to Paganism. And here it may be proper to adduce the testimony of Maimonides: "Whether a servant be born in the power of an Israelite, or whether he be purchased from the heathen, the master is to bring them both into covenant. But he that is born in the house is to be entered upon the eighth day, and he that is bought with money on the day in which the master receives him, unless the slave be unwilling. For if the master receives a grown slave, and he be unwilling, his master is to bear with him, to seek to win him over by instruction, and by love and kindness, for one year; after which, should he refuse so long, it is forbidden to keep him longer than the twelve months, and the master must send him back to the strangers whence he came; for the God of Jacob will not accept any other than the worship of a willing heart."—[Quoted in Stroud's Sketch, page 63, from Gill's Exposition.]

It is but candid to admit, before leaving this topic, that Gentile servants seem to have been in a condition, in some respects inferior to that of Hebrew servants. [1.] They were never purchased for six years; but always till the Jubilee. [2.] No mention is made of Hebrew servants, even when their ears were bored, laboring for the children of their master; whereas, if the master of a Gentile died before the jubilee, he was inherited by the children, and retained until his whole time of service expired. (Lev. xxv. 46.)

Argument 5. *The servitude of every class of persons was limited.*—That the service of one class of servants was limited to a period of six years, is expressly declared by the law; (Ex. xxi. 2. Deut. xv. 12.)—In regard to a second class, the law is equally explicit; (Lev. xxv. 39–43.) And if thy brother that dwelleth by thee be waxen poor, and be sold unto thee, thou shalt not compel him to serve as a bond-servant, (*lo-thaabed bo abodath abed*, literally, thou shalt not serve thyself with him with the service of an *ebed*.) But as an hired servant (*sakir*), and as a sojourner he shall be with thee, and shall serve thee unto

the year of jubilee. And then shall he depart from thee, both he and his children with him, and shall return unto his own family, and unto the possession of his fathers shall he return. For they are my servants whom I brought forth out of the land of Egypt; they shall not be sold as bond-men [*lo yimmakeru mimkereth abed*, they shall not sell themselves with the sale of an *ebed*.] Thou shalt not rule over him with rigor, but shalt fear thy God.—This statute is entirely distinct from that in Ex. xxi. 2, &c. Deut. xv. 12, &c. It relates to another class of persons. According to the latter, the servant is bought for six years, but may, at pleasure, extend the time of service, and become a servant “forever.” In the former, no mention is made of a six years’ engagement, nor of having the ear bored as a mark of continued servitude. The law in Deut. provides that the servant, going free at the end of six years, shall not be sent away empty; but shall be furnished liberally out of the flock, the floor, and the press. Nothing is said of his returning to his own possession. That in Lev. makes no provision for furnishing “the brother” liberally, when he departs; but expressly declares that he “shall return unto the possession of his fathers.” A servant of the one class was, and was called, an *ebed*; Ex. xxi. 2, If thou buy an Hebrew servant, (*ebed ibri*.) A servant of the other, could not be sold with the sale, nor be compelled to serve with the service of an *ebed*. Some commentators suppose that the six years’ servants were sold for debt or crime; and that the other class sold themselves through poverty. [So Henry.] But the laws afford no reason for this distinction. The liberal provision allowed the six years’ servant when his time had expired, shows that he too was poor, and by no means agrees with the supposition that he had been sold for crime. Dr. Crothers, in his “Gospel of the Typical Servitude,” has clearly proved that the law, in Ex. xxi. contemplated the sale of *younger brethren* who were not land-holders: while the statute in Lev. xxv. 39, provided for the *first born*, the possessor of “the inheritance of his fathers,” who, from poverty, had been compelled to part with his real estate until the jubilee. We refer our readers to the pamphlet above mentioned, for a full exhibition of the argument upon this passage. It is evident,

therefore, that Doctor J. is entirely at fault when he supposes that in Lev. xxv. 39-42, a contrast is drawn between Hebrew servants and "foreign slaves," who might be subjected to "rigorous treatment." [p. 28.] The contrast is really between Hebrew servants of one class, and Hebrew and heathen servants of another class. The inference that Gentile bond-men might lawfully be treated "with *rigor*," (*be'pharek, oppression, cruelty, mochtho*, Septuagint, the word used, Ex. i. 13, to describe the Egyptian cruelties towards the Hebrews,) because one sort of Hebrew servants *might not*, is worthy the head and the heart of a pro-slavery D. D. On the same principle the ancient Doctors of the Law inferred from the command, Thou shalt *love thy neighbor*, (Lev. xix. 18,) the right to hate their *enemy*. (See Mat. v. 43, and Bloomfield's Notes.)

Two classes of servants yet remain to be mentioned. Ex. xxi. 2-6, If thou buy a Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve: and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself: if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. If his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master's, and he shall go out by himself. And if the servant shall plainly say, I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free: then his master shall bring him unto the judges: he shall also bring him unto the door, or unto the door-post: and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl; and he shall serve him *forever*, (*le'olam*.) Compare Deut. xv. 12-18, and he shall be thy servant *forever* (*olam*). And also unto thy maid servant shalt thou do likewise.—Lev. xxv. 44-46, And ye shall take them (the heathen and the strangers) as an inheritance for your children after you, to inherit them for a possession, they shall be your bond-men *forever*, (*le'olam bahem taabodu*, literally forever of (or with) them shall ye serve yourselves.)—The term of service of both these classes is expressed by the same word, *olam*, translated, *forever*; and Dr. J. insists that the ear-bored Hebrew, as well as the Gentile, were slaves for life. We will not say that "no commentator ever enter-

tained such an idea;" but we will say, that Josephus, (Antiq. B. 4, c. 8, § 28.)—Jahn, (Arch. § 351, 1.)—Carpenter (in his Guide to the Study of the Bible.)—Scott, Henry, Barnes, and every writer on Jewish law accessible to us, contradict his assertion, and affirm that *at least all servants of Hebrew descent* were freed on the year of jubilee. Bush contradicts himself. The learned Bishop Horsey says, that the man is ignorant of Jewish technical terms who does not know that the expression, '*forever*,' in this connection, means no more than to the year of jubilee. However, we appeal, not to critics and commentators, but to the written word itself; and we assert that both the Hebrew ear-bored servant, and the bond-man of the Gentiles, were released from servitude by the year of jubilee.

The word *olam* does not necessarily imply perpetual servitude. Our author's reply to this assertion is rant—mere rant. "We are told," says he, "by a brother who did not thus argue when dealing in debate with a Universalist, * * * that *forever* means only to the year of jubilee—the servant of the bored ear goes out at the jubilee. To this I answer, [1.] Suppose his six years' service ended a short time before the jubilee—say a month—then *forever* means just thirty days? Is this interpretation of Scripture language; or is it gross perversion? Could Ballou himself, or Ballou's master desire any thing better? If *forever* means but thirty days, or ten days, or one day, then rejoice, all ye devils and damned spirits; rejoice, ye thieves, and liars, and drunkards, and profane swearers, and Sabbath breakers; for behold we bring unto you glad tidings—we proclaim in hell a Universalist jubilee: you shall be punished indeed *forever*; but, glory be to licentious criticism, forever means but thirty days, or one day! Do you believe it, Mr. Moderator? Is there a devil in hell so foolish as to believe it!"—[p. 35.] Now all this is supremely silly; and Doctor J. has too much sense not to know it. The primary signification of *olam* is, *eternity, unlimited duration*. "So Gesenius, in the third edition of his Hebrew Lexicon, '*olam, eternity*,' which is the only definition he gives." In this sense it is used, Gen. xxi. 33, the *everlasting* God: Ps. ciii. 17, The mercy of the Lord is from *everlasting* to *everlasting*. Jer. xxxi. 3, I have loved thee with an *everlasting* love. So is it

applied to future happiness and punishment, Dan. xii. 2, Some [shall awake] to *everlasting* life, and some to shame and *everlasting* contempt. Such is the meaning of *olam* in all passages where the context, or the nature of the subject, does not require a limitation. Hence, in arguing with a Universalist, no scholar ever did, or ever would say that in every place where it occurs, it necessarily means eternity; but that it retains its primary and proper sense wherever a secondary sense is not absolutely required. Now there is nothing in the word of God, whatever there may be in the fancies of men, which demands a restricted meaning when *olam* is applied to the duration of future punishment; but positive proof to the contrary is abundant. Gesenius adds, "that the expression in Hebrew, as among us in common life, is often used in an inaccurate manner, i. e. when merely a very long space of time is denoted. So it is applied to the Jewish priesthood; to the Mosaic ordinances; to the possession of the land of Canaan; to the hills and mountains; to the earth; to the time of service to be rendered by a slave," &c.—[See Stuart's Exeget. Essays, pp. 47–52.] Parkhurst says that *olam* denotes "sometimes the period of time to the Jubilee," and cites in proof the passages under consideration, Ex. xxi. 6, Deut. xv. 17. In fact, according to Doctor J.'s own interpretation, the word "forever," is taken in a secondary sense. Must the ear-bored Hebrew be a slave, literally, *leolam*—throughout eternity? Oh no, says the Doctor; but as long as he lives. And could he not perceive that, by his own showing, *olam* might denote a period of *one day*? for the man might die the day after his ear had been bored. We may add, that a secondary signification is required in every passage cited by the author, [pp. 35, 36.] The Hebrews held their possessions, not strictly forever; but during their abode in the land, and the continuance of the Mosaic institutions. "Suppose," says he, "that (the slave's) six years' service ended a short time before the jubilee—say a month."—Well, we suppose that in such a case, *the Hebrew would not have his ear bored*; for he was induced to submit to that ceremony by his love for his wife and children, whose term of labor had not yet expired. But if the jubilee were so near, his family would shortly be free; and he might dwell with them without becoming

a servant. In short, the Doctor's argument is founded upon the supposition that *olam* can never be taken in a limited sense : how idle and erroneous a supposition, every intelligent man can see.

But what authority have we for saying that *olam*, as used in Ex. xxii. 6, Deut. xv. 17, and Lev. xxv. 46, must mean "the period of time to the jubilee?" We answer, that the law of the jubilee required the emancipation of every servant.—Lev. xxv. 9, 10, Then shalt thou cause the trumpet of the jubilee to sound, on the tenth day of the seventh month, in the day of atonement shall ye make the trumpet sound throughout all your land. And ye shall hallow the fiftieth year, and *proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof*, [*lekol yoshebha*, to all inhabiting her, that is, the land.] Does the phrase *lekol yoshebha*, in this connection, denote descendants of Abraham only; or does it include all who dwelt permanently in Judea, under the protection and government of the laws of the land? If the latter, then the Gentile servants, who had of course been circumcised, and who were in one sense Hebrews, though not Hebrews of Hebrews, [Phil. iii. 5,] enjoyed the benefit of the jubilee release. This question must be determined by a comparison of passages. The verb *yashab* signifies, to sit; to settle; to fix one's abode; to inhabit a place or country. In some of its forms it is employed in the following Scriptures:—[1.] In those which refer to all who dwell upon the face of the earth: Ps. xxxiii. 8, Let all the *inhabitants* [*yoshebe*] of the world stand in awe of him. Verse 14, He looketh upon all the *inhabitants* of the earth. Ps. xlix. 1, lxxv. 3. Isa. xviii. 3. xxiv. 1, 5, 6, 17. xxvi. 9, 18. xxxviii. 11. xl. 22. Jer. xxv. 29. Lam. iv. 12. [2.] In those which speak of all who reside in a particular city or region, making no distinction between native citizens, and those strangers who may have a permanent abode there: Ex. xv. 14, 15. Sorrow shall take hold of the *inhabitants* of Palestina. * * * All the *inhabitants* of Canaan shall melt away, Num. xiii. 32, The land through which we have gone to search it, is a land that eateth up the *inhabitants* thereof. (Not the Canaanites only, but all who did or might thereafter dwell there.) Josh. ii. 24, All the *inhabitants* of the country do faint because of us. xvii. 11, 12. Jud. i. 19,

27. v. 23. x. 18, he shall be head over all the *inhabitants* of Gilead. 2 Kin. xix. 26, Isa. x. 13, I (the king of Assyria) have removed the bounds of the people, * * * and have put down their *inhabitants*, &c., xx. 6. xxiii. 2, 6. xlii. 10, 11. Jer. x. 17. xxi. 13. xxii. 23. xxiii. 14. xxvi. 15. xlviii. 19, 43. xlix. 8, 30. l. 34. li. 35. Ezek. xxix. 6. Mic. i. 11, 12, 13, 15. vi. 12, 16. Zeph. ii. 5. Zech. viii. 20, 21. (3.) The same word is employed in passages which declare the total destruction of all who reside in a city, country, &c.: Gen. xix. 25, And he overthrew those cities, and all the plain, and all the *inhabitants* of those cities, (*kol-yoshbc.*) (Were Lot and his two daughters the only strangers resident in Sodom, Gomorrah, Admah, and Zeboim?) Lev. xviii. 25. Deut. xiii. 15. Thou shalt surely smite the *inhabitants* of that (idolatrous Jewish) city with the edge of the sword, destroying it utterly, and all that is therein. (Would idolatrous Gentiles in that city be spared, on the ground that they were not inhabitants?) Jud. xxi. 10. Isa. v. 9. vi. 11. Until the cities be wasted without *inhabitant*, and the houses without man, and the land be utterly desolate. Jer. ii. 15. iv. 7. ix. 11. x. 18. xiii. 13. xix. 12. xxi. 6. I will smite the *inhabitants* of this city, *both man and beast*. xxvi. 9, This city shall be desolate without an *inhabitant*. Compare the fulfilment, xxxiii. 10, The streets of Jerusalem *are* desolate, without man, and without *inhabitant*, and without beast. xxxiv. 22. xlv. 22. xlv. 19. l. 35. Compare verses 39, 40, The utter desolation of Babylon; and li. 29, To make Babylon a desolation without an *inhabitant*. Am. i. 5, 8. Zeph. ii. 5. iii. 6. It is certain that when God executed the threatening, that he would "sling out of the land all the *inhabitants* of Judea," the Gibeonites and other Nethenim, who were "strangers," and the bond-servants of the Hebrews were carried captive as well as native Israelites. (See Ezra. ii. 1, 43-58, 65. Neh. vii. 6, 46-60, 67.) Were these circumcised and proselyted Gentiles "inhabitants of the land," when Jehovah, by Nebuchadnezzar, blew a trumpet of vengeance; but *not* inhabitants when his trumpet of mercy uttered its silver sounds on the day of jubilee? Was this the manner of the God of the land? (4.) This word is used to denote persons expressly declared not to have been citizens, properly speaking, of the land in which

they dwelt: Gen. xlv. 10, Joseph said to his father, Thou shalt dwell (*yashabta*) in the land of Goshen, * * * thou and thy children, &c. Certainly they became *yoshbcha*, "*inhabitants thereof*." Yet compare Ex. xxiii. 9, Ye know the heart of a stranger, seeing ye were strangers in the land of Egypt. 1 Chron. ix. 2, Now the first *inhabitants* [*yoshbin*] that dwelt in their possessions in their cities, were, the Israelites, the priests, Levites, and the *Nethenims*. Here the Nethenim, though Gentiles, and perhaps uncircumcised, are expressly called *inhabitants* of the land.

On the ground, then, of the almost if not absolutely uniform use of the word in question, we have a right to interpret the law of the jubilee *in its natural sense*, as giving liberty to all classes of servants. But there are other reasons, equally forcible, for adopting the same conclusion. The jubilee trumpet proclaimed "liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof." Was this merely an annunciation of the truism that all the freemen in Israel were free? Or was it a declaration of independence to those who had been in a state of servitude? Now, if, as Doctor J. asserts, the servant bought of the heathen or stranger, and the ear-bored Hebrew, were excluded from the benefit of this proclamation, who enjoyed it? Who was set free on the jubilee? Not the six years' servant; for his case was provided for by another statute. The class of poor elder brethren, mentioned, Lev. xxv. 39-43, were not *freed*, for they had never been "sold with the sale of an *ebed*; but were as the hired servant or sojourner. The servants who had sold themselves to the stranger, might be, and probably would be, redeemed before the jubilee. Strange provision—this of the jubilee! Men went throughout all the land, [a land in which, as we are assured, there were thousands of slaves,] blowing the trumpet and proclaiming liberty—to nobody—to the free;—leaving the slaves, and their children—slaves forever! What a solemn farce! equaled in the history of mankind, only by the conduct of our republican slaveholders, who, on the Fourth of July, publicly read, in every city, town, and hamlet of their land, the Declaration of our fathers, "that all men are created free and equal, endowed with certain inalienable rights,

among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness;" and on the fifth, drive to the cotton-fields their twenty-five hundred thousand slaves! Was the jubilee trumpet intended to tantalize the poor bond-men? to be a cruel mocking of their misery? And that no circumstance of singularity might be wanting to this jubilee trumpet-blowing, the proclamation was made on the tenth day of the seventh month; and on the fifteenth day of the same month, five days afterward, the men-servants and the maid-servants must assemble with their masters, in the place which the Lord should choose, and "rejoice in the feast" of tabernacles! [Deut. xvi. 13-16. Lev. xxiii. 27, &c.] With the sound yet tingling in their ears, which had announced the freedom of all but themselves; these bond-men would be in fit mood, surely, to rejoice with their masters! What havoc does "the defender of the faith" of slaveholders make with the holy and just and good law! When Jehovah bade the trumpet shout *Liberty! Liberty! to all the inhabitants of the land*, that trumpet gave no uncertain or unwelcome sound. It gave the *ebed* and the *amah*, whether Jew or Gentile, abundant reason to rejoice, and to bless God for a constitution which taught and enforced the equal rights of humanity. Are we asked why these servants should be so happy in the termination of a voluntary engagement? The apprentice is glad when his time of indenture is completed; and calls himself free, though he was never a slave.

Once more;—The jubilee was *typical*. The trumpets were blown on the eve of the great day of atonement. That atonement was typical of the blood that cleanseth from all sin, [1 Jno. i. 7;] that was shed for the remission of sins; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world.—[1 Jno. ii. 2.) The liberty trumpets, whose glad sound gave freedom to all the servants in Judea, prefigured the proclamation of that "liberty wherewith Christ maketh his people free;" even those who had yielded themselves servants (*doulous*) to sin and satan. (Ro. vi. 16.) Satan was a master of their own choice: so was the servant of the Jew self-sold. Now, by whom is this deliverance enjoyed which our blessed High Priest hath purchased with his own blood? Is it not by those who have made a covenant with him

by sacrifice? [Ps. l. 5.] And had not the servant bought of the heathen or the stranger made a covenant with God? Did he not carry its seal upon his body? Had he not confirmed it with the annual recurrence of the paschal feast? Had he not gone up to the sanctuary of the Lord, ten days before the jubilee, that he might attend "the holy convocation," and prepare for the solemnities of the great atonement?—(Lev. xxiii. 23, &c. Deut. xvi. 9–16.) Were not his sins typically atoned for, with those of the people whose God he had chosen for a portion? And shall he be refused the typical freedom consequent upon that atonement? Then shall the humble Gentile who trusts in the atoning blood of Christ, be left under the power of the devil, to be carried captive by him at his will!—Thanks be to God! the holy and just and good law taught better things. "Let not the son of the stranger, that hath joined himself to the Lord, speak, saying, the Lord hath utterly separated me from his people. * * * The sons of the stranger, that join themselves to the Lord, to serve him, and to love the name of the Lord, to be his servants, every one that keepeth the Sabbath from polluting it, *and taketh hold of my covenant*: even them will I bring to my holy mountain, and make them joyful in my house of prayer: their burnt offerings and their sacrifices shall be accepted upon mine altar; for my house shall be called a house of prayer for *all people*."—[Isa. lvi. 3–7. 1 Kin. viii. 41–43.]

We close this argument with the language of the venerable father first named in Doctor J.'s dedication: "Provision was made for *universal emancipation* every fiftieth year. * * * Some contend that because the law of *emancipation* is found in the tenth verse, (Lev. xxv.) and the law of *bondage* in verses 44–46, the jubilee did not reach those who had been bought of the heathen, or of the strangers who sojourned in the land! What! not reach them, when they were circumcised and inhabited the land as much as any Hebrew servant, male or female, whose ear had been bored with an awl! They might as well tell us that the Babylonish captivity will take place after the latter-day glory, because it is written subsequently in the book of Malachi, ch. 4. * * * Verily, he must be a blind guide who decides the import of a law merely from the place where it stands

in the statute book. * * * The year of jubilee, commencing on the great day of atonement, typified 'the acceptable year of the Lord,' or the gospel dispensation—'GOOD TIDINGS OF GREAT JOY TO ALL PEOPLE.' But if the sweet sound of the *jubilee trumpet* meant no deliverance to the servants bought from the heathen, then it very poorly represented 'the good things to come'—now proclaimed by the *gospel trumpet*, to the *chief of sinners*. Tell me, for whose special benefit was the year of jubilee appointed? * * * For the benefit of *all servants*, not otherwise provided for? Unless you can show that they did not inhabit the land! The language of the statute is *explicit* and *FULL*. 'And ye shall hallow the *fiftieth year*, and proclaim *LIBERTY* throughout *all the land*, unto *ALL THE INHABITANTS THEREOF*? To servants, not to free inhabitants.—'A jubilee, a sweet sound of trumpets, shall that fiftieth year be unto you.'—[Relations, &c. of Servants and Masters:—By J. L. WILSON, D. D. The italics are his own.]

Argument 6. *Every class of servants among the Jews, received wages.* The law says, (Lev. xix. 13,) "Thou shalt not defraud thy *neighbor*, (*rea*) neither rob him," and adds, as a specification, "The wages of him that is hired (*sakir*) shall not abide with thee all night until the morning." Undoubtedly, Jeremiah introduced no new principle, unknown to the Mosaic system, when he said, "Woe unto him that buildeth his house by unrighteousness, and his chambers by wrong; that useth his *neighbor's* (*rea*) service without wages, and giveth him not for his work." (xxii. 13.) Was the servant bought of the heathen, or of the stranger, considered as a neighbor? Let the law answer: 'Thou shalt love thy *neighbor* (*rea*) as thyself.—(Lev. xix. 13.) Compare verse 34, But the *stranger* that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, *and thou shalt love him as thyself*; for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt, &c. See also verse 17. Ex. xvi. 17. Prov. xxv. 17, 18. Mat. vi. 43. xxii. 36–40. Indeed, the specification given above relates to a *sakir*, who might be an uncircumcised stranger.—[Deut. xxiv. 14.] This point settled, we ask, would it be robbery and oppression, using a neighbor's service without wages, to buy him against his will, of a third person; and to reduce him and

his posterity to perpetual slavery? Would that master satisfy the demands of the law, who gave his servant food, clothing and lodging, only; and that, not according to contract with the servant, nor to an amount that would be a full recompence for his labor,—but at his own pleasure? These are the *wages* given by our American slaveholders; and do they comply with the requirements of the divine law? We cannot give a better answer than that of R. J. Breckinridge: “Out upon such folly! The man who cannot see that involuntary domestic slavery, *as it exists among us*, is founded upon the principle of taking by force that which is another’s, *has simply no moral sense.*” We do not say that the *ebed* received daily wages, as did the *sakir*: but that, in some form, he received *what he himself agreed to serve for*.

Argument 7. *Servants might hold property; and were sometimes the heirs of their masters.*—Saul’s servant had money of his own, (1 Sam. ix. 8.) Ziba, the servant of Mephibosheth, made David a present of two hundred loaves of bread, a hundred bunches of raisins, a hundred of summer fruits, and a bottle of wine. (2 Sam. xvi. 1.) He had twenty servants of his own. [ix. 10.] David afterwards divided all the property of Saul’s house, between Ziba and his master. (xix. 24, 30. Compare ix. 9.) “Gehazi the *servant* (*naar*, but called *ebed*, verse 25,) of Elisha, received of Naaman two talents, [about £700 or \$3000; Scott.] [2 Kings, v. 22–26.] This his master did not take from him; but he seems to have expected that he would expend it for “olive-yards, vineyards, sheep, oxen, men-servants, and maid-servants.” [verse 26.] Mat. xviii. 23–34, illustrates the condition of Jewish servants. The servant said, “Lord, have patience with me and I will pay thee all.” How could he do this if he, and his, and his earnings, already belonged to his master? The same servant had his debtors, [verses 28, 30,] whom he might imprison for money due to him. We have already shown that they offered sacrifices; which implies the possession of property.

As to their heirship, see Gen. xv. 2, 3; and the case of Ziba, already referred to. 1 Chron. ii. 34–41, “Now Sheshan had no sons, but daughters. And Sheshan had a *servant* (*ebed*.) an Egyptian, whose name was Jarha. And Sheshan gave his

daughter to Jarha his servant to wife; and she bare him Attai," &c. Prov. xvii. 2, A wise servant shall have rule over a son that causeth shame, and shall have part of the inheritance among the brethren. It would seem, from this passage, that the Hebrews, customarily, made good servants fellow-heirs with the children.—Compare with this characteristic of Hebrew servitude, the fact, that in our country, "Slaves have no legal rights of property in things real or personal; and whatever property they may acquire, belongs, in point of law, to their masters." [Stroud's Sketch, Prop. 5, 45.] See, also, Louisiana Civ. Code, Art. 35, "A slave is one who is in the power of a master to whom he belongs. * * * He can do nothing, *possess nothing, nor acquire anything, but what must belong to his master,*" [p. 22;] and the laws of South Carolina, Georgia, Virginia, North Carolina, Maryland, Mississippi, and Kentucky, (pp. 45-49.)

Argument 8. *There is no proof that Jewish masters were permitted to sell their servants.*—The *onus probandi* lies upon those who affirm the contrary. Let them produce a law authorising such sale; or a single instance, from all Jewish history, of actual practice under such a law. An apparent exception to our general statement may be found in Deut. xxi. 10-14. The Hebrew soldier who saw "among the captives" a beautiful woman might marry her. If she became disagreeable to him, he might divorce her, as he might a Hebrewess, but, "thou shalt let her go whither she will; * * * thou shalt not sell her at all for money; thou shalt not make merchandise of her, because thou hast humbled her." May it not be inferred, that, if he had *not* humbled her, he might have sold her? Without denying the correctness of this inference, we remark, (1.) That this woman, with all her class, was not originally "a servant bought with money," but a captive.—They were obtained in a manner wholly different from that in which all other servants, whether of Hebrew or heathen origin, were procured. (2.) They were not only captives, but criminals; that is, they belonged to a community, which, as a community, were regarded and treated as guilty of crime. They suffered under the great law of "social liability," for

the offence of their rulers; just as "the captive that was in the dungeon," and "the maid-servant behind the mill," suffered for the offence of Pharaoh. (Ex. xi. 4, 12, 29.) These captive women belonged to a city that had given the Israelites occasion to prosecute a *just* war. This must be granted, because God had authorised the war, and "had delivered their enemies into their hands." [Deut. xx. 12, 13, xxi. 10.] Before besieging their city, too, the Israelites had "proclaimed peace" to these enemies, on reasonable grounds. [xx. 10, 11.] They had refused peace; and thus had aggravated their original offence. At the command, and with the help of God, the city had then been captured; all the males put to the sword; and these women with their children taken prisoners, who were now expiating, by servitude, the national guilt. Now the question we are arguing, and the great practical question to be answered by the American church and people, is, not whether *criminals* may be *punished* with imprisonment for a time, or for life; with hard labor in a penitentiary, or the chain-gang; with slavery, or with death. This all admit. The Constitution of our own free State declares that "There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in this State, *otherwise than for the punishment of crimes,*" &c. [Art. 8, sect. 2.] The question is, whether persons chargeable with no crime, or only

—————guilty of a skin

Not colored like our own,————

may be justly held in perpetual, involuntary servitude. In this part of our argument we are proving that the Mosaic system never maintained the affirmative: and the case of these prisoners of war can never establish the contrary. [3.] These captives were, of course, freed at the year of jubilee. (4.)—Let it not be forgotten that these "women and *little ones*, (the very words excite our sympathy,) were placed, by Jehovah, under the protection of his innumerable statutes relative to "the widow and the fatherless." "Ye shall not afflict *any widow or fatherless child*. If thou afflict them *in any wise*, and they cry *at all* unto me, *I will surely hear their cry*; and my wrath shall wax hot, and I will kill you with the sword; and your wives shall be widows, and your children fatherless." (Ex. xxii. 22, 23.)

Argument 9. *Servants were not subject to the liabilities of property.*—A few particulars may be specified. [1.] *Children* were sometimes taken for their parents' debts; but there is no instance of servants seized by creditors for the debt of their master. See Neh. v. 1–5. Isa. l. 1. 2 Kings, iv. 1. Mat. xviii. 25. In this latter case, the servant who could owe some millions of dollars, ten (thousand talents,) would most probably have some servants. He and his wife and children are threatened with sale; but no allusion is made to selling his servants. [2.] Various kinds of property were levied on by creditors: servants were not. Flocks, asses, oxen, (Job xxiv. 2, 3;) the bed, (Prov. xxii. 27;) landed estate, Lev. xxv. 25, 28;) houses, [Lev. xxv. 29, 30.] Mat. v. 40. [3.] Property of all sorts was given in pledge: servants were not. Ex. xxii. 26, 27. Deut. xxiv. 10–13. [4.] Lost property was to be restored by the finder: runaway servants were not. [Compare Deut. xxii. 1–3, with xxiii. 15, 16.] [5.] It was customary to give presents to friends, or superiors. 1 Sam. x. 27, 2 Kings viii. 8, 2 Chron. xvii. 5.] A large variety of things is enumerated; see (Gen. xlv. 22, 23. 1 Sam. xvi. 20, xxv. 18. 2 Sam. xvi. 1. 1 Kings, xiv. 3, xv. 18, 19, xvi. 8. 2 Chron. xxi. 3, besides the passages already quoted under the same head relative to patriarchal servitude.) But servants are nowhere included in these lists of presents made by the Hebrews, though the *heathen* sometimes gave them away. (Gen xx. 14.)—Since, therefore, servants were not subject to the ordinary uses of property, we may reasonably conclude that they were not property. It may be asked, why damages were paid the master, in case the servant were injured, rather than to the servant himself. “If the ox shall push a man-servant, or maid-servant; he (the owner) shall give *unto the master* thirty shekels of silver,” &c. (Ex. xxi. 32.) Does not this law recognize the servant as his master's property? No. The master had paid a full price for his service. If the latter were injured, the loss fell on the former. And, if the servant were killed, the master was bound to support the servant's family.

Argument 10. *The Hebrew Lawgiver punishes man-stealing with death.*—There are two statutes to this effect. If any man

be found stealing any of his brethren of the children of Israel, and maketh merchandise of him, or selleth him; then that thief shall die; and thou shalt put evil from among you. (Deut. xxiv. 7.) And he that stealeth a man, and selleth him, or if he be found in his hand, he shall surely be put to death. (Ex. xxi. 16.) (1.) The crime forbidden is that of stealing a free-man, Hebrew or foreigner. Why is it made capital? What constitutes it so heinous an offence that nothing but the *life* of the thief can satisfy the demands of justice? Was it the personal violence done to the victim in his seizure? Assault and battery were otherwise punished. Was it the secrecy with which he was carried off? The offence would have been more insolent, had he been stolen at mid-day. Was it the fact that he was sold to the Gentiles, where his soul would be periled by their idolatries? The penalty was the same, if he were found in the hand of the man-stealer. Wherein, then, lay "the exceeding sinfulness of this sin?" It was a crime committed against the inherent and inalienable rights of mankind: a practical denial of that foundation principle of all liberties, *the right of a man to himself*. It was making a man a chattel, merchandise, property. It was "using a neighbor's service without wages," and against his will. It was covetousness laying the corner stone of the Temple of Slavery. Let the man-stealer die, said the Law-giver: and when he said it, he pronounced the doom of slave-holding, and proclaimed the equal and eternal rights of man. More than three thousand years ago, from the summit of Sinai, Jehovah published, in these words, the great, leading principle of our Declaration of Independence. And did that same Legislator who placed this "law of liberty" almost in the very front rank of his statutes, proceed to establish, or even to tolerate, a system of compulsory servitude, of perpetual slavery? a system which must necessarily violate that very principle? (2.) If the stolen man was found in the hand of the thief, this law secured his immediate emancipation. When his captor had just paid the highest penalty of the law, what Jew would venture to seize, or to retain him? (3.) But in case the man-stealer had *sold* him, not a word is said about his emancipation. How shall we account for this? Had

he not the same right to instant liberation, as if he were found in the hand of his captor? Undoubtedly. And yet, while even in this case the thief is executed, the man stolen seems to be passed unnoticed. Why is not search made for him? Why is not the purchaser punished? He must have learned from the slave himself, that he was stolen: and is not the receiver of stolen goods as bad as the thief? We can conceive of but one way to account for this apparent oversight. The victim, if sold, must have been sold to a heathen, and carried into a foreign country. "*No Israelite would buy him,*" as Henry justly observes. Why?—Because they dared not buy, for they were not allowed to hold, an involuntary servant unconvicted of crime. Had he been bought by a Hebrew, doubtless the law would have required his emancipation: but having been sold to a foreigner, he was without the jurisdiction of Hebrew Magistrates.

· **Argument II.** *Fugitive servants were not to be restored to their masters.*—Thou shalt not deliver unto his master the servant which is escaped from his master unto thee: he shall dwell with thee, even among you in that place which he shall choose in one of thy gates where it liketh him best: thou shalt not oppress him. (Deut. xxiii. 15, 16.) This law is fatal to the doctrine of our opponents. Like the flaming sword at the gate of Paradise, it turns every way. It must refer, either to servants of Hebrew masters who escaped from one part of the country to another; or to heathen servants who fled into Judea. (1.) If it related to the former, it is proof positive that compulsory servitude did not exist in Israel. The unwilling servant had only to escape to a neighboring town, or district, and he was free. (2.) But this law was intended, doubtless, for the benefit of heathen servants. It protects slaves; and there were no slaves in Judea to need its protection. That slavery existed among the surrounding heathen, is implied in the act itself. And why should heathen servants, who escaped from their masters, be received with open arms by the Hebrews; be allowed a residence in the city of their choice; and be protected from oppression? Why were they forbidden to restore them, when their masters demanded their delivery? Because heathen legislators, knowing or

caring little about the rights of man, had established slavery in their respective countries. Their usual servitude was compulsory: and the Divine Legislator forbid his people to countenance a system which compelled the poor and defenceless to toil for the rich and powerful. (3.) If the chosen people of God had none but voluntary servants, who sold themselves; if these servants were protected in life and limb; if they were treated with great kindness; if their service continued for six years only, or at farthest to the jubilee; if they were paid a stipulated price in hand, and received competent maintenance;—if these things were true, (and we have shown that they were,) these heathen rulers, beholding the contrast between slavery, as it existed among them, and Jewish servitude, would recognise the justice and humanity of that law which forbade *such* masters to countenance the claim of slave-holders by restoring their runaways. They would have no inducement to pass laws of retaliation; and might even restore *servants* to those who would not return *slaves*. (See 1 Kings ii. 39, 40.) But on the supposition that slavery existed in Judea, this statute protecting heathen fugitives would be inconsistent with the system of which it formed a part, and destructive of it. If Jewish servitude and heathen slavery were alike founded on the claim of property in man, and on the principle that might gives right, the neighboring princes could not but see the manifest injustice of such a law: they would be compelled, in simple self-defence, to adopt retaliatory measures; and their dominions would become a sanctuary for Jewish slaves, as was Judea for those of the heathen. But whoever considers the limited extent of the holy land; that its northern, eastern, and southern boundaries were imaginary lines; and that three times a year the body of the Israelites were at Jerusalem, cannot fail to perceive that by the natural operation of their own law, the Hebrews would soon be relieved of their involuntary servants.

So much, then, by way of proof that the system of servitude sanctioned by the Mosaic law, was not slavery. We pass, now, to the New Testament; an examination of which will establish our next position.

PROPOSITION III. THE APOSTLES DID NOT TOLERATE SLAVE-

HOLDING IN THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH.—To understand the course of the apostles in regard to slavery we must consider the circumstances under which they were called to act. Gibbon, as we have already said, estimates the population of the Roman Empire in the time of Claudius at 120,000,000. (Dec. and Fall, c. 1.) Of this vast multitude, *one half*, according to that writer, or *two-thirds*, according to Robertson, were *slaves*. They were found in almost every province of the empire. A single citizen sometimes possessed 20,000 slaves. As many as 10,000 a day were sold in Tarsus of Cilicia. Immense slave-marts were established in many of the principal cities. “Timæus, perhaps with some exaggeration, asserts that Corinth had, in early times, before Athens had reached her supremacy, 460,000 slaves.” The system of slavery was not merely tolerated, but sanctioned by the law of the land. It was interwoven with the whole frame-work of society. The slave was the absolute property of his master; who had the *jus vitæ et necis* the right of life and death, over him. Slaves were forbidden to marry free persons. Their food and clothing depended upon the master’s pleasure. The farm slaves were shut up at night in *ergastula* (prisons.) The old and infirm were frequently exposed, when they became burdensome. Even Cato adopted this custom. No law fixed the amount of labor to be exacted. Obedience was enforced by severe discipline. The rod, the whip, thongs, scourges loaded with lead, chain-scourges, the equaleus, lyre strings, the ungula and forceps, the rack, throwing from the Capitoline rock, mutilation, crucifixion, burning alive, were the instruments and modes of punishment employed. Veditius Pollio fed his fish with the flesh of his menials. Slaves were proverbially addicted to lying. *Fur*, thief, was once synonymous with slave. The females were extremely licentious.*—These facts present a horrible state of things; and, at first thought, we might suppose that the apostles must have openly denounced a system productive of such terrible consequences. But let us call to mind their situation. Their master had said,

* For these and similar facts, see Adams’ *Rom. Antiq.*; Hume’s *Essay on the populosness of ancient nations*; an article on Roman slavery, in the *Bible Repository*, vol. 6; and Tytler’s *History*, vol. 1, &c.

“Behold I send you forth as *sheep in the midst of wolves*: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. But beware of men; for they shall deliver you up to councils, &c. * * * and ye shall be hated of all men for my name’s sake.”—(Mat. x.) He had forewarned them of persecution and a violent death. His predictions were shortly fulfilled. The kings of the earth set themselves, and the rulers took counsel together against them. The apostles preached every where at the hazard of their lives. Every church they planted was a “little flock” surrounded by a multitude of ravening beasts. Wicked men busily circulated the report that these christians designed “to turn the world upside down;” and the result was that they were “every where spoken against.” In such circumstances, to have waged a public war against slavery; to have taken the stand and employed the active efforts now adopted by abolitionists, would have been, (humanly speaking,) to have drawn upon their devoted heads immediate and utter destruction: and that without even the remotest prospect of benefiting the poor slaves. But we may be asked, was not idolatry a universal sin, sanctioned by law, and intimately connected with the government? Yet the apostles fearlessly, publicly, and everywhere denounced it.—True: but the cases are by no means parallel. Let it be remembered that the empire contained from *sixty to eighty millions* of slaves, whose wrongs were enormous and accumulated: that their masters were in constant fear of insurrection: that a project to clothe slaves in a peculiar manner had been abandoned, from dread of showing them their numerical superiority: that the slaves were proverbially foes; *totidem esse hostes, quot servos*. (Sen. Ep. xlvii. quoted in Bib. Repos. 6, 428:) that many insurrections had occurred in different parts of the empire: that scarcely a century before the apostles’ days, 70,000 slaves had, for six years, maintained the field in Sicily; of whom 20,000 fell in battle, and the rest were crucified: that B. C. 73, a servile war had raged, for three years, in Italy; during which time several Roman armies had been defeated, and Rome itself threatened; and that, at length, Spartacus, with from *one to two hundred thousand* slaves had miserably perished. Let these,

and similar facts be remembered; and let it be considered that there was no christian public sentiment to appeal to: none of the modern facilities by which to excite a nation to a righteous course of policy: that the only advocates of freedom and righteousness were a handful of despised men: that the Divine blessing could be expected only in the prudent use of appointed means: and we may easily discover why the apostles did not avow, and should not have avowed, openly, and before the whole Roman world, the absolute duty of immediate and universal emancipation. Reason and Scripture alike forbade them to destroy themselves by a course that would benefit nobody.

On the same principle, Paul, predicting the fall of the Roman Empire before the rise of the man of sin, veiled his meaning under these turns, "only he that now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way." (2 Thess. ii. 7.) But to the christians he spoke more openly: "Remember ye not that when I was with you I told you these things?"—"The Roman Empire, united under one potent government, and extremely jealous of all other authority and power, prevented, &c. * * * *But it would not have been prudent* for the apostle explicitly to mention it, in an epistle for general perusal; * * however most of the fathers so far understood him, as to declare that Antichrist would not come, till after the downfall of the Roman Empire." (Scott.)—We need not expect, therefore, in the New Testament, a direct declaration of the fact that man cannot hold property in man; nor that immediate emancipation is a christian duty. Much less are we to anticipate a bold denunciation of the Roman *laws* respecting slavery; or any public and repeated assertion of the rights of Roman slaves. The apostles were not wanting in moral courage; nor were they indifferent to the wrongs of humanity: but they could not do impossibilities. The Saviour would not throw himself from the pinnacle of the temple; and confide in the angels to preserve him. (Mat. iv.) Paul was not authorised to scuttle the ship in which he was carried to Rome; and trust to the Lord to keep it from sinking. Nor would the apostles have been justified in publicly preaching, *to a heathen world,*

doctrines, whose diffusion, *in the state of society then existing*, would have been the signal for universal insurrection and bloodshed. They did all that could consistently be done, under the circumstances, when they inculcated such principles *among christians*, as are inconsistent with the existence of slavery; and used such language as implies that members of the church were not, and could not be, slave-holders. They were not called to legislate for those *out of the church*. "For what have I to do to judge them also that are without? Do not ye judge them that are within? But them that are without. God judgeth." (1 Cor. v. 12.)

That the spirit of Christianity, as presented by the apostles to their converts, did restrict the rights which christian masters had over their slaves, by the Roman law, is admitted on all hands. The law, as we have seen, allowed masters to put their slaves to death; to extort testimony upon the rack; to punish them with dreadful tortures: to turn out the old slave to die on a dunghill, &c. Might the *christian* master claim and exercise all these *legal rights*? The Roman law said, "*Inter servos et liberos matrimonium contracti non potest; contubernium potest.*" A freeman may live with a slave, but not marry her. Was this legal fornication tolerated in the church? The property of the slave belonged, by law, to his master. Was this considered just among christians? Could a christian master sell his slave at pleasure, because the law allowed it? The law regarded the slave as his master's property. Did the christian master consider his servant as a chattel, a piece of property, a part of his estate? Our opponents will grant that, in some of these respects, the precepts of christianity forbade what the law of the land allowed. We contend, that, without express precepts in every case, the *spirit* of Christianity restricted the christian master, in respect to *all* the rights above mentioned. Especially do we insist, that, while the Roman law, regarded the slave, as in the language of Aristotle, (Polit. I. 6,) *ktēma kai organon tou despotou empsychon*, property and a reasoning tool in the hands of his master; the christian law taught, with Saint Augustine, *non oportet christianum possidere servum quomodo equum aut argentum*. It does not become a christian to own a servant as

he would his horse or his money. (See the quotations in the Bib. Rep. vol. 6.) And this we shall attempt to prove in the following pages.

To arrive at the exact teachings of the New Testament in regard to slavery, we most ascertain the meaning of the words *doulos*, *despotes*, and *kurios*.

1. *Doulos*. "This word," says Doctor J., "properly and commonly means a person held to service for life—a slave." (p. 45.) Now we maintain, on the contrary, that *doulos* is not the definite Greek term for *slave*, but *andrapodon*; and that *doulos* strictly signifies, one who is subject, in some respects, to another, a *servant*, as our translators of the New Testament have uniformly rendered it.

That *andrapodon* is the definite word for slave, may be seen by consulting Homer's *Iliad*, vii. 472–475. Herod. lib. i. cap. 66, 155, 156, 161, lib. iv. cap. 203, v. 27, vi. 9, 23. viii. 29. Xenophon's *Anab.* (Cleveland's ed.) p. 8, line 30; p. 162, line 10; p. 174, line 18; p. 179, line 29; p. 198, line 8; p. 217, line 12; p. 219, line 20; p. 220, line 5, 20. *Cyropedia*, lib. 8.

For examples of the classical use of *doulos*, &c. in the sense of a *servant*, a *subject*, subjection, &c. where the persons to whom the terms are applied were not *slaves*, see Herod. lib. 1, c. 95, 120, 129, 139, the Persians are called *douloi* of the Medes, until they gained the ascendancy, c. 164, 169, 210. lib. 2, c. 1. lib. 4, c. 20, comp. 72. lib. 6, c. 32. lib. 7, c. 39. Xerxes calls Pythius, a Lydian prince, his *doulos*, lib. 8, c. 102. Artemisia, addressing Xerxes, calls Mardonius, the Persian general, *doulos*, lib. 9, c. 122. See, also, *Anab.* p. 201, line 20.—We may add the testimony of Potter, in his *Grecian Antiquities*, [p. 59.] "Slaves, as long they were under the government of a master, were called *oiketai*; but after their freedom was granted them, they were *douloi*, not being like the former, a part of their master's estate, but only obliged to some grateful acknowledgments, and small services, such as were required of the *metoikoi*, [resident foreigners,] to whom they were in some few things inferior," &c.

As to the New Testament use of this word, Dr. J. labors to show that in all cases, "the idea of continuous, perpetual servi-

tude is included." [p. 46.] We dissent from his general statement, classification, and conclusions; and shall take the liberty to present our own.—According to Greenfield's *Schmidius*, the word *doulos* occurs 122 times in the New Testament. Of these, 19 are parallel; and the remaining 103 may be classed as follows:

1. Applied to servants of men;

[1.] Of Jewish masters,	47 times.
[2.] Of masters generally without distinction,	18 "
[3.] Of a Gentile master, [Mat. viii. 9,]	1 "
[4.] To christians as servants of each other, [Mat. xx. 27, 2 Cor. iv. 5,]	2 "
2. To the servants of God and Christ,	28 "
3. To Christ as the servant of God, [Phil. ii. 7,]	1 "
4. To the servants of sin and Satan,	4 "
5. Used indefinitely, [Rom. vi. 16,]	1 "
6. To those "under the elements of the world." [Gal. iv.]	1 "

103 "

Now we assert that in 84 of these 103 cases of the use of *doulos*, the word denotes *servants* who were *not slaves*: and that it has the same signification in some of the other 19 cases. It is employed upward of 40 times in the discourses of our Saviour. Being himself a Jew, living in Judea, and addressing Jews, it is altogether natural and probable that he should draw his illustrations from Jewish customs and institutions. When he compares the kingdom of heaven to a king who would take account of his *servants*, [*douloi*, Mat. xviii. 23.] &c. we have a right to infer that he speaks of *servants* in the Jewish sense of the word. *Doulos*, in such cases, corresponds with *ebed*; and we have already proved that the Jewish servants were not slaves. Dr. J., indeed, supposes the contrary. Referring to the passage just quoted, he says, "The master, like many in our day, had entrusted much of his property to his servants * * and thus, one of them was found to have acted unfaithfully—he had squandered his lord's money. His master, just as masters now do, commanded him to be sold, and his wife and children.

Now, if *doulos* does not express the relation of slavery, * * * * how can we understand the transaction? And if it be said, he was sold under the law which makes indebtedness a crime, rendering the debtor obnoxious to sale, then we have slavery recognised. Take it either way, you have the relation of perpetual servitude." [pp. 46, 47.] Such criticism is truly amusing. The good Doctor is determined that this *doulos* shall be a slave; and, to prove him such, he supposes absurdities, misrepresents the text, and contradicts himself.—This man was one of the servants of a king; and, as Rosenmuller says, *Ubi de regibus agitur, servi dicuntur omnes subditi*, sed precipue, qui sunt in aulico ministerio, &c. All the king's subjects are called his servants, but especially his ministers. So Grotius. One of his treasures, (Kuinoel.) Some petty prince (Dr. A. Clarke.)—The sum due proves that he was no slave, in the ordinary sense: "ten thousand talents," (verse 24.) If this be taken literally, and the talents were of silver, the debt was more than \$20,000,000, or if the gold talent, some \$300,000,000. (Dr. Clarke.) Supposing, with Bloomfield, that *murion* denotes merely a great number of talents, still, significatur infinita pecunie vis, an immense amount of money is intended. (Rosenm.) Yes, says our Doctor, "his master, *like many in our day*, had entrusted much property to his servants!"—The order to sell the servant and his family proves that he was no slave. Dr. J. views it differently. "His master, *just as masters now do*, commanded him to be sold," &c. Do southern masters sell their slaves, who owe them more than they can pay? We should like the mathematical professor at Oxford, or Jack Downing, "to cipher up," and show the President how much they would gain by *selling their own property to pay themselves!* When a farmer's mare runs away with, and destroys, his carriage, does he sell her and her colt, pocket the money, and rejoice that his loss is fully recompensed? Well, says the Doctor, if not a slave before he was sold for debt, he was afterward; so either way you have perpetual servitude. Alas! even this refuge fails: for, first, the servant *was not sold at all*. Secondly, had he been sold, the Doctor has admitted that he could be sold but for *six years*, (pp. 30, 31;) and thirdly, he was a *doulos*

before he was even threatened with sale; so that a man may be a *doulos*, though he is not a slave. Q. E. D.

We pass the second class of servants of men; for their condition is the matter in controversy; and the third, "the captain's servant," as unimportant. In the fourth class of passages, christians are called the *servants* of each other.—Paul said to his hearers, "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus the Lord; and ourselves your *servants* for Jesus' sake." Was he the *slave* of his converts? Christians are called, (28 times,) the servants of God and Christ. And "they are life servants;" says Dr. J., "bound under the most absolute authority to honor and obey and submit to his commands. * * They are his *forever*. Moreover, they were *unwilling*, when he bought them with a price; and they were unwilling until he changed them by his law, &c. They are servants forever, "under the yoke." (p. 46.) Such fallacies, built upon the literal use of figurative language can deceive no one. The professed christian, whose own consciousness does not teach him that he is no slave, "has need that one teach him again which be the first principles of the oracles of God." (Heb. v. 12.) We only remark, (1) that christians choose their own master; (Josh. xxiv. 15, 22; Mat. xi. 29, 30);—(2) that they receive the highest wages, (Heb. xi. 26);—(3) that they are expressly said to be "no longer *servants* (*doulos*), in the servile sense. (Jno. xv. 15, comp. Gal. iv. 4–7);—(4) that Dr. J. expressly contradicts *himself*, when proving the meaning of *doulos* from its opposite, *eleutheros*; and *Christ*, who says, "If the son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed," (Jno. viii. 34–36;) whereas Dr. J. assures us they are *slaves still*; and have only changed masters:—[5] that if christians on earth are slaves, so are saints and angels in heaven, [Rev. xxii. 3;] and as the Doctor proves that all wicked men are the slaves of Satan, it follows, that God and the devil are the only free beings in the Universe; all others, in heaven, earth or hell being slaves to one or the other!

Again, Christ took upon him the form of a *servant* [Phil. ii. 7.] comp. Isa. xlii. 1, Behold my *servant*, [*abdi*,] whom I uphold, &c. We shall not trifle with the good sense of our readers,

by proving that Christ was not the *slave* of his father.—The servants of sin and Satan are voluntary. They choose their own master; they are content with his wages, “the pleasures of sin for a season;” they may leave his service without warning; and his claim to them rests only upon their own choice.—Lastly, in Ro. vi. 16, the apostle gives the definition of *doulos*. It means, not necessarily a slave, but one who submits to another: no matter for what time, or upon what conditions.

2. *Despotes*. This word “properly denotes the possessor, or master of *slaves*; one who rules as a master over his slave, with *uncontrolled* power, a despot. A proprietor, as of a horse,” &c. [Donnegan.] He derives it from *poicin*, to cause; and *deos*, fear, or *desmos*, a chain. So Passou: “The commander, especially of slaves; a householder, dominus; with anax, in an address to slaves, a despot; *unlimited commander*, who rules his subjects as slaves; a possessor, owner, as of a horse.” Compare *despoina*, a mistress of the slaves in the family; *desposune* and *despoteia*, unlimited authority. [Donn. and Pass.]—In the New Testament, *despotes* is used *ten* times. [1.] Applied to God and Christ, as exercising unlimited dominion: Lu. ii. 29; Ac. iv. 24; 2 Tim. ii. 21; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Jude iv.; Rev. vi. 10. [2.] To men, 1 Tim. vi. 1–2; Tit. ii. 9; 1 Pet. ii. 18. Of these passages we shall speak presently.

3. *Kurios*, “A proprietor; a possessor; a master; *one who has power or authority over others—in reference to that over slaves, despotes is used; kurios, for a father, a husband, a divinity.*”—[Donnegan.] Compare *kuria kurcia*, &c.—In the New Testament, *kurios* is applied, [1] several hundred times, to the Saviour. It was a favorite title by which the disciples addressed him. [See Jno. xiii. 13.] [2.] To men, as owners of inanimate things; Mat. xv. 27, the dogs eat the crumbs of their *master's* table.—To men, considered as having authority over other men, who, yet, were not slaves; Mat. vi. 24; 13, 27; 18, 25; 21, 30, the son says to the father, “I go, *sir*, [*kuric*.] 25, 11 the foolish virgins call the bridegroom, *kurios*: but he replies, “I know you not.” Lu. xvi. 3–8, the faithless steward calls his master, *kurios*. That the steward was not a slave, &c. verses 3, 4. Lu. xix. 33, And as they were loosing the colt, the

owners [*kurioi*] said, &c. "The sense is, those who had power over it, including the *servants* of the owner." [Bloomfield.] John xii. 21; Ac. xvi. 30; 25, 26, Festus applied the term to the Roman Emperor. 1 Pet. iii. 6. Sarah called her husband *kurios*.—To men, considered as having a control over their servants; Eph. vi. 5, 9; Col. iii. 22; iv. 1.

We are now prepared to state this general result: (1.) *Doulos* is a general term, denoting one in some respects subject to another person. It is properly translated, as in our English Bible, *servant*,—not *slave*. It may mean *slave* also, if the connexion require it; since all *slaves* are *douloi*, though all *douloi* are not *slaves*. [2.] The proper term for *slave-holder*, is *despotis*. [3.] The usual term for a *master*, who is not a *slave-holder*, is *kurios*.

Argument 1. *The apostles uniformly address christian masters as kurioi; but they call heathen masters despotes, slave-holders.*

In Eph. v. 22. Paul exhorts *wives* to be subject to their own husbands; [verse 4,] *husbands* to love their wives; [6, 1,] *children* to obey their parents; [verse 4,] *fathers* to train up their children in the fear of God; [verse 5,] *servants*, (*hoi douloi*) "be obedient to them that are your masters [*kuriois*] according to the flesh;" [verse 9,] "and ye *masters* [*kurios*] do the same thing unto them, * * * knowing that your master [*kurioi*] also is in heaven." Evidently, the persons in these different relations are addressed as in the church.—So in Col. iii. *wives* are addressed, [verse 18,] *husbands*, [verse 19,] *children*, (verse 20;) *fathers*, (verse 21;) "*servants*, (*douloi*) obey in all things your masters (*kuriois*) according to the flesh, (verse 22;) "*masters*, (*kurioi*) give unto your servants that which is just and equal; knowing that ye also have a master, [*kurios*] in heaven.—In both these passages, the relation of christian masters to their servants is compared with that of Christ to his people; not however, to convey the idea that both have unlimited dominion; for then the word *despotes* would have been used; but, on the contrary, to show that christian masters exercised an authority, lawful, just, regulated by the law of love, founded on the consent of the servants, and employed with a constant regard to the best interests of their dependents.—If it be said

that some of these Ephesian and Colossian *douloi* were, in all probability, *slaves*, belonging to *heathens*, and that the *scheathen*, as well as the christian masters, are called *kurioi*; we answer,—the apostle seems purposely to select that word, as including both sorts of masters: for all slave-holders are masters; though all masters are not slave-holders.

Turn now to the passages in which masters are called *despotai*. Tit. ii. 2, that the *aged men* be sober, &c.; the *aged women*, likewise, &c., (verse 3;); the *young women*, (verse 4;); *young men*, (verse 6;); “exhort *servants* (*doulous*) to be obedient to their own masters (*despotais*):” but no address to these *despotai* follows. Why?—They were slaveholders, as their name imports; and therefore, not in connection with the church. So, I Pet. ii. 10, servants, (*oiketai*), be subject to your own masters (*despotais*) with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward. Here we find no exhortation to the *despotai*; though afterwards, *wives*, [iii. 1.] and *husbands*, [iii. 7.] are instructed in their relative duties. Will it be urged, that, in this last passage, *despotai* includes both christian and heathen masters; that the former are “the good and gentle,” and the latter, “the froward?” There is no ground for such a conclusion. Many heathen slaveholders were doubtless “good and gentle,” just as are many non-professors, and even infidels, in our own time and country. Henry Clay, in his notorious Richmond speech, represented himself as a “good and gentle” master, and spoke of his slaves as “fat and sleek.” And surely our author must allow that he is such, after commending, as he does, the choice of “Charles Clay.” Again, I Tim. vi. 1, 2, Let as many servants (*douloi*) as are under the yoke count their own masters (*despotas*) worthy of all honor, &c. Here, undoubtedly, the (*despotai*) were slaveholders, for their servants were under the yoke; and heathen, for they are contrasted, in the next verse, with “believing masters.”

But we shall be told that our whole argument is overthrown by this very passage; for here, “believing masters” are *despotai*, also. “And they that have *believing masters*, (*pistous despotas*),” verse 2.—The candid enquirer, who has observed that in every other passage relative to this subject, the apostles distinguish

the terms *despotai* and *kuriol*, applying the one to slave-holders, and the other to christian masters, will be ready to ask why they are here used indiscriminately. Is there not a cause? And a careful examination of the text, with the application of the ordinary rules of criticism, will satisfy him that "believing masters" were not slave-holders; though, in this solitary passage they are called *despotai*. (1.) The context shows that the servants of believing masters were not slaves. "Let as many servants as are under the yoke," &c. This evidently implies that there are some servants (*doulous*) not under the yoke: just as the expression, (Jno. i. 12,) "But as many as received him," &c. implies that some did not receive Christ. Now, to be "under the yoke," as Dr. J. has super-abundantly proved, is to be a slave. Paul teaches, therefore, that some *douloi* were slaves, and some were not, but were servants. That the latter class were servants of christian masters, is proved by the next verse; "And they that have believing masters," &c.: in the Greek, *Hoi de pistous echontes despotas*. The conjunction, *de*, marks an antithetic sentence. (Stuart's Gr. Gram. § 150, 5.) The subject in verse 2, is *contrasted* with that in verse 1. The servants who have believing masters are in a different situation from that of those under the yoke. The latter are commanded to serve their own masters, that the gospel be not reproached: the former, because their masters are faithful and beloved brethren. The one, are *douloi* still under the yoke,—*slaves*: the other, *douloi* not under the yoke,—*servants*. The masters of the former, were heathen, who did not recognise their slaves as brethren: those of the latter, believed that their servants were created by the same heavenly father; descended from the same common earthly father; redeemed by the same Saviour; and, if christians, travelling to the same eternal home; and therefore, members, not only of the brotherhood of man, but of the christian fraternity. The very exhortation that servants, whose equality was thus recognised by their masters, should not despise them, shows the radical difference between their relation in servitude, and that of slaves. No such command is given to the latter. Now, the apostle having shown that the servants of believing masters were not slaves, it follows that such masters

were not *slave-holders*; and Paul would mislead neither Timothy nor his other readers, if, for once, he called them, not “believing *kurioi*,” but “believing *despotai*.” Indeed, the epithet, “believing,” would prove to a *primitive* christian, that *despotes* was taken in an unusual sense.

(2.) Let it be observed, also, that these believing *despotai* had once been heathens, and slave-holders. Even our opponents do not argue, if we understand them, that, members of the primitive church who had not held slaves previous to their conversion, might, after connecting themselves with the church, become slave-holders: but only, that converted slave-holders were not required to emancipate, before making a profession of religion. These masters, then, had long been *despotai*. Becoming christians, they became *kurioi*. It is no unusual thing, however, to designate a man by a name or title once familiar to him, though now no longer, strictly, or at all, appropriate.—Thus we are told that the lame walk, the deaf hear, (Mat. xi. 5;) “the dumb speak,” (ix. 33;) “the dead stand before God,” (Rev. xx. 12.) So Rahab is called “the harlot,” even when her faith is represented as exemplary. If we say that our village contains ten drunkards, and ten *reformed* drunkards, would any one understand us as saying that the latter were drunkards still? Precisely such a license does Paul employ, when he speaks of *despotai*, and *believing despotai*.

Having given the above directions to slaves, and servants, the apostle adds: “If any man teach otherwise,” &c., “he is proud, (*tetuphotai*,) knowing nothing, but doting about questions and strifes of words,” &c. There is reason to believe that he alludes to some Judaizing christians who were inculcating a sort of leveling doctrine in the church; denouncing, not slavery, merely, but all human government, and all submission to pagan authority. Josephus informs us, that some of the Jews thought it a wicked thing to own, besides God, *any mortal masters*, (Jew. War, B. II. c. 8, § 1.) “Their Rabbins thought it unbecoming any Jew to be a bond-slave to an heathen, or idolator.” (Whitby, 2, 408.) These opinions they were probably propagating among the believing slaves of heathen masters. (So Scott, Whitby, Bloomfield, &c.)

Every great moral, political, or religious revolution is accompanied, in the present corrupt state of human nature, by excesses, and extravagances, of which it is the occasion rather than the cause. No sooner was the christian church founded, than heresies began to appear. Wolves in sheep's clothing, men who said they were apostles, but were liars, (Rev. ii. 2,) usurping the christian name, propagated the most licentious principles; and the abominations of gnosticism brought reproach upon genuine christianity. The fanaticism of Munzer and the Anabaptists would never have been heard of, but for the labors of the reformers. The efforts of the friends of freedom to check the usurpations of Charles I., terminated in the temporary success of Cromwell and the fanatics. The religious controversies of those times, gave rise to the Seekers, the Ranters, the Behmenites, and a swarm of other enthusiasts. What extravagancies followed, in many places, the great revival of the 18th century! But how unjust, how unreasonable, to charge these follies and heresies on the real advocates of truth and righteousness! The great anti-slavery movement of the last fourteen years, has not escaped the lot of all violent agitations of the public mind. In its progress it has occasioned, or been connected with, various heretical doctrines and sects, political and religious. The women's-rights party; the no-government party; the Fourier-association party; the anti-Sabbath, the anti-church, anti-ministry, anti-Bible, anti-common sense party, have been, more or less, associated with the great anti-slavery party. To a limited extent they have had common advocates. But their wild and wicked fantasies are no more chargeable upon the abolitionists, as a body, than were the fooleries of Carlstadt, upon the reformers. As Luther said of him and his followers, so the mass of anti-slavery men say of these factions,—*"We slap their spirit on the snout."*

Doctor J., however, unable to distinguish between a great popular movement of the humanity of Christendom, and a few local and petty extravagancies;—between the heavings of the vast ocean, and the scum upon its billows;—fixes his eye upon a handful of fanatics; describes them as the real abolition party; and "finds the origin of abolitionism in the vanity, self-conceit

and puffed up pride of the human heart.”—(p. 67.) Misapplying the language of Paul, he says, “If any man teach opposite to these doctrines, if he teach modern anti-slavery doctrines, such as abound in their publications and speeches, he is *tetuphotai*—proud we have it translated. But I appeal to every Greek scholar, if it do not mean *vain, puffed up, self-conceited*, * * * * puffed up with vain pride and contemptible self-conceit,” &c. (pp. 67, 68.) We cannot dismiss this matter without remark; and Dr. J. cannot complain, if we “say some things extremely unpleasant, that may come with blistering severity.” For when we remember that such men as Wesley and Jonathan Edwards, in former days,—Dr. Bishop, Dr. Crothers, and Father Dickey, in our own time and neighborhood,—and hundreds of the best, wisest, and most patriotic christians and citizens of this and other lands, have maintained the great radical principles of abolitionism,—who that knows Doctor J. can hear him assert that those principles “find their origin in the vanity, self-conceit, and puffed up pride of the human heart,” and refrain from applying the words of the poet,

“O wad some power the giftie gie him,
To see HIMSELF as others see him;
It wad frae sic a blunder free him,
And foolish notion!”

For if every one who is chargeable with “vain pride and contemptible self-conceit” is to be ranked with the *tetuphotai*, then, heaven help the President of Miami University.—Garrison, indeed, “the father of modern abolitionism!” Does Doctor J. know that Garrison’s “*Liberator*” was commenced in January, 1831; and that in 1830 the Synods of Cincinnati and Indiana adopted the following resolution, which contains the chief article of the abolition creed? “Resolved, That the buying, selling, or holding a slave, for the sake of gain, is a heinous sin and scandal, and requires the cognizance of the church judicatories,” &c.—(See Chr. Intellig. vol. 2, 339.) Some of the fathers in our own Synod have been preaching this doctrine for a quarter of a century. Let Doctor J. study the facts, principles, and history of the anti-slavery enterprise; and he will never again display his ignorance by calling Garrison the father, and Abby Kelley the dry-nurse of abolitionism.

Argument 2. *The apostles, when exhorting slaves to obedience, never enforce their exhortations by reminding them that they were the rightful property of their masters: nor do they, directly, or indirectly, recognize the right of property in man.* We have said *doulos* properly means a servant; but, being a general term, it includes slaves. Many of the persons called *douloi*, in the New Testament, were doubtless the converted slaves of heathen masters, whose civil condition was not affected by their conversion.—They, as well as other servants, are exhorted to obey their masters: but on what ground? We need not occupy space here. Let any one read Eph. vi. 5–8; Col. iii. 22–24; 1 Tim. vii. 1; Tit. ii. 9, 10; 1 Pet. ii. 18–25; and he will see that the reasons for obedience are such as these: that servants may please God; that they may receive from him the reward of the inheritance; that the name of God, and his doctrine, be not blasphemed; that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things; that they may imitate the patience of Christ; &c. Never once is their masters' right of property in them adduced; although, as we have already said, such right, if it existed, would afford one of the most natural and forcible arguments for submission on the part of the slave. But does not Paul regard Onesimus as Philemon's property, when he says, "I would have retained him with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered unto me in the bonds of the gospel: but without thy mind would I do nothing?" He does not, Onesimus was a *doulos* of Philemon; not necessarily a slave, but a servant; one who was under some just and legal obligations to serve his master; to what extent, or for what time, we know not. By his flight, and perhaps in other ways, he had wronged Philemon; and it was Paul's duty to enjoin his return, that Onesimus might discharge his obligations, or be legally released from them by his master.

Argument 3. *Men-stealers are ranked, by the apostle Paul, with the worst criminals.* "The law is made for the lawless and disobedient, for the ungodly and for sinners, for the unholy and profane, for murderers of fathers, and murderers of mothers, for manslayers, for whoremongers, for them that defile themselves with mankind, for *men-stealers*, for liars, for perjured persons,"

&c.—(1 Tim. i. 9, 10.) The original word for manstealers is *andrapodistes*. *Andrapodon*, as we have shown, is the definite term for *slave*. From this noun is formed the verb *andrapodidzo*, “to make a slave, to capture in war and sell as a slave, to seize and sell freemen as slaves, to exercise the trade of a slave-merchant, to kidnap.”—(Donnegan.) From the verb is formed *andrapodistes*, which signifies, “one who makes a slave in any of the senses of *andrapodidzo*.”—(Ibid.) The remarks already made upon Ex. xxi. 16, are applicable here, and need not be repeated. We only add, that our Confession of Faith *once* contained the following note. The General Assembly of 1794, by their committee, Dr. A. Green, John B. Smith, James Boyd, Wm. M. Tennant, N. Irvin, and Andrew Hunter, appended it to the 12nd question of the larger catechism. “1 Tim. i. 10. The law is made for *manstealers*. This crime, among the Jews, exposed the perpetrators of it to capital punishment; (Ex. xxi. 17;) and the apostle here classes them with sinners of the first rank. The word he uses, in its original import, comprehends all who are concerned in bringing any of the human race into slavery, *or in retaining them* in it. *Hominum fures, qui servos vel liberos abducunt, retinent, vendunt, vel emunt. Stealers of men are those who bring off slaves or freemen, and keep, sell, or buy them.* To steal a freeman, says Grotius, is the highest kind of theft. In other instances, we only steal human property; but when we steal *or retain men in slavery*, we seize those who, in common with ourselves, are constituted, by the original grant, lords of the earth.—Gen. i. 28.”

Argument 4. *The traffic in slaves is recorded as one of the crimes of Babylon the Great.* The slave-trade as naturally accompanies the system of slavery, as the shadow does the substance. The history of slavery, in all ages, proves them to be inseparable.—And indeed, if the arguments of Dr. J. establish the divine allowance of the one, they equally prove the permission of the other. If the Jews, and primitive christians had a right of property in their servants, they had, of course, a right to *sell*, as well as to *buy* them. Hence follows the slave-trade. But the trade in “*slaves*, and the souls of men,” (Prov. xviii. 13) is charged as swelling the guilt of the Romish apostacy. Can we

suppose that the same traffic was practised among the early christians?

Argument 5. *The love of freedom, of each other, and of man, which prevailed in the primitive church, forbids the supposition that slavery was tolerated among them.*—"The principles of both the law and the gospel," [says Scott, on 1 Tim. vi. 1,] "when carried to their consequences, will infallibly abolish slavery." Our opponents fully admit this. There is no need, say they, of preaching abolitionism. Let the pure and simple gospel be proclaimed among our southern brethren, and slavery will cease to exist. We grant it: for we believe that the simple gospel, so far as this subject is concerned, is abolitionism. And do we assume too much when we assert that the primitive christians, as a body, did, in their personal conduct, "carry to their consequences the principles of the law and the gospel," to an extent seldom since realized? We think not. "To believe, to suffer, and to love," says Milner, "was the primitive taste." Read the following account of their temper and conduct; and ask if slave-holding could co-exist with it. "Among the various features in the character of the primitive christians, there is none so eminently claims our admiration as their mutual love. All the details transmitted to us of their social intercourse, and their public conduct, bespeak the lively operation of this christian spirit. And when we read of * * their ready disposition to render every one his due, the high condescending to those of low degree, the poor giving their tribute of respect to those whom Providence had placed in a more exalted station, and all vying, with amiable rivalry, to promote each other's happiness and welfare, we perceive the strong grounds of the proverbial observation of the heathen, 'Behold how these christians love one another'! * * Bound to each other by ties infinitely holier and dearer than any that belong to the world, they looked upon themselves as members of the same common family. Every time they met, either in their own houses or in their public assemblies, they interchanged the kiss, as a badge of fellowship, and token of the warmest affection. Though totally unconnected by ties of consanguinity, they addressed each, according to their respective age and sex, by the name of father, mother,

brother, sister. Though naturally separated by distinction of rank and diversity of color, nothing could cool or prevent the reciprocities of their mutual love. The knowledge of the simple fact, that any one was a follower of Jesus, changed him at once from a stranger into a friend; creating a union between them not be described by the cold, selfish friendship of the world; and to them belongs the peculiar distinction of realizing a state of society which many philosophers had often delighted to picture to their fancy, and wished for in vain, the idea of a community united by no other bond than the golden chain of universal love. * * Many of the sufferers for the cause of religion, were sent to labor, like slaves, in distant and unwholesome mines. Thither the benevolence of their brethren followed them. * * * Nay, many even undertook long and toilsome pilgrimages, in order to comfort and support these victims of oppression. * * Nothing could repress the ardent wish to pour the balm of consolation into the hearts of men, who were suffering the worst species of slavery for the sake of the truth. Many in private life expended every thing they could spare from the bare support of life in the purchase of Bibles, and, on every suitable occasion, distributed them to the poor. * * One man is recorded to have sold himself into the family of a heathen actor, and continued for years cheerfully performing the most servile offices, till having been the instrument of converting the whole family to christianity, *he received from the grateful converts the reward of his liberty.* The same individual, learning that the Governor of Sparta had fallen into dangerous errors, offered himself again as a slave, and continued for two years in that situation, when his zealous efforts for the conversion of his master being crowned with success, *he was no longer treated as a servant, but a brother beloved in the Lord.* * * Many wealthy individuals, on their conversion to christianity, sold their estates, and betaking themselves to manual labor or to the preaching of the Word, devoted the price of their labor to benevolent purposes. * * * In the general intercourse of society, the primitive christians, acting according to the rules of scripture, were careful *to render to all their dues*, and to practise every thing that is just, honest and of good report." (See Coleman's Christ. Antiq. pp. 384-396.)

Barnabas, in the Catholic epistle attributed to him, which is supposed to have been written about A. D. 70–80, says, “Thou shalt not be bitter in thy commands toward any of thy servants that trust in God, lest thou chance not to fear him who is over both; because he came not to call any with respect of persons; but whomsoever the spirit had prepared.” (§ 19.)

It appears from numerous testimonies that the charity of christians, in the early ages, was employed in purchasing the freedom of converted slaves. Says Justin Martyr, *Apol. 2.* To sullegomenon para to proestoti ephitithetai, kai autos epikourci orphanois, kai cherais, kai tois en desmois ousi.—And Tertullian, *Apol. II*ae quasi desposita pietatis sunt; nam inde non epulis, nec potaculis dispensatur, sed egenis alendis, humanisque et pueris et puellis, re ac parentibus destitutis. Et si qui in metallis, et si qui in insulis, vel in custodiis, &c. The sabbath collections were devoted, among other charitable purposes, to redeeming christian slaves. To this Ignatius alludes in his epistle to Polycarp, § 4, *Doulous kai doulas*, &c. “Overlook not the men and maid servants; neither let them be puffed up; but rather let them be the more subject to the glory of God, that they may obtain from him a better liberty. Let them not desire to be set free at the public cost,” &c. (Archb. Wake’s Trans.) Says Clement, in his 1 Ep. to the Corinthians, § 55, *Epistamatha pollous*, &c. We know how many among ourselves have given up themselves unto bonds, that thereby they might free others from them. Others have sold themselves into bondage, that they might free their brethren, with the price of themselves. Upon which Cotelerius notes, *Ad horum exemplum postea B. Paulinus Nolanus præsul subiit voluntariam servitatem, ut filium viduæ liberaret; &c.*—Such were the principles, such the spirit, such the conduct of primitive christians. In the midst of churches inspired with such love to God and to man, such unbounded benevolence, such hearty self sacrifice, could members claim and hold their fellow-men, their fellow-christians, as property, as chattels, articles of which they might buy and sell at pleasure? We cannot believe it: and upon this single argument we are willing to rest the whole controversy relative to the apostolic churches.

PROPOSITION IV. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE BIBLE CONDEMN,
AND POSITIVELY FORBID SLAVERY.

Having already protracted our remarks far beyond our original intention, we shall forbear any extended comment on the passages adduced under this head. At another time, we may perhaps endeavor to do them more justice.

1. God is the original owner of all that exists. Every thing is his by right of creation. Having created all the other works of his hands, belonging to this earth, last of all Jehovah made man out of the dust, to be the lord of this lower world. "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." (Gen. i. 26, comp. verse 28-30.) Compare the grant to Noah and his posterity. (ix. 2;) and Ps. viii. 6-8. Here we have the original title deed, by which, only, man can claim a right of property in any thing. The child of God, he has inherited, by will, this noble patrimony. But in this deed,

He gave us only over beast, fish, fowl,
Dominion absolute; that right we hold
By his donation; but man over man
He made not lord: such title to himself
Reserving, human left from human free.

We no where find that God has given the Saxon a right of property in the Indian and African; the white, in the black; the rich and powerful, in the poor and defenceless. God only is the lawful *despotes*; not a slave-holder, but a Being possessed of unlimited authority over all creatures, animate and inanimate, rational and irrational. The human *despotes*, the true slave holder,

————— to himself assuming
Authority usurped from God not given,

claims a title and a power which can belong only to the Creator. He is a stronger brother, who dissatisfied with "the portion that falleth to him," seizes his own brethren, and adds not only their portion, but themselves, to his estate. Does the Father approve such conduct?

When the Constitution of the United States gives to Congress certain specified powers, it clearly withholds all other, not

specified. When God gives us a right of property in inanimate and irrational creatures, he evidently declares that we have no right of property in each other.

2. The Bible unequivocally asserts the natural equality of men. It tells us that we are descendants of a common father; placed under the same great law of moral obligation; responsible to the same judge; hastening to be tried at one awful tribunal. In the oldest book of the Bible, Job, who, as our modern Doctors assure us, was a slave-holder, recognises this equality. "If I did despise the cause of my man-servant or of my maid-servant, when they contended with me; what then shall I do when God riseth up? and when he visiteth, what shall I answer him? Did not he that made me in the womb make him? and did not one fashion us in the womb?" (xxxii. 15.) "Have we not all one Father," asks Malachi; "hath not one God created us? why do we deal treacherously every man against his brother," &c. (ii. 10.) And Paul says, "God hath made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth." (Ac. xvii. 26.)—Now this principle of the unity, the brotherhood of the race, utterly forbids one man to call another his property.

3. The great law of love, and the golden rule, lay the axe at the root of slavery. "THOU SHALT LOVE THY NEIGHBOR AS THYSELF." (Lev. xix. 18.) Compare the Saviour's comment, Lu. x. 25-37.—"THEREFORE ALL THINGS WHATSOEVER YE WOULD THAT MEN SHOULD DO TO YOU, DO YE EVEN SO TO THEM: FOR THIS IS THE LAW AND THE PROPHETS." (Mat. vii. 12.)—The apostle's command, "If thou mayest be made free, use it rather." (1 Cor. vii. 21,) implies that freedom is a better a more desirable state, than slavery. It therefore lays the the christian master under obligation to place his slave in that preferable condition. By the way, what a lofty, magnanimous, and truly heroic sentiment is that of Dr. Junkin's, (p. 34.) "*American slavery is better than British freedom.*" Nothing *ad captandum*, there, reader! It is the eloquent out-pouring of a noble soul, boldly declaring its preference of "*hog and hominy*," to mere physical, intellectual and moral *liberty*! Happy the University over whose destiny presides a man capable of such lofty aspirations!

4. The right of servants to wages is repeatedly asserted, both in the Old and New Testament. Compare Jer. xxii. 13, Col. iv. 1, Jas. v. 1-4. But this right necessarily precludes the right of property. Dr. J. and his fellows may quibble as they please; they may cite Prof. Vethake to prove that "just and equal" means food and clothing: but a grain of common sense will explode them and their logic, and convince us that this law of Christ requires every master to give his laborers *a fair compensation*. Common sense decides that *the servant's right to wages is founded upon his right to himself, which cannot co-exist with another's absolute right of property in him*. Nor does the amount of wages depend upon the master's pleasure. Common equity tells us that "*it takes two to make a bargain.*"

5. We have already sufficiently shown that the servitude permitted by the Bible, does not interfere with these great principles which annihilate the foundation claim of the slave holder.

APPENDIX.

Just as the preceding pages were prepared for the press, we received the following communication from the venerable Dr. BISHOP, which, with the accompanying letter, we here present to the public.

MY DEAR FRIEND:

I make free to forward you a few of my Christmas thoughts on the *Eight hours speech*. If it is agreeable to you, and if you shall be convinced that it will be of any service, either to you, or the good cause, you may have them printed and published in the form in which they now stand, at the close of your full and particular reply * * * * Provided we have come to the same *result*, it may be a benefit to the cause, with some minds, to see that the very same conclusions may be obtained by a somewhat different arrangement, or different mode of reasoning. * * * *
* * * * May the Lord bless and direct and support you.

Sincerely yours,

R. H. BISHOP.

Oxford, Ohio, Dec. 26th, 1843.

SUMMARY REVIEW.

Doctor Junkin's late pamphlet, of 79 pages, demands some attention; for—

I. A publication of this kind must be very acceptable to the many, both within and without the visible church, whose consciences are somewhat awakened as to the inconsistency of American slavery with christian character, and christian standing.

II. The form in which the argument is presented, is exceedingly plausible; and yet,

III. The whole argument, from beginning to end, is *deceptive*:—only fallacy upon fallacy.

SPECIFICATIONS.

I. The *title* of the pamphlet is a deception. It assumes that all who are in any way opposed to American slavery, are opposed, of course, to the union, and peace, and prosperity, and existence of these United States. This is far from being matter of fact.

II. There is a deception in the use of the terms *tolerate* and *toleration*, as used in the title page and elsewhere. These terms, when connected with law and government, must always, when they mean any thing, mean that the persons or things enjoying the benefit of toleration, are more or less under the protection of law and government, as something that is good, and not evil.

III. The facts, as stated in the case of Joseph, furnish a good argument in behalf of American slaveholders. They stand thus: Joseph's brethren *stole him*, as they had no legal or moral right to dispose of him in the manner they did: but the Ishmaelites, and Potiphar, gave a fair market price for him; therefore their title in him, as their property, was good!

IV. The argument to prove that Abraham was a large slaveholder, is from its very nature, only a shadow. Mere verbal criticism must, in all cases, be very inconclusive reasoning, as to historical matter of fact.

V. No satisfactory proof can be offered that Hagar was a slave, in the modern sense of that term. All that can ever be known from the history, as it stands, is:—that Hagar was for a period of some 14 or 15 years a member of Abraham's family, in a dependent situation; and that on one occasion, and that under very peculiar circumstances, she was, for a few months, very ill-used both by Sarah and Abraham.

VI. It is roundly asserted that Jacob and his family had slaves when they went down into Egypt, and that they were deprived of them by their task-masters, when they themselves were reduced to personal slavery. All the facts upon record, in the history of Jacob, are in direct opposition to this assertion.

I. Laban having hotly pursued Jacob as a runaway, for seven days, and having at last overtaken him, did not, among all

his other accusations, charge him with having carried away any of his servants or slaves.

2. Jacob's children, by his two handmaids, are everywhere spoken of, so far as birth and standing are concerned, as on a perfect equality with his children by Rachel and Leah.

3. Hamor and Shechem, in giving an inventory of what they and their tribe would gain, by having Jacob's family incorporated with themselves, make no mention of servants, either male or female.

4. In all the after movements of Jacob and his family, no mention is made of servants. Jacob, like an Ohio farmer with a large family, appears uniformly to have made his sons and his grand-sons attend personally to their own work, and to his work, as he himself had done from his boyhood.

5. In the whole story of Joseph there is no mention made of servants; and when the famine brought the ten sons, once and again to Egypt, to buy corn, they had no servants attending them. Nor had they any slave, either young or old, to bring to the Egyptian slave-market. They brought money in their hand to give in exchange for corn.

6. We have, in the xlv. chapter of Genesis, the names and the number of Jacob's family when they entered Egypt: but no mention is made of servants of any kind. Nor in Jacob's last will and testament, given in full in chapter xlvii. do we find any servants belonging to the estate, to be divided as a blessing among the sons and grand-sons.

VII. The whole of the argument in support of Proposition IV., is, from its very nature, fallacious, because it is an attempt to establish an historical fact, by mere verbal criticism; and because, also, in that criticism, there is contained a gross violation of a common sense rule; viz: that the exact meaning of any verb, must always be determined by the nature of the noun which it governs. Thus, the President of the United States, and Queen Victoria, both *possess* the supreme authority in their respective countries; but the Queen also *inherits* her possessions. The one possesses for life; the other only for a very limited period. And yet each is invested, for the time being, with nearly equal power; and in both cases, the most

of the sovereign rights which they possess and exercise, are inalienable. Again, a mechanic may possess his shop on rent, and his tools and a large portion of his custom by inheritance. His tools are always at his own disposal, unless in the hands of the sheriff; but his custom depends upon a thousand contingencies, over which he has very little control. Hence it follows, that the real situation of the bond-men among Jews can never be ascertained by mere verbal criticism. But, whatever was the nature of the servitude of that portion of their bond-men who were originally from the heathen, it is evident that their situation was essentially different from that of those who were slaves in other nations.

1. Their bond-men were very soon so incorporated into the families to which they belonged, as to be perfectly at home.—Hence,

2. In no period of Jewish history, do we hear of any dread of danger from this class of the population; as there was continually from the slave population of such places as Sparta, and Rome, and Italy.

3. A large portion of the history of the Jews, as well as many of their judicial arrangements, were typical of the developement of the great plan of salvation, in New Testament days. Hagar, the Egyptian bondage and deliverance, the Jubilee, the cities of refuge, &c. &c., are specimens of this. Hence, it is highly probable that all the arrangements respecting bond-men from the Gentiles, were of this nature.

4. It is extremely probable, that the term *forever*, in the law respecting Gentile bond-men, did not qualify the *possession of individuals*, but the continuance of the system, till the end of the Old Testament dispensation. We have no evidence that *hereditary servitude* existed in any form among the Jews, unless in the case of the priesthood. Even when children were taken to satisfy the debt of the father, the servitude must have ended when the debt was extinct; and in every case, of course, the personal servitude of any individual ceased, when he was taken out of the hand of the creditor by death.

The argument in support of Proposition IV, closes with a flagrant fallacy in the application of Isa. xiv. 2, to the subject. If this and similar passages from the Old Testament prophecies are figurative, their application in support of American slavery is illogical, because it is using terms in two different senses in the same argument: and, on the other hand, if they are to be understood and applied literally, then all the Gentiles will, in the days of millennial glory, be reduced under the Jews to a state of domestic slavery, such as we have in these States!

Hence, every just view which can be taken of Jewish bond-men, will lead to the conclusion, that there is nothing in the

whole arrangement which can furnish any warrant or authority for such a system of servitude as American slavery has been, and is, and ever must be, while it exists. The system is *necessarily* a moral evil, in direct and open opposition to the authority of God, and to all social and moral relations.

VIII. The argument from the fourth and tenth commandments, is a mere begging the question at issue. It assumes without any proof, and even in the face of opposite proof, direct and plain, that there was no kind of servitude among the Jews, but that of slavery in the modern sense of the term. Nay, more; if this argument is good for any thing, it proves equally, that so far as men-servants and maid-servants are concerned, these commandments were made and ordained and published, only for the slave-holder and his slaves.

IX. In the argument from the meaning and application of the Greek word, *doulos*, in proof of Proposition VI., there are at least these fallacies.

1. In a large portion of the passages referred to, these terms are used figuratively, while the question at issue is about an historical fact. Hence, the argument contains another gross violation of a common sense rule of logic; viz: that in all reasoning, whether mathematical or moral, every term used must be used in exactly the same sense, in every part of the argument. But,

2. Even admitting the correctness of all the criticism employed, the whole of the figurative applications of these terms, in the passages referred to, are only *illustrations* of some abstract doctrine respecting the state, or character, or privileges, or punishments of saints, or sinners. But an illustration, however clear or proper, is no logical argument, any more than a witticism or a pun is. The question before us is not about the propriety or force of a rhetorical illustration. It is a plain matter of fact question; viz: Did our Lord, or his apostles, or did any members of the first christian churches, buy or sell or hold human beings as chattels, as many who are now called christians do, in America? Hence, the whole of what is advanced under that head is irrelevant, and a deception:—the very point at issue is misunderstood.

X. So far as argument is concerned, all the facts stated respecting the extent, and universality, and evils of slavery in the Roman Empire, and throughout the world, in the days of the apostles and their coadjutors in preaching the gospel, and in establishing churches among the Gentiles, may be admitted; and yet the question at issue be just where it was. The question is not, What was the state of morals and religion in the Roman Empire, or in the Pagan world, in the days of the apostles?—but the question is, What was the character of the

churches organised by these men, at this period? Were any of the churches formed by the apostles, slave-holding churches, such as we have in America? It falls upon those who are in the opposition, to give us direct and positive proof that there were at this period such churches, and such members. The probability is strong, that there were, at that period, and for many generations after, no such churches, and no such members.

1. The whole tenor and tendency of every thing belonging to the gospel, and to christian institutions, are in direct opposition to almost every thing connected with American slavery.

2. The apostles gave and enforced directions, plain and explicit, to believing masters,—the *kurioi*,—and to believing servants: but they never addressed, directly, unbelieving masters,—the *despotai*,—or unbelieving servants.

3. The duties to their servants, whether believing or unbelieving, directly enjoined upon believing masters, are of such a nature, that, if they were punctually and faithfully performed, they would naturally abolish slavery in every christian family, in less than one generation. These duties and directions are still enjoined and addressed, by the same authority, to every christian church, and to every christian man; and if they were understood, and honestly attended to, the results would be just what they were in the apostolic days.

4. It will not be easy to prove, that either the Roman law, or the Roman government, ever threw any obstacle in the way of masters manumitting their slaves.

5. There were, in early periods, christian men and christian churches, who were distinguished for purchasing slaves, that they might be restored to a state of freedom.

6. A bull from “his holiness” the Pope, in 1539, was necessary to sanctify the traffic in African and heathen slaves, then first carried on by the Portuguese. This is strong presumptive evidence that the christian church, as a body, had no connection with slavery, previous to that period: nor is there any evidence that the form in which slavery exists in America was attempted to be defended by scripture, previous to that papal edict. His present holiness at Rome has issued another bull on the same subject; but of entirely different character. This is one of the remarkable facts in the history of the present day: and may we not begin to hope that the Protestant churches of every name, and every Protestant man, will unite heartily with the Roman Catholics, in this great and good work; and that the whole christian community will be speedily rid of every relic of this evil,—*this enormous and highly aggravated sin*.